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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to contribute an original account of state power by 
reconceptualising the state-civil society distinction through the category of political 
administration. Through an analysis of the development of the state in Britain 
between 1832 and 1918 it seeks to show why such a reconceptualisation is 
necessary and the features which distinguish it from other accounts. This task is 
performed via an immanent critique of the work of Hegel, Marx and Foucault. It 
is argued that historical materialism has lost the recognition of the constitutive 
power of the state found in Hegel and Marx, a recognition which needs to be 
recuperated in order for an adequate theoretical account of state power to be 
sustained. From 1832 in Britain this constitutive power was expressed in the 
development of new administrative mechanisms through which the state ordered 
and structured civil society. The threefold function of political administration - the 
fashioning of labour power, the subsumption of struggle and the constitution of 
legal subjects - place it with law at the heart of the operation of state power, and 
it is this that political theory in general, and historical materialist theory in 
particular, need to recognise. The category of political administration is developed 
through a critique of Foucault's account of administration which, it is argued, lacks 
an understanding of the political. It is argued that political administration emerges 
as a response to class struggle and that from 1832 the British state was shaped 
through this struggle; this use of struggle is counterposed to Foucault's category 
of resistance. 
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IV 
Introduction 
The 1970s and 1980s saw a substantial increase in the amount of theoretical work 
on the state, both within and outside of Marxism. The Poulantzas-Miliband debate, 
the state-derivation debate and discussion of crisis were all attempts to rethink the 
'problem' of the state within Marxism. Outside Marxism the emergence of neo-
liberal and libertarian writings, such as those of Robert Nozick, placed the state at 
the centre of their analysis, as did the more authoritarian conservative strands of 
the 'New Right'. 1 
This was a veritable explosion of work on the state. It experienced its own 
version of a backlash. In an essay highly critical of the usage of the state concept 
in political theory David Easton suggests that as a tool for research the state is part 
of a conceptual fad, participated in by Marxists, particular types of conservatives, 
and neo-liberals, which merely provides a buzz-word and a sense of legitimacy but 
not much else to social and political research. Debates involving the state concept 
are vapid, ending in a semantic morass. Exemplifying this semantic morass is the 
work of Poulantzas where the outcome is the declaration of the state as an 
'undecipherable mystery'. For Easton this exemplifies the conceptual opacity and 
cumbersomeness of the use of the state as a tool of analysis. The suggestion he 
makes is that political analysis would achieve great theoretical benefits from a shift 
in conceptual focus away from the state. 2 Easton's alternative, systems analysis, 
need not concern us here. I use it as an example of just one of several currents in 
political thought that have sought to reject the state concept. 3 For the recent focus 
on the state has provoked a variety of approaches that have sought to work without 
a concept of the state altogether. 
One of these new theoretical approaches involves a shift of focus away from the 
state to 'civil society'. This literature has both a theoretical and practical point. The 
practical input has come from the range of forces, groups and organisations that 
have emerged from 'civil society' in both Western and Eastern Europe. In 
particular, the literature has focused on the way that Eastern European regimes 
were undermined by social movements within civil society: the typical example 
here is Solidarity in Poland. This 'model' is said to operate equally in Western 
1 
Europe, though for obvious reasons towards different ends. Nonetheless it is 
claimed that the new social movements need to utilise the concept ·civil society' 
as part of the shift to a radicalised democracy. 4 These writers often point to the 
excessive attention that the state has received, especially within Marxist and 
socialist literature, and argue that this has resulted in a skewed focus, in which the 
state receives all the attention whilst civil society receives none. 
A second approach takes as its point of departure the work of Michel Foucault. 
Foucault rejects the state-civil society distinction altogether, and those working 
within a Foucauldian theoretical framework have continued in this vein by 
suggesting that rather than refocus the analysis away from the state and onto civil 
society, we need to reject such binary oppositions. Here, the state-civil society 
model is itself part of the problem and a coherent analysis of power needs to reject 
it rather than reformulate it. 
The analysis developed in this thesis differs significantly from both these 
accounts, and seeks in part to offer a critique of them. It recognises the strength of 
some of the criticisms of a classical Marxist account proposed from these positions, 
in particular the crude nature of an economistic approach or one that conceives of 
the state only in terms of bodies of armed men and Parliament (of which more 
below), but it seeks to overcome a number of the problems they raise. The 
argument is that the state remains central to our understanding of politics and 
power. Yet, as Poulantzas points out, there can be no theory of the state that is not 
simultaneously an analysis of its presence in the constitution and reproduction of 
the relations of production. 5 The state concept, it will be argued, only makes sense 
if one uses it in conjunction with 'civil society'. By retaining the state-civil society 
dichotomy as a conceptual distinction this thesis is situated at a critical distance 
from the work of Foucault and those who seek to use a Foucauldian conceptual 
schema. Yet at the same time it recognises that Foucault's rejection of the state-
civil society distinction is based on a substantial series of historical developments 
in the exercise of power. It is for this reason that the category 'administration' 
becomes increasingly important. Foucault's development of the concept 
. administration' as a response to the transformation he regards as occurring in the 
exercise of power in Europe during the nineteenth century is a step in one right 
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direction: administration now exists alongside law as the fundamental mechanism 
mediating civil society and class struggle. 
Reasserting the need for the state-civil society distinction, and asserting its 
centrality to materialist analysis, this work also seeks to break with particular 
traditions within Marxism, traditions which have either ignored the model, focused 
entirely on the state, or reduced the model to a crude economism. This does not 
mean that we should focus exclusively on civil society to the detriment of state 
power. Rather, the argument is that one needs to consider both state and civil 
society, and to theorise them in relation to each other. Yet whilst the state-civil 
society dichotomy needs to be retained, it also needs to be rethought. It needs to 
be rethought by developing a concept of political administration as a mediation 
between state and civil society which is also a product of class struggle. In other 
words, what is attempted here is the development of a theoretical approach to the 
state through a reconceptualisation of the state-civil society distinction using a 
category of political administration, rooted in struggle. 
One of the features of this account is that it reasserts the power of the state 
within the state-civil society model. The state, far from being dismissed as an 
epiphenomenon of the economic, is granted the status it warrants given its 
constitutive power over civil society. Yet at the same time the state can be read as 
the outcome of struggles within civil society. These struggles will be seen to have 
an effect on the institutional materiality of state power, resulting in the emergence 
of a set of administrative mechanisms to mediate class struggle and subsume it 
under the auspices of state power. 
Now, it is undoubtedly the case, as Noberto Bobbio suggests, that Marxists have 
often operated under the illusion that the first task when dealing with any problem 
is to go and find out what Marx has said. The difficulty with this is that instead of 
developing a theory of the state one becomes engaged in exegesis of the 'classical' 
Marxist texts. Once their content has been ascertained and assured, it is assumed 
that a Marxist theory can be read off from it. 6 Yet, as is well known, Marx failed 
to develop a full-length theory of the state. The most that one can find are scattered 
fragments throughout his work. This should have worked to the advantage of 
Marxism, creating as it does an open space for new theoretical work: especially 
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advantageous given the new developments in state power that were to occur in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
The chapters below seek to argue that although Marx offered no theoretical work 
on the state, and because of historical developments one cannot simply 'read off 
a Marxist account or 'piece one together', there is within Marx's work a set of 
categories that are crucial for the development of theoretical work on the state. 
These are 'state', 'civil society' and 'administration'. Each needs to be considered 
within the context of historical developments in the political economy of bourgeois 
society and the nature of class struggle. These categories need to be developed in 
two ways. One is by going forwards from Marx to examine the historical changes 
between state and civil society; the other is by going backwards from Marx to 
examine the theoretical problem as Marx adopts it from Hegel. To put this another 
way: rather than search for the elements of a Marxist theory of the state in Lenin, 
there is more fruitful searching to be done in Hegel. 
In his work State Theory Bob Jessop distinguishes between 'strong' and 'weak' 
theories. The former 'would provide an integrated account of the state in terms of 
a single set of causal mechanisms. It would explain all the institutional and 
operational features of a state in a given conjuncture'. In contrast a 'weak' theory 
would be 'a useful set of theoretical guidelines or orientations which would inform 
a Marxist analysis without trying to explain everything in a deterministic manner'. 
Instead it would 'point us to the most important factors which conjointly shape that 
complex synthesis of multiple determinations formed by the modern state and state 
power in its various domains of influence'. 7 Jessop suggests that it is impossible 
to develop a strong theory, but that even in constructing theories in the weaker 
sense Marxists have failed, both conceptually and presentationally. In the former 
sense there has been a severe limitation in the concepts used, whilst in the latter 
sense many theories are barely comprehensible. 
Using this distinction it could be suggested that the argument in the following 
chapters offers a theory in the weak sense; it seeks only to search for concepts 
adequate for political analysis, and to tentatively show how they might be used. 
However, in the process it will be shown that Marxism can develop concepts equal 
to the complexities of state power. The concepts are coherent and, in the use of the 
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category political administration, offer the foundation for the analysis of the 
development of administration as a mediating form between state and civil society. 
The institutional materiality of administrative forms can then be specified and 
studied in their concrete historical particularity, including their place within the 
framework of law. A subsidiary argument that is also present in this thesis is that 
class struggle must be central to the analysis. This is an explicit theoretical 
orientation which does not seek to explain everything in a deterministic manner. 
It seeks to go beyond the drawn out and often sterile debates as to the question 'Is 
there a Marxist Doctrine of the State?', 8 to ask what the state does and how it does 
it, the kind of question which draws our attention to specific states in specific 
periods. Nonetheless, this requires the theoretical tools adequate for comparative 
analysis. 
In choosing 1832-1918 as the object of analysis in Part III, I seek to explore the 
period in which the working class was incorporated into the body politic in Britain, 
a process completed by 1918, following the assumption of political power by the 
bourgeois class in 1832. Whilst these are the years in which two key Acts of 
Parliament incorporated the bourgeois and working class respectively, it is also 
between these dates that administration becomes politicised and used by the state 
for the three-fold purpose traced in Chapter Five - the fashioning of labour power, 
the subsumption of struggle and the constitution of legal subjects. Though Chapter 
Five is 'historical' in character the orientation of the work is explicitly theoretical. 
The concern is not to reveal new historical material, but to consider which concepts 
best interpret the changes that occurred during this period. The chapter therefore 
builds on the critique of alternative theoretical accounts of this period developed 
in Chapter Four, where the argument for taking administration to be central to our 
understanding of the political is also developed. The discussion is limited to the 
development of the British state and, within this, the place of the English working 
class. 9 
The account builds on the theoretical work in Parts I and II. The 
reconceptualisation of state and civil society through the category political 
administration has its roots in the work of Hegel and Marx. Chapter One explores 
the state-civil society distinction as it operates in the work of these two thinkers, 
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drawing out the key theoretical insights they make. In Chapter Two we explore the 
attempts by some Marxists to develop further the analysis of the state. These are 
shown to be highly problematic, partly because of the absence of the state-civil 
society distinction in favour of a crudely economistic base-superstructure model or, 
in the case of Gramsci, a failure to develop the state-civil society distinction from 
within the base-superstructure model. 
Part II is given over to an immanent critique of the work of Michel Foucault, 
who has thrown down perhaps the most serious theoretical challenge to the Marxist 
analysis of the state. The necessity of retaining the state-civil society distinction 
will be drawn out via a critique of the work of Foucault and those who seek to 
utilise the categories he develops. Foucault's work fails to acknowledge the 
constitutive power of the state. Yet its sensitivity to both the kind of historical 
changes we are concerned with and the consequent necessity of developing a more 
adequate account of power, leads him to some key insights. His focus on the 
administrative mechanisms through which power operates contributes greatly to our 
understanding but, because it operates without any account of its role vis a vis the 
state and civil society, has severe limitations. It needs to be politicised, in the strict 
sense, and hence turned into an account of political administration. 
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9. If the argument is successful then it is possible that it can be used for analyses 
of other states, but that question is beyond the scope of this thesis; I therefore make 
no attempt at a comparison with other states. Likewise the focus on the English 
working class omits any discussion of the colonial situation in this period, and 
especially the question of the Irish working class. 
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Part I: State 
Introduction 
Much has been made of the variety of approaches to the state in Marx's work, with 
commentators isolating three or more theoretical approaches. These are said to 
include an instrumentalist approach in which the state is seen as a committee for 
the management of the affairs of the bourgeoisie; an approach in which the state 
is seen as an arbiter or a major factor in social cohesion; and an approach which 
considers the state as part of the superstructure, thereby utilising the 
base-superstructure model. I 
It is not my intention to choose between one or more of these approaches, nor 
am I concerned with isolating and discussing them individually. Rather I am 
concerned here with developing the theoretical premises for the argument in the 
rest of this thesis. It will be argued that the work of both Hegel and Marx provides 
key insights into the nature and functioning of state power. An immanent critique 
of this work will provide the starting point for the development of the theoretical 
categories with which to comprehend political administration in its relationship 
with state and civil society, categories that need to be developed in the light of both 
historical change and subsequent political theory. It will be argued that despite 
Marx's substantial critique of Hegel one of his approaches to the state is heavily 
indebted to Hegel, not just in its dialectical method but in the very content of its 
analysis of the state and society. This will be welcomed as a positive dimension of 
Marx's work, not in order to signal some kind of shift back to Hegel in preference 
to Marx, but in order to move, via an immanent critique of the work of both 
writers, towards a more adequate conceptualisation of state power in its relation to 
civil society. More specifically, it will be argued that although Marx's development 
of historical materialism would appear to signal a major theoretical shift away from 
the idealism that characterises Hegel's work, the more suggestive dimensions of his 
work on the state concern the way that the state can act not merely as an arbiter 
or factor of cohesion, but as a major constitutive power over civil society. 
Moreover, much of this constitutive power will be argued to be necessary given 
society's rootedness in struggle. It is these two moments in Marx's work that will 
be shown to be heavily dependent on the Hegelian heritage. Lest this be read as 
reducing Marx to HegeL it will also be shown that Marx makes significant 
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theoretical advances beyond Hegel, both in his understanding of the institutions of 
state power and of the nature of the relationship between state power and class 
struggle. 2 Thus rather than fleeing from Hegel only to find him waiting there for 
us at the end3 this study starts in the way he himself would probably prefer - with 
an immanent critique. 
The purpose of these discussions is thus not to engage in yet another 
historical-theoretical exegesis of the Marx-Hegel relationship, interesting though 
that relationship may be, but to provide the theoretical groundwork for the 
arguments contained in the rest of this thesis, which will consider the manner in 
which the capitalist state seeks to administer social struggle and the theoretical 
problems this poses. 
The fruitfulness of an immanent critique of Hegel and Marx is brought out in the 
discussion of key writers in the' classical' Marxist tradition, in Chapter Two. There 
the work of Gramsci will be shown to be far richer in its analysis of state power 
in relation to civil society because, despite its faults, its adoption of key Hegelian-
Marxist categories and an expanded state concept prove far more useful than the 
work of either the Second International or Althusser. Lenin was unable to 
conceptualise the incorporation of the working class into civil society, despite the 
fact that this process was almost fully achieved in Western capitalist states by 
1918. Part of this failing rests on the dependence of his analysis on the external 
relations of the state (imperialism) rather than 'internal' administrative processes. 
Conversely, Althusser's analysis, whilst allowing for the incorporation of the 
working class, conceptualises this through a range of 'ideological' institutions 
coterminous with the social body. This serves to dissolve the specificity of the 
political, thereby losing the possibility of developing real materialist analyses of 
state power. It is in contrast to these that the strength of Gramsci' s adoption of a 
combination of Hegel's as well as Marx's insights can be illustrated. However, 
whilst Gramsci is right to retain and rethink the state-civil society couplet, by 
separating this from the base-superstructure couplet (a separation consolidated by 
his assertion of the Hegelian heritage of the former and the Marxian heritage of the 
latter) Gramsci is then forced to draw them together again . artificially', resulting 
in a highly problematic transformation. 
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Chapter One 
State Power, Social Power 
State and Civil Society in Hegel and Marx 
F or both Hegel and Marx the distinctive political feature of modernity is the dualit:y 
of state and civil society. Both recognise it as the manner in which modem society 
is differentiated from feudalism. Whereas in feudalism social relations were both 
economic and political at one and the same moment, indeed the 'economic' and the 
'political' were so fused that it is mistaken to distinguish them in this way, Hegel 
and Marx recognise 'modern' society as one of separation, whereby political 
relations take the form of and are exercised through a separate state authority. 
Economic relations are seemingly devoid of political content. 
Prior to Hegel political thought worked not with a distinction between 'state' and 
'civil society', but with one between 'state and civil society' on the one hand and 
the 'state of nature' on the other. The terms 'civil society' and 'state' were 
coterminous, a meaning that was captured by the phrase societas civilis. In practice 
this meant that to be a member of civil society was to be a member of the state -
a citizen.l A distinction between the two only began to emerge about 1750, with 
works such as Adam Ferguson's An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767). 
The distinction is central to Hegel's work, although the two concepts are ultimately 
reintegrated in the totality. For Hegel the necessity for the distinction appears to 
have a number of origins and dimensions: the French Revolution, the industrial 
revolution in England, and the recognition of the existence of a sphere of social 
conflict. These shall each be dealt with briefly in turn. 
For Hegel the French revolution posed the problem of the age: the political 
realisation of freedom, in particular vis a vis the old ruling institutions. The demand 
for freedom is a demand for a legal and political form in which this freedom can 
be realised. As such the French Revolution was an event of world-historical import, 
to which French philosophy adheres by asserting the universal principle of 
freedom. 2 The essence of the French revolution was that, despite its explicitly 
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political nature and its concern for the transformation of economic relations it , 
contained a social dimension. In his earlier lena period (1805-6) Hegel is sensitive 
to this dimension but lacks the conceptual tools to address it adequately. By the 
Philosophy of Right (1821) however, he has developed the category of civil 
society. 
It was partly in seeking a conceptual framework to incorporate the ideas of 
freedom and a social realm thrown up by the French Revolution that Hegel turned 
to the question as it was posed in England, focusing in particular on the changes 
being wrought by the industrial revolution in particular. It became clear that this 
distinctly modern mode of production produces extremes of poverty and wealth, 
and a class which because of its poverty relies only on its labour. At the same time 
Hegel worked through English political economy and its attempt to comprehend 
this situation. This alerted him to two major features which he incorporates into his 
thought as central categories, which Marx later adopts and radicalises: needs and 
labour. The network of social relations that Hegel would call 'civil society' appears 
to him to be based on the system of needs rather than the contract. Needs are 
posited as the basis for social engagement of otherwise private persons. Likewise 
Hegel develops the concept of labour, not only as a category of political economy, 
but also as the basis for humanity's liberation from nature. 3 
Finally, Hegel is aware that the coming together of private individuals, in a 
sphere that is neither family nor state, will involve a clash of wills, antagonism and 
tensions. Relations in civil society are conceptualised as imbued with conflict, a 
conflict which will require the regulation by public authority. 
Hegel is thus faced with a major conceptual problem: how to think the world 
historical importance of the realisation of freedom in the French Revolution, the 
growth of industrial society, the dialectic of labour and needs, and all this in a 
sphere rooted in conflict. In other words, there exists a sphere of 'social' relations 
which cannot be subsumed into the sphere of 'family' or 'state' and which, 
furthermore, neither traditional political theory nor natural law theory can fully 
account for. By the time of the Philosophy of Right Hegel has made the crucial 
theoretical shift by positing a third dimension, 'civil society' standing between the 
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family and state. 4 As such Hegel recognises civil society as the hallmark of the 
modern world. 
By using the phrase burgerliche GesellschaJt, which in German means both civil 
and bourgeois society, Hegel captures the two distinctive features of this new 
sphere of social relations. First, that they are socio-economic as opposed to political 
relations. That is, the political moment has been abstracted into another sphere. 
Second, this new sphere of civil society is essentially bourgeois - it is a sphere of 
atomised self-seeking individuals. It is through this conceptual distinction that 
Hegel wrestles with their real separation as an historical moment and seeks to 
supersede it. It is precisely this problematic that Marx inherits from Hegel. 
Marx accepts Hegel's argument concerning the essentially modem aspect of the 
emergence of civil society, along with its bourgeois nature. He writes that 
The constitution of the political state and the dissolution of civil society into 
independent individuals - who are related by law just as men in the estates 
and guilds were related by privilege - are achieved in one and the same act. 5 
This for Marx is a process of abstraction, and is the defining political characteristic 
of modern society: 
The abstraction of the state as such was not born until the modern world 
because the abstraction of private life was not born until modem times. The 
abstraction of the political state is a modern product. 6 
Hegel and Marx agree that the separation of state and society, the political and the 
socio-economic, removes the political element from man's life; man becomes split 
into two, his fundamental being becomes alienated. At the same time within civil 
society man is separated from man as an isolated individual. Finally, this sphere 
produces extremes of poverty and wealth that threaten to destroy it. For these 
reasons both Hegel and Marx consider the separation of state and civil society as 
something to be superseded, overcome in a higher order. But they disagree as to 
the form that this supersession can take. 
For Hegel state and civil society are structurally integrated with each other in a 
series of interlocking mechanisms. Thus civil society consists of the system of 
needs, police, and law and administration, whilst the 'strictly political state' 
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likewise has three dimensions: the crown, the executive, and the Estate Assembly 
or representative body. The phrase 'political state,7 alerts us to the fact that Hegel 
is working with two conceptions of the state: the 'strictly political state' containing 
the range of institutions and moments, and the state properly so called. This latter 
concept is the 'actuality of the Ethical idea', 'the actualization of freedom', 'the 
march of God in the world', and it is with this latter concept, the state proper, that 
Hegel is referring to the totality of human life within a community united by 
tradition, religion and morality, which thus forms an ethical community. The 
moments, or spheres of 'ethical life', of this universal state proper are the family, 
civil society and the political state. For Hegel the family is the first ethical root of 
the state, whilst the corporation, based in civil society, is the second. 8 Civil society 
is a form or aspect of the state: 'one may regard this system in the first instance 
as the external state, the state of necessity, and of the understanding'. 9 The final 
moment of the state as an ethical community is the 'political state'. Aside from the 
fact that, as commentators have noted, this dual concept of the state has been the 
source of much confusion as far as Hegel's commentators and critics are 
concerned, it has also been the source of some misunderstanding when considering 
the work of those who have sought to utilise a Hegelian conception of the state, 
albeit one that has been radically rethought. I am thinking here of Antonio 
Gramsci, whose Hegelian-Marxist conceptualisation of state and civil society is 
considered below (Chapter Two). 
Whilst state and civil society are held apart conceptually they are simultaneously 
pulled together through a dual mechanism, each element of which operates in the 
opposite direction to the other: the police and corporations represent the penetration 
of the state into civil society, whilst the Estate assembly represents the penetration 
of civil society into the state. This interpenetration of state and civil society follows 
from Hegel's understanding that the system of needs does not and cannot exist in 
a vacuum free from any 'interference' by public authority. Whilst accepting many 
of Adam Smith's insights he accepts the principle of a hidden hand only in an 
oblique fashion. 10 This is because for Hegel the system of needs must be 
politically ordered and publicly regulated. Even if it were the case that the collision 
of producers and consumers could re-establish itself automatically, 'its adjustment 
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needs to be consciously regulated by an agency which stands above both sides'. II 
It is to this end that the police exists. For Hegel 'police' refers not to a national 
body charged with the task of enforcing the law, but to a whole range of 
institutions mediating between the individual and the universal. Thus 'the police 
should provide for street-lighting, bridge-building, the pricing of daily necessities, 
and public health', they should engage in the provision of education, welfare, the 
founding of colonies. 12 
Just as the police is intended to overcome the problems integral to a market 
system, so the corporation is intended to overcome the problems integral to moving 
beyond the family and becoming a member of civil society. Through membership 
of a social estate we assume a particular social standing. We are no longer 
individualised atoms seeking economic self-interest but contribute to the welfare 
of others. In this sense the corporation assumes the role of a second family for its 
members. 13 The organisation of trades and professions, estates, are corporations 
in civil society. Hegel considers there to be three corporations corresponding to the 
three estates: the agricultural, the business and the universal (the bureaucracy). 
Such corporations provide members with a collective identity and purpose and 
resist the danger of an unorganised crowd coming into existence. For reasons that 
will become clear below it is important not to regard these as classes. What is 
significant about the estate-corporation continuum is that though they be 'of civil 
society estates are constituted as corporations by the state. 'It is only through legal 
recognition that a community becomes a corporation' and 'a community can exist 
in civil society only if it is legally constituted and recognised'. 14 Given that the 
state is the law15 Hegel is here registering the constitutive power of the state over 
civil society. The state does not simply regulate civil society, it actively shapes it 
according to necessary ends. 
It is theoretically significant that Hegel places the police and corporation in civil 
society. For both have the universal as their end. 'What the police provides for...is 
the actualisation and preservation of the universal which is contained within the 
particularity of civil society', and 'the end of the corporation ... has its truth in the 
end which is universal in and for itself and in the absolute actuality of this end.' 16 
With the police and corporation assuming such ends the sphere of civil society 
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passes over into the political state; they represent the political inside ciyil 
society. 17 
Yet in similar fashion civil society also penetrates into the state. This is achieved 
through the Estates Assembly. The estates of civil society are equipped for their 
political role by virtue of being independent of the resources of the state and the 
favour of the executive, free from the uncertainty of trade, protected from the 
masses. By assuming a position in the state through the election of deputies to an 
Estates Assembly 'the private estate attains a political significance and function'18 
It is a function of utmost importance since it is to act as a mediating organ between 
the government on the one hand and the people on the other. 
This position means that they [the Estates] share the mediating function of 
the organised power of the executive, ensuring on the one hand that the 
power of the sovereign does not appear as an isolated extreme ... and on the 
other, that the particular interests of communities, corporations and 
individuals do not become isolated either. 19 
Just as the police and corporations represent the penetration of the state into civil 
society and operate as a mediating organ, so the Estate Assembly represents the 
penetration of civil society into the state, ('the proper significance of the Estates 
is that it is through them that. .. the people begins to participate in the state' 20). It 
likewise operates as a mediating organ. 
Marx's comment that this is the 'solution to the puzzle' provides the key to his 
critique of Hegel. The 'solution' is that the Estates are supposed to regain the unity 
of political and civil life lost in the separation of state and civil society. For the 
Estates represent the particular interests of groups, not individuals. It is groups that 
enter into and liaise with the state, and it is therefore groups that achieve political 
significance. It is because of this that Hegel comments that the German language, 
by giving both the classes of civil society and the Estates the same name, Stande, 
maintains the unity which they previously possessed. However, Marx points out 
that Hegel has forgotten his own observations on the separations of modern society. 
The classes of the middle-ages were not originally civil and then became political; 
they were civil and political at precisely the same time. The political significance 
of these classes was not acquired, but was inherent in their very existence. Yet for 
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Hegel the Estates represent the unity of political and civil life, despite the fact that 
he himself had shown the separation of civil and political life. 
Marx regards Hegel's 'solution' as the theoretical synthesis of a very real 
problem, because 'the Estates are the incarnation of the contradiction between the 
state and civil society within the state. At the same time they symbolise the demand 
that this contradiction be resolved'. 2J In other words, the resolution of the 
separation between the state and civil society is not achieved through a mediating 
institution. A mediating institution can only mediate, it cannot resolve. 
The ... truth is that Hegel experiences the separation of the state from civil 
society as a contradiction. The mistake he makes is to rest content with the 
semblance of a resolution which he declares to be the real thing. By contrast 
he treats with contempt the 'so-called theories' which call for the 
'separation' of the classes and Estates. These theories, however, are right in 
that they express a consequence of modern society for here the Estates are 
nothing more than the factual expression of the real relationship between the 
state and civil society, namely one of separation. 22 
The Estates are the theoretical mystification of a real process. They gIve the 
illusion of unity but do not, and cannot, achieve it in reality. They represent the 
romanticism of the political state and of political theory, for they present the image 
of unity and harmony. 
Thus whilst Hegel's conceptualisation operates with the two categories, state and 
civil society, he seeks to mediate their opposition through a complex series of 
organs and mechanisms which mask the fact that it is the state that has ultimate 
authority. The possession by the state of constitutive power over civil society is 
not only a means of mediating the separation of civil society and the state. It is also 
Hegel's political solution to the contradictions of civil society. Political struggle 
takes place within the state. The state, as the place of political activity and of 
reason, is the place where the resolution of struggle and crises occurs. The police 
and corporations of civil society pass over into the policing and the corporate 
organisation of civil society by the state. The organisation of the state 
administration, the civil service, illustrates this most clearly. Hegel regards the civil 
service as a fundamental feature of a modern state. As the educated elite it is able 
to grasp the essentials of ethical life and, as professional civil servants, its members 
18 
are free from having to provide for themselves and their family. Firmly positioned 
within the state as part of the executive, the civil service concerns itself with the 
transition from the universal to the particular and individual. This means not merely 
respecting the legitimate interests it finds in civil society, their mere supervision; 
it means actually organising and governing civil society. 23 
This recognition represents one of Hegel's major insights: that in the modern 
duality of state and civil society the existence of administrative mechanisms is 
fundamental, for the state must not only establish laws which are universal in 
content applying across the face of civil society, it must also implement these laws 
and administer the particular. Thus law and administration, whilst separable in 
principle, are structured into one another. Through them the state constitutes a 
range of administrative mechanisms through which it regulates civil society. 
Now, although Marx regards this as accommodation on Hegel's part and IS 
therefore deeply critical of it, and despite the fact that in his development of 
historical materialism he will assert the struggles within civil society as the driving 
force of history, Marx at times makes use of Hegel's insight into the nature of state 
power. In his analysis of the French state at a particular historical moment, for 
example, Marx marvels at its power: 
In France the executive has at its disposal an army of more than half a 
million individual officials and it therefore constantly maintains an immense 
mass of interests and livelihoods in a state of the most unconditional 
dependence; the state enmeshes, controls, regulates, supervises and regiments 
civil society from the most all-embracing expressions of its life down to its 
most insignificant motions, from its most general modes of existence down 
to the private life of individuals. This parasitic body acquires, through the 
most extraordinary centralisation, an omnipresence, an omniscience, an 
elasticity and an accelerated rapidity of movement which find their only 
appropriate complement in the real social body's helpless irresolution and its 
lack of a consistent formation. 24 
Here the state is supremely powerful - omnipresent and omniscient - usmg its 
presence and knowledge to regulate and regiment civil society. Elsewhere Marx 
comments that one outcome of the French revolution was a state which encoils and 
enmeshes civil society like a boa constrictor: 'every minor solitary interest 
engendered by the relations of social groups was separated from society itself, fixed 
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and made independent of it and opposed to it in the form of state interest, 
administered by state priests with exactly determined hierarchical functions'. 25 
The state maintains itself because it has the capacity to separate social interests, 
formalise them into concerns of the state, and administer them bureaucratically, 
thereby negating their social force. In other words, in the very process of 
organising civil society and the working class, it simultaneously disorganises them 
and subsumes social force and struggle into an administrative form. The 
indebtedness to Hegel is apparent. As Riedel notes, Hegel recognises that society 
would not be 'civil' if it were not ordered and administered politically.26 We can 
add that, given society is as much 'bourgeois' as it is 'civil' (burgerliche 
Gesellschaft) so society would not be bourgeois unless it were ordered and 
administered politically. We shall return to this below. 
Now, Hegel regards the civil service as an estate of civil society; he deals with 
it in both the sections on the state and the section on the system of needs in civil 
society.27 However, there is an important respect in which the universal estate 
differs from the others, for it is an estate that is constituted entirely by the state. 
Despite Hegel's hints that due to the necessity of education and legal training the 
members of the executive and civil service constitute the bulk of the middle class 
[des Mittelstandes], the double meaning of Stand does not apply here.28 It is not 
simply that anyone can be a candidate for public office, as Hegel himself notes. 29 
It is that there is no estate of civil society that presents itself for legal constitution 
and recognition as the bureaucracy. As such the state must constitute the 
administrative organ that is the civil service from scratch, as it were. In his desire 
to argue for a complementarity between estates and Estates Hegel misses this point, 
and in the process misses one of the central features of the power of the state. 
Likewise Marx, in his discussion of the Estate of civil servants, also misses this.30 
Moreover, though he regards the bureaucracy as an Estate within the state Hegel 
positions it in the executive rather than the Estate Assembly. Thus in the very act 
of its constitution the bureaucracy is distinguished from other groups that operate 
within the state. Administration assumes a role inherently different from any other 
section of the state, precariously straddling the boundaries of state and civil society 
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whilst simultaneously performing the same role with the boundaries of legislature 
and judiciary. 
Let us consider why there is the need for mediation. For Marx the necessity for 
state authority lies in the fact that civil society is persistently on the verge of being 
torn apart by class antagonism. Hegel's work on the state is notable for its absence 
of anything approaching a class analysis. Despite the fact that for Hegel civil 
society contains opposite extremes of extravagance and poverty, and that there is 
the possibility of a large number of people falling below a certain standard of 
living, losing any feeling of right, integrity and honour and becoming a rabble, he 
considers that there is no way for this situation to be superseded. It is a problem 
which can not be overcome. This will provide the basis of Marx's argument that 
Hegel's philosophy of right is merely an attempt to mediate the contradictions of 
civil society rather than overcome them. For our part here we need to register the 
significance of this aspect of Hegel's work for, along with Marx's critique, it 
prefigures arguments developed in later chapters. 
Two features stand out in Hegel's three-fold division of the estates of civil 
society. First, there is no space within this distinction for the working class (let us 
say, an estate of wage labourers). Second, Hegel does not use the category 'class' 
for the estates, but reserves it precisely for those engaged in wage labour. He 
suggests that the sphere of needs and the manner of production in civil society 
gives rise to the division of labour, and this gives rise to a class which is tied to 
such work. 31 As Avineri notes, it is only in referring to workers that Hegel uses 
the term Klasse rather than Stand which he uses when otherwise discussing 'social 
classes' .32 Given that for Hegel the estates are precisely the socio-economic 
classes of civil society this must mean that the working class is not of civil society. 
Since each of the estates is a different sphere of need, not being an estate must 
mean that the working class is outside the recognised sphere of needs. But not 
being a member of an estate means that that person is nothing, nobody: 
When we say that a human being must be somebody we mean that he must 
belong to a particular estate; for being somebody means that he has 
substantial being. A human being with no estate is merely a private person 
I . l' 33 and does not possess actua Uillversa Ity. 
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Not having an estate thus excludes an individual from society; not being an estate 
excludes the working class from civil society. As such it is excluded from 
participation in ethical life. And it is only by being a member of civil society that 
an individual has rights and claims in relation to it.34 
Thus although Hegel posits the necessity for mediation of social conflict and 
contradictions of wealth and poverty, and he is aware of the centrality of the 
working class to this - for the working class is a product of civil society - Hegel 
does not theorise this in relation to his model of conflict. Despite the fact that the 
working class is a product of civil society, and is most endangered by its workings 
and poses its greatest threat, there is no space in Hegel's theoretical schema for this 
class. Or rather, the only theoretical space which it is allowed is as a threat to 
social stability. As Cohen and Arato comment, being incapable of intraclass 
integration, workers in Hegel's view do not seem capable of interclass conflict. 35 
Moreover, poverty as it manifests itself as class division is the one problem of 
civil society that cannot be resolved through Hegel's series of mediations. For 
poverty is a general consequence of civil society and on the whole it arises 
necessarily out of it. Public authority may alleviate the problem, but cannot 
overcome it. Hegel can only note despairingly that 'the important question of how 
poverty can be remedied is one which agitates and torments modern societies'. 36 
But this is also a problem of the class that is in poverty. Hegel lacks any solution 
to the problem because his concept of class is theoretically distinct from his 
concept of Stan de . In other words, although Hegel works with a set of social 
divisions of civil society, his own analysis reveals an even more basic set of social 
divisions, rooted in the concept of need. Yet he cannot integrate this into his 
theory. He is unable to address the problem of class within this theory.37 
In fact, Hegel misses the opportunity, provided by his own conceptualisation of 
power, classes and the state, to theoretically incorporate the working class and 
therefore provide the solution to the problem of poverty as it is presents itself in 
his work. For as we have already seen, the communities which form estates can 
only exist in civil society if they are legally constituted and recognised, and yet 
only those communities that are already organised can be legally constituted and 
recognised. Given the supposed disorganisation of the working class it is consistent 
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for Hegel to exclude them from social and political life. However, one possibility, 
that would have gone some way to solving the problem of poverty as it appears in 
his work, is for the working class to be organised, legally constituted and 
recognised through the activities of the state and the mediating organs. Whilst 
Hegel may not have wished to recommend such an act for political reasons, it is 
his failure to envision the possibility of the constitution of workers as individual 
citizens and members of a class of civil society that illustrates the limits of his 
work. Nonetheless he provides the key categories with which to make such a 
conceptualisation, and these will be developed in later chapters. 
Now, despite his trenchant critique of Hegel, and the centrality of a universal 
class with radical chains to this critique, Marx makes the same mistake, for he 
uncritically inherits from Hegel the belief that the working class is a class in but 
not 'of civil society. In his 'Introduction' to his critique of Hegel's philosophy of 
right he makes this explicit: 'Where is the positive possibility of...emancipation? 
This is our answer. In the formation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil 
society which is not a class of civil society'. And in The German Ideology he 
writes of the class that bears the burdens of society and none of its advantages, and 
which consequently is 'ousted from society'. 38 Despite his distance from Hegel 
Marx accepts the existence of a class outside of society. Following Hegel, he fails 
to envision the inclusion of the working class as a class of civil society and the 
state. Both writers fail to do so despite their recognition of the necessity for state 
regulation and the constitutive power of the state over civil society. 39 
This failure is partly a product of historical circumstance. At this period in 
history the European working class stood in a contradictory position to both civil 
society and the state. It was half outside and half inside both society and the state; 
in its struggle to become fully social it stood with one foot inside the state. 40 This 
manifests itself as a tension throughout Marx's work concerning the historical 
possibility of working class recognition. For example, the class struggles in France 
of 1848 to 1850 are significant because although the working class failed to 
triumph despite being a decisive mass force in the political sphere, it achieved 
recognition as a political force. Marx notes that 'What it [the proletariat] conquered 
was the ground on which to struggle for its revolutionary emancipation, by no 
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means this emancipation itself .41 Likewise, in discussing 'The Chartists' (1852) 
Marx regards the initial show of hands by both electors and non-electors as only 
partial recognition, acceptable only if a 'satisfactory' conclusion is reached (the 
'right' candidates being elected). The show of hands is a concession to the people, 
to popular participation, but is overridden as soon as it threatens the system. 'The 
election by show of hands was a mere ceremony, an act of formal politeness 
towards the 'sovereign people' and the politeness ceases as soon as the privilege 
is menaced'. 42 
The point is that the working class suffered an ambiguous existence at this 
moment, being both recognised and yet not recognised, in but not of civil society. 
In the process of struggle and declaring itself as a class force it could gain 
recognition from precisely those forces already of civil society but its standing 
was so weak that it could find itself, when it seriously threatened political order, 
on the receiving end of organised political violence and thereby defeated in its 
struggle. Thus was the delicate relationship between the working class and the 
state. Its recognition was a facade; it was recognised only as long as it did not 
assert itself too vehemently; if it did this and was experienced as a threat by the 
bourgeois class and the state, it was 'unrecognised'. 
Moreover, in the very process of granting recognition the state was able to 
restructure itself and civil society accordingly. Class struggle leads to its mediation 
through state action. For example, the demand for the organisation of labour by 
20,000 workers outside the Hotel de Ville results in the development of a 
permanent special commission to investigate the situation of the working class - the 
demands of the working class creates a Ministry of Labour alongside all the other 
state ministries. 43 The demands of the mass force of the working class are thus 
transformed into a government commission, a department of state. Likewise the 
outcomes of the struggle over the length of the working day is the official 
recognition of class power and a host of formal regulations to deal with it.44 
Working class demands become formalised within the bourgeois political system. 
Consequently key political developments can be read not as the overthrow of the 
bourgeois social order but rather its 'political reconstitution, the political 
reconsolidation of bourgeois society'. 45 
24 
From Civil Society to the Social 
There are some fundamental structural affinities between Marx and Hegel's views 
on state, civil society and the working class, and some similar conceptual 
omissions, but it needs to be stressed that Marx thoroughly radicalises the model 
that he inherits from Hegel. There is a more subtle and nuanced relationship 
between the two writers than is suggested by the dismissal of Hegel as the 
philosopher whom Marx stood on his head. Too much has been made of the 
aspects of Marx's early critique of Hegel that are in fact essentially Feuerbachian. 
(I am referring to Marx's discussion of Hegel's inversion of subject and predicate). 
Obviously this element of Marx's critique cannot be ignored, and more than 
anything it stresses the philosophical and political context in which he was writing. 
But reading Marx's critique of Hegel through this debate alone would reduce him 
to F euerbach, and that is something to be avoided. For the F euerbachian aspects of 
Marx's critique are in fact the least significant or interesting ones today. It will be 
argued here that Marx moves beyond Feuerbach as he moves beyond Hegel, and 
he does so by developing the category of the social. 46 
Marx believes that his solution to the problem of state and civil society IS 
equally the solution to the problem of poverty. This registers a shift in Marx's 
focus from the separation of state and civil society to the analysis of that civil 
society; since civil society constitutes the base of all social and political relations 
it is to this that Marx is forced to turn. One feature of this task is that Marx adopts 
and radicalizes the categories labour and alienation. 47 
It has been noted that for Hegel poverty is a general consequence of civil society 
and arises out of it of necessity. Marx accepts this conceptualisation of poverty as 
it is linked with civil society,48 but at the same time seeks to overcome it through 
an immanent critique of civil society and political economy. Political economy as 
it operates within bourgeois thought faces the central contradiction that the class 
of labour is both the source of wealth and the class of poverty and alienation. 
Political economy overcomes this contradiction by positing the laws and categories 
of political economy as natural and ahistorical. 49 His critical encounter with 
political economy moves Marx to understand civil society through the wage labour 
and private property relation. The effect of this is to deepen Marx's understanding 
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of civil society, for the system of needs and the problematics of political life is 
now be read through the contradiction between wage-labour and property. 50 
On the other hand, Marx's understanding of the political economy of labour is 
rooted in the philosophical conception of labour as he inherits it from Hegel. Marx 
writes that Hegel's importance is that he 'grasps the nature of labour and conceives 
objective man ... as the result of his own labour'. 51 Thus for Marx labour is a 
category of both philosophy and political economy. As such it is integrally related 
to the category of alienation. Marx distances himself from Hegel's essentially 
idealist concept of alienation, in which the only labour known is abstract mental 
labour and human nature or man is equivalent to self-consciousness, for in such a 
conception all estrangement is only the estrangement of self-consciousness rather 
than 'real' estrangement. This estrangement can then be overcome not through 
historical practice, but through a philosophical reinterpretation of the world. 52 
In the process of drawing political economy and German philosophy together 
Marx radicalises both. The philosophical conception of labour lends weight to the 
importance granted to political economy of wage-labour, and, simultaneously, 
alienation can be used as the basis of the critique of wage-labour. For wage-labour, 
far from being the satisfaction of needs, becomes a fundamentally alienating and 
alienated activity. 53 The implications of this for our analysis here are enormous. 
As Cohen notes, the 1844 manuscripts 'mark a turning point in Marx's work not 
simply because they resulted from his first confrontation with political economy 
but, above all, because they signal a new approach to the analysis of civil society. 
The introduction of the dualistic concept of labour (objectifying praxis/historically 
specific wage labour) as the unifying and active centre of both civil society and 
history occasions the transformation'. 54 Moreover, the development of the 
category wage-labour allows Marx to deepen and strengthen his critique of the 
contradictions and struggles within civil society. 
Two things follow which pre-empt the discussion in the sections below. First, 
what will be discussed below as the re-uniting of state and civil society now has 
a material grounding in the movements of civil society, the sphere of needs in 
particular. It seeks to overcome the alienation and poverty there. And this 
reunification, the revolutionary supersession of the existing order, must be the work 
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of elements of civil society, the universal class throwing off its radical chains. 
Second, this achievement of universal freedom can therefore not be reduced to the 
domain of a democratized state. 55 From this point Marx will argue that liberation 
within the state or through the state is not sufficient, will not be universal 
liberation, for political freedom is not human (social) freedom. The latter must refer 
to the sphere of needs and labour, whilst the former refers to formal, political, 
freedom. 
Marx's rejection of the mediating institutions introduced by Hegel in response 
to the contradictions of modernity is based on his claim that Hegel's 'resolution' 
is in fact only the semblance of a resolution in which the contradictions are 
preserved in a different form rather than superseded. 56 Now, what is partly at 
issue here is a dispute over the concepts of 'mediation', 'overcoming', 
'supersession' and 'resolution' - the core categories of dialectical logic. Hegel's 
dialectical category Aujheben (sublation) is used for its double meaning of abolish 
and preserve. Conscious of this, Marx notes that in spite of their 'sublation' in the 
Philosophy of Right family, civil society, state etc. 'continue to exist' .57 That is, 
they are preserved in their abolition. Hegel and Marx's agreement that civil society 
contains contradictions and separations and that these need to be overcome and 
thereby solved leads to a fundamental disagreement as to the nature of their 
supersession. Yet despite Marx's focus on the centrality of the logic to Hegel's 
political philosophy - 'Hegel's true interest is not the philosophy of right but 
logic,58 - there is a deeper political critique to be noted. For Marx, Hegel's 
solution represents an accommodation of the separations within modern society. 
Since the separations that exist are a product of the abstraction of the state and the 
development of private property the practical attempt to overcome them through 
mediation merely expresses them anew; it does not and can not truly overcome 
them. More significantly, it is the continuation of the contradictions and their 
assimilation into the state. That is, Hegel's 'resolution' of the problem is in fact a 
conversion of the problem into a new form. For, as was noted above, the outcome 
of Hegel's mediating institutions is that the struggles of civil society are shifted 
onto the state and are there administered. The political consolidation of bourgeois 
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society involves the subsumption of social struggle into political administration by 
the state. 
In his gradual distancing from Hegel it would appear that there are three 
directions in which Marx is moving. First, Marx argues that many of the 
institutions that perform 'mediating' roles are in fact state institutions rather than 
those of civil society. Second, Marx posits civil society as the real driving force 
behind history, or the arena in which the 'real' struggles of history are played out. 
Third, in rejecting Hegel's 'solution' to the problems Marx seeks to recommend his 
own method of overcoming the separation of state and civil society. What will be 
argued here is that in Marx's work these three dimensions are in tension. It will be 
argued that historical materialism needs to retain all three, but must be aware of the 
tension that exists between them. Finally it will be claimed that, with regard to the 
first two, only by developing a more thorough category of 'political 
administration', produced in and through struggle, can state power be understood. 
F or although in Marx's own work this provides the greatest source of tension it is 
precisely this dimension that needs developing. Later chapters will show how, in 
the light of historical developments, the insight that the state can subsume social 
struggles into the political administration, an insight found in both Hegel and Marx, 
needs to be developed. Rather than jettisoning Marx and Hegel as a result of the 
significant historical changes since their day, it is argued that their work requires 
a rethinking and their core categories strengthening. If this period saw the political 
reconsolidation of bourgeois society in the granting to the working class of the 
political ground on which to struggle, and the increased regulation of civil society 
by the state, then the conceptual dichotomy of state and civil society which was so 
crucial to Marx's earlier analysis may appear inadequate. If the working class is 
becoming assimilated into the state as it develops as a political force then clearly 
there are institutions which are in some way successfully mediating between the 
state and civil society and in doing so preventing revolutionary transformation. In 
the light of historical developments either the state-civil society dichotomy needs 
rejecting or it needs rethinking. The contention here is that it needs rethinking, and 
that this may be best achieved by utilising the category political administration. 
Later chapters will show why this is so and how it can be done. In doing so it will 
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also be argued that not only is the working class now of civil society, it is also now 
of the state. Furthermore it will also be argued that the working class \vas 
constituted as such by the state and that in the process this fundamentally altered 
the functioning of state power. 
In a significant moment in the development of Marx's own theoretical approach 
to the state he notes that many of the mediating organs in Hegel's account are in 
fact organs of the state rather than civil society. 
The 'police', the 'judiciary' and the 'administration' are not the 
representatives of civil society which administers its own universal interests 
in them and through them; they are the representatives of the state and their 
task is to administer the state against civil society. 59 
This is one of Marx's most fundamental insights yet, despite its presence 
throughout his later writings, he does not develop it. For this insight is instantly 
overtaken by Marx's positing of civil society as the real driving force behind 
history; or rather, the struggles within civil society function as that driving force. 
When Marx declares that the history of all hitherto existing society is the history 
of class struggle it is within the sphere of civil society that these struggles take 
place. 60 The premises of materialist method, the socio-economic relations of civil 
society, provide the basis from which 'legal relations and political forms' are to be 
comprehended. 61 
Many of the commentaries on Marx's work, both Marxist and non-Marxist, 
consider the state-civil society model to be relegated in favour of the 
base-superstructure model. In part this has its roots in Marx's concerns in his later 
work, and his comments on this work; not least the notorious 1859 Preface where 
he describes his shift in concerns from civil society to the key to its anatomy, 
namely political economy. 62 Much has been lost in the focus on the 
base-superstructure model to which Marx appears to shift. The crude economism 
this model has frequently been taken to consist of has acted as a straightjacket 
rather than an aid to Marxist political theory. This straitjacket has its roots in the 
'later' Marx's focus on developing a critique of political economy rather than 
engaging in 'political' analysis. From the suggestion that the key to the anatomy 
of civil society lay in political economy it was almost predictable that the focus for 
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analysis would not be civil society itself, nor the relation between the state and 
civil society, but political economy. It is a commonplace now to say that this is 
why Marx never developed the analysis of the state that he always intended to. The 
point here though is that Marx appears to have abandoned the analysis of civil 
society as a whole. Alvin Gouldner describes it as becoming a residual concept 
once Marx began to develop the critique of political economy, the outcome of 
which was that any analysis of social structures had to be assimilated to the mode 
of production. 63 There is some truth in this, but rather than abandoning the 
analysis of civil society as Gouldner maintains, Marx actually shifts his focus in 
such a way that the state-civil society model appears to play a secondary role at 
best. Thus, in much the same way that the state remains largely untheorised in 
Marx's later work, so does the state-civil society relation. 
The appearance that Marx has shifted his focus entirely on to political economy, 
and his suggestion that the key to the anatomy of civil society lies in political 
economy, has made it too easy for Marxists after Marx, seeking orthodoxy, to read 
civil society as the economic system and to focus on this. Civil society became 
equated with the capitalist economy rather than bourgeois society. The outcome has 
been the development of the base-superstructure model, within the broader 
theoretical structures of diamat, where the economic base is viewed as the 
determining force, the (political) superstructure as an epiphenomenon of this base. 
Such a conception loses the richness of the state-civil society model as Marx 
inherits it from Hegel. For the complexities of Hegel's own system of family, civil 
society and state can easily be overlooked, where Hegel's 'civil society' is read 
entirely in terms of the system of needs. Too much can then be made of Marx's 
own discovery of English political economy, and the theoretical sophistication 
involved in considering the policing of civil society through law and administration 
is lost. 64 One of the central arguments of this thesis is that whilst a Marxist 
critique of political economy may be necessary for a materialist theory of the state 
it is not sufficient. 65 It is impossible to comprehend the state without 
conceptualising it in relation to civil society, but this can not be done if civil 
society is reduced to the economic for there are centres of social action which are 
by no means reducible to the economic, most notably the family.66 
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Marx does not dispense with the state-civil society model. It remains throughout 
his work, and needs to be maintained alongside base-superstructure. Indeed, it is 
through retention of the state-civil society couplet that one can avoid the 
over-simplified and turgid understanding of base-superstructure too common within 
Marxism. Hunt has traced the development of the concept of civil society in 
Marx's work through three stages.67 He suggests that in the early stage it is 
central to his analyses. It is counterposed to the state and figures in his critiques 
of Hegel. In the transitional stage Marx begins to distance himself from the 
concept, tending to consider 'social relations' in general, but he has not developed 
the categories to fully reject it. In the final stage, from the late-1850s onwards the 
concept 'civil society' disappears from his work, at the same time as he 
distinguishes labour from labour-power. This final shift is captured in the 1859 
Preface where he suggests that the key to the anatomy of civil . society lies in 
political economy. 
The problem with such a formulation is that there is too much continuity III 
Marx to sustain it fully. Hunt draws attention to the way the final draft of 'The 
Civil War in France' differs from the first draft because 'civil society' has been 
replaced by 'society'. The problem with this is two-fold. First, it suggests that 
Marx had not completely abandoned the use of civil society after the late-1850s. 
If in 1871, the year of the essay, he was still using it, albeit in a first draft, he 
could not have been wholly against its use. Second, the replacing of 'civil society' 
with 'society' removes only the 'civil'. Retaining 'society' retains the substantive 
point: the distinction between state and its other. 68 That is, such changes are part 
of the tension surrounding the state-civil society model in Marx's work rather than 
a rejection of it. 
Likewise there is a problem over the use of 'bourgeois society' in translations 
of texts such as Capital. Hunt draws attention to the way in which one translation 
biirgerliche Gesellschaft is translated as 'civil society' whereas in another it is 
translated as 'bourgeois society'. The same is true of the Grundrisse. Moreover 
there are slippages from one translation to another in the same text. 69 But if this 
is a problem, then it is one of translation alone. Marx is using biirgerliche 
Gesellschajt, for the same reason as Hegel - because it means both bourgeois 
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society and civil society. In the 'later' works, where Marx is discussing 'bourgeois 
society' he equally means 'civil society'. If one translates burgerliche Gesellschafi 
as civil society rather than bourgeois society, as some commentators have 
suggested, then the later works are replete with the concept. 70 
Finally Marx's occasional use of quotation marks around 'civil society', such as 
found on the first page of the 1857 Grundrisse, are in danger of overinterpretation. 
As has just been mentioned, the term 'civil society' on the first page of the 
Grundrisse is in some translations rendered 'bourgeois society', still inside 
quotation marks. 71 These are intended to alert us to the problematic nature of the 
use of this concept. As Hunt himself suggests, this indicates a transition from a 
rather uncritical use to a critical use in which its limitations are recognised. 72 It 
also suggest that Marx has not dispensed with the concept. 
The focus on base and superstructure also shifts attention away from another of 
Marx's categories: the 'social'. It was noted above that Marx dismisses Hegel's 
proposed solution to the separation of state and civil society. Since mediating 
institutions can only mediate the separation, the real solution must be to close it off 
completely, and it is this that Marx intends by using the category of the social. 
With the distinction between state and civil society the possibility emerges of the 
development of disciplines in which 'political' and 'social' relations are studied 
separately. The 'political' and the 'social' become objects of enquiry in their own 
right. Sociology and political science develop as independent disciplines; the sphere 
of the social becomes the concern of sociology. As Goran Therborn writes: 'the 
rise of Sociology was a crucial part of the increasing prominence and the 
intellectual discovery of burgerliche Gesellschafi - in the sense of both bourgeois 
and civil society' .73 The problem then becomes how these two arenas of the 
political and the social relate to each other; do social science and political science 
have any integral relationship?74 At the same time the economic sphere becomes 
isolated as a third element. The state-civil society distinction is transformed into the 
problem of spheres, and of how these spheres interact, if at all. 75 
Now, in Marx's work the sphere of the social is clearly fundamental. But it is 
fundamental not only because he inherits it from Hegel via the concept of civil 
society (and, it should be said, Saint-Simon), but because he uses the concept of 
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the social, (man as a social animal), to make some of the fundamental breaks that 
he is renowned for. Thus for example, Marx overcomes philosophical idealism not 
by a polemical shift to philosophical materialism, but through a focus on the social 
nature of human existence. Rather than replace idealism with materialism in a 
Feuerbachian manner/6 he criticises both idealism and materialism by developing 
the concept of 'human sensuous activity, practice, human society or socialised 
humanity'. Likewise he overcomes the dichotomy of humanity and nature through 
the same conceptual move: 'The human essence of nature exists only for social 
man; for only here does nature exist for him as a bond with other men ... Society 
is therefore the perfected unity in essence of man with nature'. 77 
This concept of the social also distinguishes Marx from the discipline of 
sociology. For although sociology utilises the concept of the 'social' the role it 
plays there is very different. Weber is right to point out that 'the social', used 
interchangeably with 'society', is construed so widely that it is taken to include the 
whole of reality, masking the complexity of cultural, economic and political 
action. 78 This can be clearly seen in the work of sociologists where 'the social', 
like 'society', is used as a category against which something else can be played 
off.79 However, Marxism has specific concepts with which to grasp given 
elements of society - state and civil society to name but two. 80 More importantly, 
in Marx's work the social is used as the fundamental category in his critique of 
bourgeois society. In this sense 'the social' as it functions in Marx's work operates 
not as a descriptive category but as a fundamentally critical one, pointing as it does 
to the alienated nature of human relations within bourgeois society, and positing 
a collective human subject to overcome them. Thus Weber's criticism is of 
sociology rather than Marxism. Despite the apparent similarities and overlap of 
categories, sociology and Marxism remain separate, Marxism distinguishing itself 
from much contemporary social and political thought by utilising the social as a 
central category of critique that is absent from its usage in sociology.81 This will 
also be a fundamental difference between Marx and Foucault for, as will be argued 
in Chapter Three, Foucault's rejection of the state-civil society distinction replicates 
the difficulties found in the discipline of sociology, leaving him as it does with no 
concepts other than 'the social' (alongside administration) with which to consider 
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the development of 'modem power'. 82 Moreover, this raises the issue of a unified 
science of man from a new angle, in which 'politics' and 'sociology' would be not 
so much disciplines but moments in an analysis of the social totality, 83 the very 
totalising project absent in much sociology and the work of Foucault and his 
followers. 
These differences between Marx on the one hand and philosophical materialism, 
sociology and Foucault on the other indicate the significance of Marx's conceptual 
move. This is illustrated in the rest of his work. For example, in his critique of 
'political emancipation' in 'On the Jewish Question' Marx argues that emancipation 
gained by specific groups through the state is political emancipation; political 
emancipation is not human emancipation; total human emancipation cannot be 
gained through the state, but requires the transcendence of the separation between 
private man in civil society and political life into a new 'social' totality. 
Only when man has recognised and organised his 'forces propres' [his own 
force] as social forces so that social force is no longer separated from him 
in the form of political force, only then will human emancipation be 
completed. 84 
And Marx champions the Paris Commune precisely for gIvmg the life back to 
society as opposed to the state: 
While the merely repressive organs of the old governmental power were to 
be amputated, its legitimate functions were to be wrested from an authority 
usurping pre-eminence over society itself, and restored to the responsible 
agents of society. 85 
F or Marx the Paris Commune broke the power of the state, showing not only that 
'the working class cannot simply lay hold of the state machinery and yield it for 
its own purposes' ,86 but that the working class could develop its own forms of 
political existence that would equally be a new form of social existence. So for 
example, in breaking with all the crucial aspects of bourgeois state power, 'power 
which claimed to be the embodiment of that unity independent of and superior to 
the nation itself, and promising instead to be a 'self-government of producers' , 87 
the repressive forces were to be abolished and the normal functions of the state 
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were performed by members of society itself. In theoretical terms for Nlarxist 
theory this meant that the working class could and did transcend the historic 
abstraction of the political state. The 'reabsorption of the state power by society as 
its own living forces instead of as forces controlling and subduing it'88 institutes 
a new form of the social. 
It is within this concept of the social that the strength of Marx's critique of 
political economy lies. The fetishism involved in bourgeois relations, in which the 
social bond is exchange value and where the social character of activity 'appear[ s] 
as something alien and objective', results in social relations assuming 'the fantastic 
form of a relation between things' .89 This is juxtaposed to the vision of a future 
society of 'universally developed individuals, whose social relations, as their own 
communal [gemeinschaftlich] relations, are ... subordinated to their own communal 
control'. And in Capital after describing the historical tendency of capitalist 
accumulation as leading to the transformation of capitalist private property into 
social property, he asks that we 'imagine, for a change, an association of free men, 
working with the means of production held in common, and expending their many 
different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single social labour 
force'. The point of course is that communism would involve the reproduction of 
individuals as social individuals where wealth is 'the universality of individual 
needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces' .90 The key to understanding 
alienated labour then is that it is not fully social; likewise the key to understanding 
alienated society is that it has not been fully socialised. 
Interestingly, there is a tension in Marx's work between the understanding of 
burgerliche Gesellschaft as something to be superseded, and the recognition that 
civil society is the first formation which socialises economic forces, in the process 
producing the very subject of revolutionary potential, the very class that will be its 
undoing, its gravediggers. Production is inherently 'social' but is yet to be fully 
socialised; this can only be achieved by the revolutionary subject, the working 
class. Thus the working class, as the universal class, will carry through the task of 
socialisation. However. if one overcomes the dichotomy of state and civil society 
in a new social unity thereby closing off the distinction between the political and 
the social, to the extent that the state disappears so too must civil society. One will 
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be left with the social.91 In this sense one can argue that it is the social rather than 
the proletariat that features as the universal in Marx's work. 
Marx inherits the concept of the universal class from Hegel, and replaces the 
bureaucracy with the class with radical chains that will be the redemption of 
humanity. But a closer reading of Marx's discussion of the universal class also 
yields an implicit concept of the social as the underlying universal. Marx criticises 
Hegel's use of the bureaucracy as the universal class and Hegel's brief attempt to 
suggest that anyone can become a civil servant thus: 
What is crucial in the true state is not the fact that every CItIzen has the 
chance to devote himself to the universal interest in the shape of a particular 
class, but the capacity of the universal class to be really universal i.e. to be 
the class of every citizen. Hegel starts with the assumption of a 
pseudo-universal class, of universality fixed in a particular class.92 
Here Marx appears to expand the concept of the universal class to be inclusive, at 
least potentially so, of every citizen, the whole social body. 
The role of the emancipator therefore passes in a dramatic movement from 
one class ... to the next, until it finally reaches that class which... realises 
social freedom ... by organising all the conditions of human existence on the 
basis of social freedom. 93 
Because the rights and claims of this class are the rights and claims of society 
itself4 this universal class is a sphere 
which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from - and 
thereby emancipating - all the other spheres of society ... This dissolution of 
society as a particular class is the proletariat.95 
The point is that whilst the working class alone is a really revolutionary class96 
and therefore the only class fit to accomplish the task of universal emancipation, 
this emancipation, once it has been achieved, is of individuals from the division of 
labour and class itself. It is only within a new social form that this can be 
realised. 97 
The depth of Marx's acceptance of the structure of Hegel's thought is apparent 
here. For the triadic conceptualisation of the social. civil society and the universal 
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class of the proletariat is analogous to Hegel's state, political state and bureaucracy. 
The bureaucracy in Hegel is a particular class, but its aims are universal and as 
such are identical with the aims of the state. The proletariat in Marx is a particular 
class but its aims are universal and as such are identical with the aims of 
society.98 However, whilst Hegel's universal class can only mediate the separation 
of state and civil society Marx's universal class is intended to overcome this 
duality, and institute a new social order in which the social has been politicised and 
politics has been socialised. Thus Marx's project can be construed as the 
socialisation of the universal and the universalisation of the political, an ongoing 
socialisation of the political and politicisation of the social in a struggle to achieve 
'socialised freedom'. 99 Whereas Hegel's universal class is designed to protect civil 
society from its own revolutionary potential by transforming social struggle into 
administrative mechanisms, Marx's universal class is designed to realise this 
potential. Whilst this strengthens his break with philosophical materialism by 
invoking the working class as the subject of historical transformation,100 it also 
poses perhaps the fundamental problem for materialist analysis, indicated above: 
for it is in struggling for the socialisation of the universal and the universalisation 
of the political, the struggle for recognition, that the working class have achieved 
something quite different - the development of new forms of political 
administration to mediate these struggles. The state has been able to reconstitute 
bourgeois society by subsuming the struggles and turning them against themselves. 
This poses fundamental theoretical problems, to which the later chapters are 
devoted. 
Reuniting State and Civil Society: suffrage and rights 
The claim that the state has been able to subsume struggles and created 
mechanisms with which to then mediate such struggles is developed in Part Three 
below. Here we can note that whereas for Marx revolutionary working class 
struggle is for a new social form, the British state managed to turn this into the 
social question, namely the position of the working class within capitalism and 
what, if anything, should be done in order to police it. Likewise, the British state 
also redefined the revolutionary demand for universal suffrage and working class 
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rights to be acceptable within bourgeois society. Again, this argument is developed 
in Part Three, but we need to first show how and why for Marx the demand for 
universal suffrage and working class rights is revolutionary. 
The socialisation of the universal and the universalisation of the political 
provides the key to a number of dimensions of Marx's work. For example, his 
suggestion that political emancipation is not full emancipation is not based on the 
rejection of reformist politics in favour of a revolutionary perspective but emerges 
from his understanding of the essential lack in political emancipation, namely its 
failure to overcome the state-civil society dichotomy and instigate a new social 
form. 101 Likewise, when considering the manner in which the state has addressed 
the contradictions of civil society Marx's argument rests heavily on this dimension. 
The reason the Whigs and Tories cannot eradicate pauperism is because they seek 
the answer in administration. It is always the opposing sides administrative policies 
that are said to need changing. 
The state will never discover the source of social evils in the state and the 
organisation of society .... Wherever there are political parties each party will 
attribute every defect of society to the fact that its rival is at the helm of the 
state instead of itself. Even the radical and revolutionary politicians look for 
the causes of evil not in the nature of the state but in a specific form of the 
state which they would like to replace with another form of the state. 102 
And when in The German Ideology Marx writes that all struggles within the state 
or over different forms of the state such as democracy, aristocracy or monarchy are 
merely illusory forms of struggle,I03 his argument again rests on the state-civil 
society couplet and the necessity for its supersession. The state is impotent to 
totally eradicate all the contradictions of bourgeois society. To abolish its 
impotence it would have to abolish private life. But to abolish private life it would 
have to abolish itself, which it cannot do. 
The question therefore has to be: how does Marx envisage the reuniting of state 
and civil society? How is this socialisation of the universal and universalisation of 
the political to be achieved? One of the clearest ways he does this is through a 
particular conceptualisation of suffrage. The fact that the working class is not 'of 
society is reflected in its lack of political substance. The fact that there is no formal 
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political recognition of the working class (as both individuals and a collective) 
other than the need for occasional uses of force against it, symbolises both the 
separation of state and civil society and the exclusion of the working class from 
being full citizens. This leads Marx to conceptualise the extension of the vote to 
the working class not merely as a method by which they could become individual 
citizens, but also as the basis for the supersession of the state and civil society 
dichotomy. 
F or Marx the vote represents a relationship of civil society to the state; the 
extension of the vote therefore represents an extension of the political development 
of civil society. Marx sees universal suffrage as a totally unrestricted form of 
suffrage, but this 'unrestriction' should not be reduced to the practical form 
whereby individuals can vote regardless of age or property qualifications. It should 
be thought of as elevating civil society to a level of political existence, which at 
the same time is the transcendence of the civil society/state dichotomy. 
The vote is the immediate, direct, not merely representative but actually 
existing relation of civil society to the political state. It is therefore 
self-evident that the vote must constitute the chief political interest of real 
civil society. Only when civil society has achieved unrestricted active and 
passive suffrage has it really raised itself to the point of abstraction from 
itself, to the political existence which constitutes its true, universal, essential 
existence. But the perfection of this abstraction is also its transcendence 
[Aujhebung]. By really establishing its political existence as its authentic 
existence, civil society ensures that its civil existence, in so far as it is 
distinct from its political existence, is inessential. And with the demise of the 
one, the other, its opposite, collapses also. Therefore electoral reform in the 
abstract political state is the equivalent to a demand for its dissolution 
[Aujlosung] and this in turn implies the dissolution of civil society. 104 
Similarly, the last section of his 1844 'Draft Plan for a work on the Modern State', 
was intended to end with "Suffrage, the fight for the abolition of the state and of 
bourgeois society". 105 
We need to be clear about the significance of suffrage here. It is not simply that 
electoral reform and universal suffrage are important in their concrete particularity, 
as part of the practical struggle in the attempt to 'conquer political power', 106 but 
because of the significance of the principle that Marx is elaborating. Hence his 
suggestion that electoral reform is a demand for the dissolution of civil society and 
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the fight for the abolition of the state. For Marx it is the political logic and 
historical significance of electoral reform and universal suffrage that render them 
important. As Colletti notes, it is not that the state-civil society dichotomy will be 
overcome by the introduction of universal suffrage, but that the drive towards full 
suffrage and electoral reform is one expression of the tendency towards overcoming 
the separation between state and civil society, 107 that is, the ongoing socialisation 
of the political and politicisation of the social. 
It is on this basis that Marx conceives the limits of representation. This is why 
the Paris Commune is granted such importance. The election of representatives 
merely produces the superintendents of the state's interests in civil society. 
Representatives do not eliminate the antithesis between state and civil society but 
serve to 'legalise' and 'establish' it. l08 By comparison, in the Paris Commune 
the electoral process was designed to result in a working rather than a 
parliamentary body with municipal councillors whose responsibilities were 
revocable at short term, who were paid workers wages, who were mainly drawn 
from the working class and who followed a formal mandate from constituents. It 
is for this reason that thus the Paris Commune is considered by Marx to have 
broken modern state power, as we saw earlier. l09 Thus for Marx the term 
'universal suffrage' has a revolutionary resonance for explicitly theoretical 
reasons. 110 
Marx is once again illustrating both his debt and his distance from Hegel, and 
nineteenth century thought in general. Hegel is critical of the idea of universal 
suffrage, favouring the representation of groups rather than individuals. III More 
substantively, for Hegel elections are intended to produce representation whereas 
for Marx they are intended to produce participation. Thus Hegel's concept of 
elections retains the separation of state and society whereas Marx's, by positing the 
fullest possible participation, is designed to constitute its dissolution. 
Similarly, Marx is echoing the thoughts of liberal and conservative writers for 
whom reforming the franchise in order to allow the working class to vote could 
and would have considerable effects on the nature of political power, both 
practically and in terms of the principle it would invoke. The classic example is the 
work of John Stuart Mill, where the principle of electoral reform and universal 
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suffrage is conceded but, once its implications are drawn out, immediately revoked 
through a number of procedures which negate the very principle. Like Marx, Mill 
recognises that in practical terms electoral reform has implications for the matter 
of who conquers political power and, also like Marx, believes that universal 
suffrage would result in working class rule. Furthermore, Mill is likewise 
concerned with the principle that universal suffrage would invoke. Although Mill 
does not conceptualise universal suffrage as the demand for the dissolution of state 
and civil society, his concern is that if granted universal suffrage would result in 
people being fully fledged citizens even though they are not fit, for reasons of 
poverty or ignorance, to be considered as such. 112 
This conceptualisation of suffrage follows from the understanding of the working 
class as a class not of civil society. It will be argued in Part III that the entrance 
of the English working class into the British state from 1867 onwards marked not 
the demise of state and civil society but the restructuring of their relation through 
the constitution of individual legal and political subjectivity on the basis of which 
new forms of political administration could emerge. The point here is not whether 
Marx (or Mill) is right or wrong. It is that the demand for suffrage could be 
conceded, the demands for political recognition could be met, and then used as the 
political and legal basis for new forms of administration. The working class had to 
be granted bourgeois rights, that is, rights as bona fide citizens of burgerliche 
GesellshaJt, on which their administration as political subjects and objects could be 
based. 
Now, one of the stronger features of Marx's work is that he recognises both the 
power and the limits of the concept of right in bourgeois society. In modern society 
feudal privilege has been replaced by political right. No 'privileged exclusivity' 
stands opposed to other exclusivities or to the public system. The struggle between 
privileged exclusivities has been replaced by the struggle of individual against 
individual. 1 \3 Such struggles now take place on the basis of freedom. The 'rights 
of man' are political rights exercised in common with others receiving their 
legitimacy through the political state. The 'rights of man' are therefore 'the rights 
of the members of civil society ie of egoistic man, of man separated from other 
men and from the community'. 114 As such the rights of man restate the separation 
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of civil society and the state and confirm the egoistic and solitary nature of modem 
life. 
The 'Rights of Man' do not, therefore, free man from religion but give him 
freedom of religion; ... do not free him from property but procure for him 
freedom of property; .. . do not free him from the filth of gain but give him the 
freedom of choice of a livelihood. 115 
Political right in this sense is effectively the right to separation. In his critical notes 
on the Gotha Programme of 1875 Marx again states that 'equal right is still - in 
principle - a bourgeois right', and is therefore in content one of inequality.116 
Whilst it is sometimes claimed that these formulations suggest that Marx rejects the 
concept of rights outright, it is more fruitful to read them in the way we have read 
Marx's comments on universal suffrage, that is, through the tension of the 
state-civil society dichotomy and the demand that this dichotomy be superseded. 
For Marx's critique is not of rights per se, but of bourgeois right, that is, right 
which rests on formal legal equality at the level of the political but fundamental 
inequality within bourgeois/civil society. Thus what is presented within liberal 
theory as the natural rights of man are in fact the rights to the inequalities that exist 
in civil society regardless of the existence of political and legal equality. These 
rights lack substantive content because of the separation of political and 
socio-economic life. In this sense Marx's comments can be read not as a rejection 
of rights, but of rights as they feature in bourgeois society, and his critique of them 
is again a matter of political logic. For Marx has inherited from Hegel the 
argument that rights follow from recognition; as such the demand for rights is a 
demand for recognition (and vice versa). As Bloch notes, Marx is concerned with 
the 'forward effect' of rights. 117 The demand for rights is a demand that these be 
universalised, but this can only be realised in a new universal community of 
socialised human relations, which has thereby overcome the contradiction of the 
separation of state and civil society. 
Here of course we come to the fundamental problem. Advocating the principle 
of the fullest possible participation, the principle of suffrage, and the principle that 
rights grant recognition is one thing. But what happens if the principle is conceded 
and yet is not followed by the socialisation of the universal and the universalisation 
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of the political? In other words, what if the capitalist state can adapt itself in a 
manner which grants the working class this recognition, as individuals and as a 
class, allows the working class into civil society and the state as fully fledged 
members, but does so by preserving itself rather than being abolished? 
.+3 
Chapter Two 
From Imperialism to Ideology 
State and Revolution, Parliament and Imperialism 
In his denunciation of the theorists of the Second International Lukacs claims that 
their opportunism 'is illustrated most clearly by the fact that none of them dealt 
seriously with the problem of the state'. There is no difference between Bernstein 
and Kautsky as they both accept the bourgeois state without ever examining its 
'character' or evaluating it from the standpoint of the proletariat as a whole. 'Lenin 
was alone in regaining the theoretical heights of Marx's conception - the clarity of 
the proletarian attitude to the state'. 1 Placing Lenin's work on the state in the 
context of debates within the Second International will enable us to test the strength 
of this claim through a brief comparison of the second generation of what is 
regarded as 'classical Marxism'. It will be suggested that Lenin's work on the state 
is flawed in a number of fundamental ways, but that the work of Kautsky, 
Luxemburg and Bernstein also contains similar weaknesses. For whilst they 
frequently discuss state power, their concentration on and utilisation of base and 
superstructure rather than state and civil society (or, better still, both conceptual 
couplets together) results in a narrow focus on the state, and the nature of its 
'determination' by the economic base. The state gets abstracted out of its 
relationship with civil society, with a considerable theoretical loss. Thus where for 
example Lenin does address the changing relation of state and civil society this is 
does through an account of imperialism. In contrast Gramsci makes far greater 
advances by adopting state and civil society from Hegel alongside base and 
superstructure from Marx, though as we shall see, his theoretical insights are 
accompanied by some theoretical difficulties. 
It is often claimed that Lenin's State and Revolution stands apart from the rest 
of his work in being an intensely theoretical text. 2 His focus on the writings of 
Marx and Engels and his concern with the principles encapsulated by the Paris 
Commune are taken as indicative of this. On the one hand this creates a distinctly 
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Marxist perspective: Lenin suggests that the basic premise behind a Marxist theory 
of the state is that the state is a product of society at a particular stage of historical 
development, that it arises because society contains contradictions which cannot be 
resolved, and thus to ensure the contradictions do not consume society a power 
above it becomes necessary to maintain order. The state is therefore assumed to be 
the product and manifestation of irreconcilable class antagonisms: it arises because 
class antagonisms cannot be reconciled, and its existence proves that class 
antagonisms cannot be reconciled. 3 Moreover, this means that the contradictions 
cannot be resolved through the state. The state, as a product of a particular 
historical epoch, is the organ for the oppression of one class by another: 'it creates 
'order' which legalises and perpetuates this oppression by moderating collisions 
between the classes'. 4 
What follows from this for Lenin is that the liberation of the working class is 
impossible without the destruction of the state. Using the Commune in his support, 
and recognising the impetus the commune gave to Marx's work on the stateS by 
showing that 'the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made 
machinery and wield it for its own purposes', 6 Lenin argues that this should be 
interpreted as the call for the smashing of the state not for slow gradual 'progress'. 
'The Commune is the first attempt of a proletarian revolution to smash the 
bourgeois state machine and constitutes the political form 'at last discovered' which 
can and must supersede the smashed machine'. 7 Lenin has good reasons for taking 
this position, for he wants to argue that the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917 
continue the work of the Commune and corroborate Marx's analysis. 8 It is for this 
reason that commentators talk of the 'libertarian' Lenin.9 
On the other hand, Lenin is quite adamant that 'the proletariat needs the 
state' . \0 Whilst he recognises that this is also pointed out by Kautsky and other 
, opportunists' and ' social-chauvinists' he argues that they all forget that the 
proletariat only needs the state that is withering away. Furthermore Lenin is 
adamant that the state under control of the working class will be used for the 
suppression of the bourgeoisie. This follows from the fact that the state is by its 
very nature an organisation of violence for the suppression of a class. The state will 
therefore be used by the majority of the population, the formerly exploited class, 
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to suppress the minority, the former exploiters, and in doing so it will abolish 
exploitation immediately. Thus 
the proletariat needs state power, the centralised organisation of force, the 
organisation of violence, for the purpose of cracking the resistance of the 
exploiters and for the purpose of leading the great mass of the population ... in 
the work of organising socialist economy. 11 
That is, Lenin's thesis is one of massive centralisation, at least for the period of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, until the state withers away. Consequently next to 
the libertarian Lenin is a Lenin arguing for the taking of political power by the 
working class, using it for suppressing reactionary forces, and concentrating the 
means of production under the control of the state. 
There are thus two strands of thought in State and Revolution. One involves the 
dictatorship of the proletariat suppressing the bourgeoisie and eliminating 
oppression; the other takes from the Paris Commune, invokes the smashing of the 
state and the transfer of its functions into the people's own organisations. It is not 
my intention here to suggest which of these two dimensions is the one Lenin most 
consistently holds. Rather I am concerned to show that despite these two 
dimensions Lenin fails to provide an adequate analysis of the capitalist state. Even 
if it were the case that his libertarianism illustrates a significant counterpart to his 
stress on the importance of the state (especially after a revolution), libertarianism 
per se is fundamentally flawed in its understanding of the state. 
These points rest heavily on the fact that whilst theoretical, Lenin's text is also 
concerned with practical issues, for it constitutes an attempt to intervene in the 
struggle within the system of dual power between the provisional government and 
the Soviets, on the side of the latter. The manuscript breaks off at the beginning of 
the seventh chapter entitled 'The Experience of the Russian Revolutions of 1905 
and 1917' which was to analyse 'the most important lessons of experience. Those 
touching directly upon the tasks of the proletariat in the revolutions in relation to 
state power'. It therefore cannot be read solely as a theoretical document. 
Central to Lenin's analysis of the state is a critique of bourgeois Parliamentary 
democracy and the 'parliamentary fetishism' of Lenin's opponents, and it is with 
this that the weaknesses of Lenin's analysis begin to be revealed. He suggests that 
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Marx's critique of parliamentarism has been forgotten, or else is regarded as 
anarchism, and that the revolutionary solution is the conversion of Parliament into 
a working body, again using the Commune as an example. 12 This is based on, yet 
supplements, Lenin's critique of the concept of 'democracy'. The concept of a 'free 
people's state', the programme of the German SPD in the late-nineteenth century, 
is considered by Lenin, following Engels, to be fine as an agitational position. But 
the way it is used by the SPD is as an opportunistic slogan that lacks an 
understanding of the state in general, and in which the only political content is a 
'pompous philistine description of the concept "democracy"'. 13 
For Lenin a democratic republic is the best form of state for the proletariat under 
capitalism. But since capitalism is a system of wage-labour for the working class 
and every state is a repressive force for the suppression of a particular class, 
parliamentary institutions serve to mask the real power relations of bourgeois 
society. Hence democracy is merely a particular state form, and will disappear with 
the state. Since it is only revolution that can end the bourgeois state, a revolution 
will also end democracy, as this too withers away. 
Now, much of this is designed as an attack on the theoreticians of the German 
SPD, especially Kautsky, whose prevarications over the revisionist issue led to his 
denunciation by Lenin. As articulated by Bernstein the revisionist perspective 
focuses on a number of dimensions of capitalist society - the increasing standard 
of living, the growth of cartels, the extension of the credit system, the increase in 
the number of capitalist enterprises and the decrease in their average size, and the 
role of the Party in these changed conditions - from which it is concluded that the 
'inevitable crisis' that capitalism is 'bound' to suffer is unlikely. The outcome is 
an increasing focus on Parliament as the central object of practical and theoretical 
activity. Since the collapse of capitalism is far from likely, prosperity growing and 
democratisation in all spheres increasing, it is to this that socialists should be 
committed, and it is to this end that parliament can be used. For these reasons 
Bernstein questions whether the state is not incompatible with democratic 
self-government. Since the breaking down of nation-states into small autonomous 
communes is both unlikely and unwelcome for Bernstein, he concludes that some 
kind of administrative unit large enough to co-ordinate a society of vast space and 
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numbers is necessary. So for example, Bernstein questions whether an extensive 
railway network could be run by small autonomous groups. But he develops this 
further. He also argues that it would be impractical for the officials appointed to 
co-ordinate this 'administrative unit' (state) to be elected through direct popular 
elections. Similarly he argues that a law-making and law-keeping agency is needed 
to maintain order and ensure that individuals follow rules. In other words, society 
has reached such a degree of complexity that a state is necessary. 14 
The essential characteristics of the state will therefore remain as before: a 
centralised body apart from society, controlling society, representing 'common 
interests' and maintaining 'harmony'. Because of this he argues that socialism is 
being realised through democratic changes and reforms in both economic and 
political life. For this reason it is not the final goal of socialism that is important, 
but the movement. Social democracy should fight for reforms in and through the 
state. 
Kautsky's response to this is complex. Whilst Bernstein had been developing his 
thesis Kautsky had also been arguing that due to changing conditions the socialist 
approach to the state must adapt, both theoretically and practically. Significantly, 
any project of 'direct democracy' was doomed to failure; although the state 
apparatus constructed by the bourgeois class could be used for different political 
purposes, it could not be shattered. 15 Yet Kautsky writes that Bernstein's 
'socialism seems to be the consummation of liberalism' and adds that revolution 
remains the fundamental aim of social democracy. Social revolution is the 
necessary final objective which every independent proletarian political party must 
strive for. 16 So whilst the movement should struggle for reforms, the final aim is 
still revolution and the conquest of power by the working class. At the heart of this 
is a Parliamentary road to socialism, for by winning reforms through Parliament the 
working class would be able to overcome both economic and political degradation, 
and it is only by changing the character of Parliament and strengthening it against 
other departments that socialism can be properly instituted. Thus for Kautsky 
Parliament is central to both the theory and practice of socialism. In other words, 
Kautsky wants both revolution and the state. 
Lenin rejects this, claiming that for Kautsky 
48 
'Theoretically' it is not denied that the state is the organ of class rule, or that 
class antagonisms are irreconcilable. But what is lost sight of or glossed over 
is this: that if the state is the product of irreconcilable class antagonisms, if 
it is a power standing above society and 'increasingly alienating itself from 
it', it is clear that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only 
without a violent revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus 
of state power which was created by the ruling class and which is the 
embodiment of this 'alienation' .17 
I t is for this reason that Kautsky is denounced for opportunism and betrayal of 
Marx's doctrine. 18 This criticism is heightened after Kautsky's criticism of the 
Revolution, based as it is on a distinction between dictatorship and democracy: 
firstly the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia is not based on democracy and, 
secondly, it is not a dictatorship of the proletariat at all, but of a small organised 
group within the Party. Thus 'starting out with the idea of establishing the 
dictatorship of the proletariat the Bolshevist regime was bound to become the 
dictatorship of the Party within the proletariat'. For example, Kautsky regards the 
decision in 1918 to exclude the Social Revolutionary Party from the central state 
organs and Soviets as both an undemocratic decision and a logical consequence of 
the Soviet Constitution. 19 Similarly the decision to dissolve the Constituent 
Assembly in December 1917 after the election failed to give the Bolsheviks the 
majority is justified by Lenin on the grounds that 'it did not express the real voice 
of the whole people', which leads him to declare that 'any assembly elected by the 
masses by general suffrage was not suitable'. 20 
The significant feature of debates around the revolution is that they indirectly 
raise the question of the socialisation of the political and the politicisation of the 
social. Kautsky is critical of the manner in which the revolution fails to politicise 
key elements of society and socialise key elements of politics. However, because 
Kautsky's own position rests so heavily on a representative Parliament and a 
rejection of 'direct democracy' he is open to the very same criticism. It is 
Luxemburg who draws this out most clearly. Her critique of the revolution rests 
heavily upon the idea of the necessity for the universalisation of the political. 
Sensitive to the same issues as Kautsky she suggests that 'every right of suffrage, 
like any political right in general, is not to be measured by some sort of abstract 
scheme of 'justice' or in terms of any other bourgeois democratic phrases, but by 
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the social and economic relationships for which it is designed'. 21 Thus the 
Bolshevik policy to give the right to vote only to those who live by their own 
labour is criticised not because it is 'unjust' but because it is incomprehensible -
'such a right to vote has meaning only in a society which is in a position to make 
it possible for all those who want to work an adequate civilised life on the basis 
of ones own labour'. Furthermore, she criticises Lenin and Trotsky on the grounds 
that their decisions are bound to result in a dictatorship not of the proletariat but 
of a handful of members of the central Party elite; thus the politicisation that comes 
with the suffrage and control of the state does not function as part of an ongoing 
universalisation of the political and human emancipation, but acts to stifle it. Where 
freedom exists only for members of the governing party it is not freedom at all. 
Echoing Marx on the nature of the universal she writes that the dictatorship of the 
proletariat must be 'the dictatorship of the class, not of a party or clique -
dictatorship of a class, that means in the broadest public form on the basis of the 
most active unlimited participation of the mass of the people, of unlimited 
democracy' . 22 
In many ways these debates alert us to some of the questions raised when 
politics is transformed such that the working class can participate in a fundamental 
way, can become part of civil society and politicised in the process, and yet 
bourgeois society remain unchanged in substance. Part of the difficulty in the 
debates within the Second International is the very different conditions that 
different writers were in and aware of. Lenin fails to appreciate the very practical 
issues posed by Parliament and suffrage in Germany. It has been said that 'in a 
literal sense, Lenin did not know what he was talking about', 23 because although 
he discusses Parliament the world was practically devoid of examples of 
Parliaments that could be called genuinely representative in even the formal sense. 
As Therborn has shown, only New Zealand, Norway and Denmark had suffrage 
without qualifications by 1915.24 However, Therborn also makes it clear that most 
capitalist states were moving towards universal suffrage by 1915, especially key 
states such as Britain, Germany and France. In this sense it is not that Lenin did 
not know what he was talking about, but that he ignored the very thing he should 
hm'e been talking about. 
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On the other hand, there is a sense in which it is true to say that Lenin did not 
know what he was talking about. When he discusses Parliament and democracy it 
is from a significant practical and theoretical distance. In real terms the twin issues 
of Parliament and democracy were minor issues in Russia. Compared to the 
situation in Germany where the SPD could win seats in a Parliament and from 
there fight a battle over 'democracy' the Russians had no equivalent experience. 
Given its ineffectual and powerless nature the existence of the Duma posed merely 
another minor tactical problem 25 and even in 1920 the question of Parliament 
remains a question of tactics. 26 In this sense Lenin shows his rootedness in 
essentially Russian conditions, and his analysis of the state is affected accordingly. 
If nothing else Bernstein and Kautsky had a sense that the extension of suffrage 
meant a fundamental change to the nature and ordering of capitalist states, and that 
theoretical development was necessary. 
There is a further sense in which the focus on Parliament in the debates in the 
Second International obscures the fundamental aspect of state development, for 
which theoretical development was also urgently needed. There is a constant 
slippage in much of this work between 'state' and 'parliament', as though the 
former is reducible to the latter. Yet the extension of the franchise was not the only 
mechanism through which the working class were incorporated into bourgeois 
society; it is argued here that this incorporation, taking the form of political and 
legal subjectivity, provides the basis for further incorporation, as objects of political 
administration. The mechanisms through which this operates were largely in place 
by 1918, and yet are largely ignored by these writers, focusing as they do on 
Parliament. It could be argued that for them the question of the state is dissolved 
into the question of Parliament, a dissolution which serves to obscure the role of 
political administration as a central mediating mechanism between state and civil 
society and its role in subsuming struggle. This dissolution is compounded by the 
absence of any theoretical account of civil society in this work. In the debates we 
have so far addressed the category 'society' serves to function as the state's . other' , 
but is conceived either as 'economic base' or as the thing that the state oppresses. 
This affects the account of the development of administration. 
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Lenin's attempt to conceptualise the development of the relationship between 
state and civil society rests on two weaknesses: its dependence on the category 
'imperialism' and its inability to conceive of the working class as part of civil 
society, apart from the 'labour aristocracy'. Lenin here relies heavily on Bukharin, 
who argues that the development of imperialism changes the nature of state power. 
Bukharin suggests that 
in contrast to the state in the epoch of industrial capitalism, the imperialist 
state is characterised by an extraordinary increase in the complexity of its 
functions and by an impetuous incursion into the economic life of society ... 
The requirements of imperialist development compeL.the state [to] absorb 
into itself the whole multitude of bourgeois organisations. 27 
Following Bukharin, Lenin argues that imperialist desires and the new form of 
finance capital evolve new forms of state mechanisms to protect bourgeois society: 
powerful banks, nationalisation of communication networks, links between state 
and banks, cartel and trusts. 
The turn towards imperialism - meaning by that the complete domination of 
the trusts, the omnipotence of the big banks, a colonial policy on a grand 
scale ... has brought the 'devouring' of all the forces of society by the 
rapacious state power to the verge of complete catastrophe. 28 
Lenin uses this to strengthen his adoption of Marx's work on the French state of 
the 1848-52 period,29 but in doing so he uncritically adopts Marx's understanding 
that the working class are not of civil society. In this he is bolstered by Bukharin's 
suggestion that only two possibilities avail themselves: either workers organisations 
'become a simple appendage of the state apparatus' or they outgrow the confines 
of the state and explode it from within. 3D Since only 'yellow social democrats' 
accept the first option, Bukharin suggests that the second is the probable outcome. 
Bukharin's revolutionary faith leads him away from the real world; he cannot 
accept that the capitalist state could concede that level of assimilation. Lenin 
follows him in this, suggesting that the bourgeoisie 'is prepared to concede 
everything except the transformation of the organisations of the class which it 
oppresses into state organisations'. 31 Lenin can only conceptualise the working 
class becoming part of society at its highest levels, its 'aristocratic' elements, but 
52 
even this assimilation has no formal administrative foundation; it is entirely a 
product of key individuals' desire for personal gain - the labour aristocracy is 
bribed by the bourgeoisie, bought off as part of a subtle ploy by the bourgeois 
class. 32 
Moreover, the suggestion that the state seeks to absorb sections of society 
because of its imperialist ventures posits this development of the state entirely in 
terms of its external, international aspects. It is as though the development of the 
state is structured entirely by the economic demands of the bourgeois class, which 
happen to be focused on external markets. This completely overlooks the fact that 
the kind of mechanisms being discussed are a product of class struggle on the 
domestic front, as will be illustrated in the case of Britain in Part III. In other 
words, Lenin's analysis appears to write class struggle out of the development of 
the capitalist states. 
Furthermore, because Lenin's 'microscopic universe' 33 does not include modern 
administration it fails to address this phenomenon. Lenin's analysis is lacking 
precisely because it is not of the modern administrative state but is a critique of the 
obsolescent Russian one. This will hardly suffice in an attempt to develop a 
materialist analysis of the capitalist state in the twentieth century. However, the 
Germans did have experience of such administrative mechanisms and yet they too 
failed to deal with them theoretically. The focus on Parliament directed attention 
away from the mechanisms of political administration being developed to mediate 
the contradictions of civil society as the working class become incorporated. 
Hegemony and the Expanded State 
In an insightful passage in his Prison Notebooks Gramsci points to the way the rise 
of sociology has led to a decline in political science and the art of politics, one 
result of which is a severely impoverished concept of the state. 34 Gramsci 
recognises this impoverished concept of the state is also present in Marxism, 
especially the Marxism of the Second International, which has lost the concept of 
the political. It is for this reason that Gramsci turns to Hegel and the Italian 
idealists for a more sophisticated concept of the state and the political. 35 Thus 
whilst it is true that Gramcsi' s work should indeed be read as an attempt to offer 
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a sustained Marxist analysis of the bourgeois state, as many commentators suggest, 
its Hegelian heritage needs to be stressed. A focus on his '''structural'' leninism' as 
the 'most complex expression of leninism' 36 fails to do justice to the significance 
of Gramsci' s attention to the political. 
In his earlier writings Gramsci follows Lenin and Bukharin in argumg that 
imperialism leads to a changed role for the state, because 'in the imperialist phase 
of the historic evolution of the bourgeois class industrial power is divorced from 
the factory and concentrated in a trust, a monopoly, a bank, the state bureaucracy', 
the state undergoes a number of changes. 
During the war and as a result of the necessities of the war, the Italian state 
took over the regulation of the production and distribution of material wealth 
as one of its functions. A sort of industrial and commercial trust has been set 
up, a sort of concentration of the means of production and exchange. 37 
For Gramsci the requirements of imperialist expansion and the demands of war 
lead to greater state involvement, 'regulation' in economic life, as it takes over 
production and material 'functions'. From this follows two things: first, this 
imperial expansion of the state raises the possibility for renewed working class 
activity, for the national co-ordination of the economy raises the possibility of a 
system of factories established on the basis of workers councils; second, these 
developments in the state reveal an underlying crisis in which the state shows its 
shaky foundations, and from this the possibility of the working class conquering 
the state arises. 
This involves a change in the position of the working class: 
The worker, freed from the bosses subjection and from the servile mentality 
generated by a hierarchy, and driven too by the new social conditions 
resulting from the new historical phase, achieves priceless gains in terms of 
autonomy and initiative.38 
Because the Italian state had revealed itself as dependent on the changes within the 
imperialist order Gramsci argues that the bourgeoisie has relinquished the claim to 
represent the nation and that the working class is the only force which can 'arrest 
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the process of dissolution of national unity'. This raises the fundamental problem 
of leadership, to which we shall return in a moment. 
What needs to be registered here is Gramsci' s early conception of the changes 
in state power. He is working with a crude periodisation involving a comparison 
between the 'liberal' and 'imperialist' phases in the historical evolution of 
bourgeois society. This is heavily determined by Lenin's work on the imperialist 
stage of capitalist development. This broad periodisation will continue in Gramsci' s 
work, and feeds into his two conceptions of the state. As these two conceptions are 
developed, and the concept of hegemony is expanded beyond the question of 
leadership, he loses the focus on imperialism. This allows for a more sustained 
attempt at conceptualising some of the historical changes, through his two 
conceptions of the state and via the expanded concept of hegemony. 
Despite the above comments it should be noted that even though he works with 
this historical distinction in his earlier work Gramsci is concerned that the Italian 
state is atypical in the sense that it did not evolve into a constitutional democratic 
state but had to be created by industrial capitalism. The peculiarity of the Italians 
is that 'the Italian state has never been liberal'. 39 In fact the Italian state barely 
concealed the fact that it was the dictatorship of the possessing class through 
bourgeois liberal democratic institutional means such as the separation of powers 
and the extension of civil liberties. In his concern for the peculiarities of the Italian 
state Gramsci suggests that: 
the present phase of the class struggle in Italy is the phase that precedes: 
either the conquest of political power on the part of the revolutionary 
proletariat and the transition to new modes of production ... or a tremendous 
reaction on the part of the propertied classes and governing caste. No 
violence will be spared in subjecting the industrial and agricultural proletariat 
to servile labour: there will be a bid to smash once and for all the working 
class' organs of political struggles (the Socialist Party) and to incorporate its 
organs of economic resistance (the Trade Unions and co-operatives) into the 
machinery of the bourgeois state. 40 
Because of this Gramsci sees the need to develop a more comprehensive analysis 
of the state in Western Europe, and in the process he fundamentally transforms the 
category 'hegemony'. 'Hegemony' was in fact in wide use prior to its adoption by 
55 
Gramsci, being used by Lenin, Stalin, Bukharin, Plekhanov and Zinoviey amongst 
others. It was a key term from the 1880' s as part of the strategy for overthrowing 
Tsarism. 41 The term traditionally referred to the type of leadership exercised by 
the proletariat over other groups, such as the peasantry and intellectuals, in alliance 
against Tsarism. In his earlier works Gramsci adheres to this meaning: 'the 
revolution presents itself in practice as the hegemony of the proletariat leading its 
ally: the peasant class. ,42 and he asserts its Leninist heritage.43 A number of 
events conspired to make the whole question of proletarian leadership subsidiary 
to a much broader question. These centre on the absence of revolution in Western 
Europe. Notable here is the failed German revolution of 1918 and the defeat of the 
council movement in Italy, which would go down as the 'missed-out' or 'failed' 
revolution. 44 To this we can add the triumph of fascism and the nature of 
developments within the Soviet state. These events created an even more pressing 
need to develop materialist analysis, to which Gramsci responds. 
A certain number of observations and criteria must form the basis for ... study. 
The first of these concerns the fact that in the advanced capitalist countries 
the ruling classes possess political and organisational reserves which it did 
not possess, for instance, in Russia. This means that even the most serious 
economic crises do not have immediate repercussions in the political sphere. 
Politics always lags behind economics, far behind. The state apparatus is far 
more resistant than is often possible to believe; it succeeds, at moments of 
crisis, in organising greater forces loyal to the regime than the depths of the 
crisis might lead one to suppose. That is especially true of the more 
important capitalist states.45 
Now for Gramsci this difference between East and West is compounded by the , 
very different degrees of development of civil society in the two regions. In one 
of his key insights, which also signals one of his significant conceptual 
developments, Gramsci suggests that 
In the east the State was everything, civil society was primordial and 
gelatanious; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil 
society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was 
at once revealed. 46 
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In other words, one of the major differences between East and West, and therefore 
one of the reasons for the failure or absence of revolution in the West is the , 
existence and nature of civil society. Gramsci is therefore positing the state-civil 
society dichotomy as one that is fruitful for an understanding of the nature of 
power in Western states. In particular, the understanding of state power IS 
dependent upon the understanding of civil society and its relation to the state. 
This is of most concern to Gramsci because it raises questions about tactics -
leading him to draw a Kautskyan distinction between war of manoeuvre and war 
of position (Kautsky's war of annihilation and war of attrition respectively)47 
where the existence and nature of civil society in the West makes a slower and 
more gradual war of position necessary. It also has the advantage of shifting his 
focus away from questions concerning imperialism and the limitations inherent in 
it, towards the factors internal to nation-states. Gramsci recognises that after 1848 
the development of the state involved not just the mobilisation of society for 
imperialist venture, but the expansion of parliament and administrative 
organisations, all in order to safeguard the political and social order. 
Modern political technique became totally transformed after Forty-eight; after 
the expansion of Parliament and of the associative systems of union and 
party, and the growth in the formation of vast State and 'private' 
bureaucracies (i.e. politico-private, belonging to parties and trade unions); 
and after the transformations which took place in the organisation of the 
forces of order in the wide sense - i.e. not only the public service designed 
for the repression of crime, but the totality of forces organised by the state 
and by private individuals to safeguard the political and economic 
domination of the ruling classes.48 
This is not just a question of state development; it simultaneously involves an 
increasing complexity in civil society.49 The problem of tactics posed here leads 
Gramsci to argue that the war of manoeuvre is no longer appropriate and needs 
replacing with a war of position; this results in an expanded concept of hegemony. 
He writes that 
In the period after 1870 with the colonial expansion of Europe ... the internal 
and international organisational relations of the state became more complex 
and massive, and the Forty Eightist formula of the 'Permanent Revolution' 
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is expanded and transcended in political SCIence by the formula of 'civil 
hegemony'. 
And he goes on to add that 
the state is the entire complex of practical and theoretical actIVitIes with 
which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but 
manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules. 50 
Thus it would seem that the state maintains political order by means of winning 
consent from the masses, and materialist analysis now needs an understanding of 
'civil hegemony'. Hegemony no longer refers to the question of leadership, but 
designates the dominance of the ruling class, and now operates in, or functions 
through, both state and civil society. The expansion of the concept is thus twofold: 
on the one hand the application of the concept has shifted from the working to the 
bourgeois class; it no longer points to the problem of proletarian leadership but 
designates the nature of class rule in general. On the other hand because it is 
extended in this first way, it now includes the various cultural, intellectual and 
moral institutions of civil society and the state. 51 
We will return to this expanded concept of hegemony below; before we can go 
further with it we need to examine Gramsci' s expanded concept of the state. His 
sensitivity to the contrast between the liberal state and the state as it develops after 
1870 leads him to expand the concept of the state in Hegelian fashion, such that 
he moves towards an identification of state and civil society: state and civil society 
have become enmeshed, with the state intervening and controlling the previously 
separate spheres of civil society. 
Gramsci argues that the liberal claim that the state should not interfere with 
economic activity, which is a part of civil society, is absurd 'since in reality civil 
society and the state are one and the same'. 52 Moreover 
the general notion of state includes elements which need to be referred back 
to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that state = 
political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the 
f .) 53 armour 0 coercIOn. 
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Gramsci's Hegelianism is evident here, and he makes a point of registering this 
heritage. It is this conception that Gramsci uses to understand the 'integral state': 
'In politics the error occurs as a result of an inaccurate understanding of what the 
state (in its integral meaning: dictatorship + hegemony) really is' .54 This state is 
the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class 
rules and justifies its rule. 5s 
However, along with this expanded concept of the state exists another, narrower 
concept, in which the state is equated with political society and contrasted to civil 
society. 
What we can do .. .is to fix two major superstructural 'levels': the one that can 
be called 'civil society', that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called 
'private', and that of 'political society' or 'the state'. S6 
The equation of state with political society serves to distinguish it from the 
non-political. S7 Anderson suggests that in Gramsci' s work 'the state itself 
oscillates between three definitions' where the state contrasts with civil society, 
encompasses civil society and is identical with civil society.58 In fact Gramsci is 
working with two conceptions where the state either contrasts with civil society or 
encompasses it (which would include Anderson's third definition). It is this dual 
conception - a narrow one (in which the state is contrasted with civil society) and 
an expanded one (in which the state encompasses civil society) - which concerns 
us. 
It was noted above that one of Gramsci' s suggestions is that we think of state 
and civil society as two superstructural levels. It is here that we find elements of 
Gramsci's Marxism. In the last chapter it was suggested that the state-civil society 
couplet in Marx becomes bound up with, and partly superseded by, the 
base-superstructure couplet. Likewise it has been noted here how Gramsci' s 
adoption of the state-civil society couplet is rooted in his reading of Hegel rather 
than Marx. However, what Gramsci does adopt from Marx is precisely the 
base-superstructure (or, 'structure-superstructure') couplet. Two issues arise from 
this. In the process of adopting it from Marx Gramsci also adapts it; and in 
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working with both couplets, the one from Marx and the one from Hegel, Gramsci 
seeks to combine the two. 
Gramsci takes from Marx the insight that it is civil society that is the focal point 
of history, embracing as it does material life and the struggles therein. This would 
appear to posit it as the structural level. For Gramsci, however, civil society 
belongs not to the structural sphere but to the superstructural, as we have seen. 
Thus for both Marx and Gramsci civil society, and not the state, represents the 
active and positive sphere; but whilst for Marx this active and positive sphere is a 
structural phenomenon, in Gramsci it is superstructural. As Bobbio notes, this 
brings into focus two very important points: firstly that Gramsci' s concept of civil 
society derives from Hegel's; and secondly that Hegel's concept of civil society, 
as understood by Gramsci, is superstructural. 59 
To explain this we need to consider the differences between Gramsci' s 
appropriations of Marx and Hegel. Gramsci is aware of the need to develop 
Marxism in a fashion adequate to historical developments. In particular he regards 
economism, with which Marxism was now closely associated, as a stumbling block 
and for this reason seeks to break with the economistic tendencies within 
Marxism. 60 He suggests that economism regards everything as economics, yet 
between the premIse (economic structure) and the consequence (political 
organisation), relations are by no means simple and direct; it is not only by 
economic facts that the history of a people can be documented. 'Mechanical 
historical materialism does not allow for the possibility of error [on the part of 
leaders], but assumes that every political act is determined, immediately, by the 
structure' .61 Rather than economIC determinism Marxism reqUIres an 
understanding of the primacy of the political. 62 However, his critique of 
economism does not lead him to break with Marxism in the manner of Bernstein, 
but to a more sophisticated attempt to conceptualise the problem through state, civil 
society and economic structure (base). In the process of performing this task 
Gramsci separates the economic base/structure from the concept of civil society. 
Thus on the one hand the economic base is seen as one side of a 
structure-superstructure dichotomy, on the other hand the superstructure is taken 
to include two levels, one of which is civil society. 
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As we have seen, civil society for Hegel includes not only the economIC 
structure but also the forms of organisation that arise from it and seek to regulate 
it. Gramsci regards Hegel's conception of association as 'vague and primitive'; 
being 'halfway between the political and the economic' Hegel's corporative 
organisation constitutes 'a politics grafted on to the economy' . 63 It would 
therefore appear that Hegel's civil society that Gramsci has in mind is not its 
economic moment - the system of needs - but the range of institutions which 
regulate them, precisely the institutions that provide the basis for administration. 64 
Thus Gramsci' s conception of Hegel's civil society is that it is a superstructural 
moment, halfway between the political and economic. 
In this sense Gramsci is seeking to combine both the state-civil society and 
base-superstructure couplets in a different way to Marx, and in so doing move 
beyond the limitations he regards as inherent in both. This takes him beyond both 
Hegel and Marx. This formulation helps shed light on the importance of the dual 
concept of the state in Gramsci' s work, and the manner in which both the narrow 
and expanded concepts work. In the narrow conception, in which the state is 
equated with political society, civil society appears to operate as a layer between 
the state and the economic structure. This would explain why a war of position 
leading to the winning of civil society was necessary before political power could 
be fully conquered. The fundamental problem with this conception is that it tends 
to utilise a far more limited concept of hegemony, to which we must now return. 
However, as we have seen, Gramsci also has an expanded concept of hegemony; 
our discussion of the expanded concept of the state can now shed light on the 
importance of this move, but we must first raise the further couplet, coercion and 
consent. In doing so we will seek to defend Gramsci from a Eurocommunist and 
post-Marxist reading. 
For Gramsci coercion and consent are key elements in the relationship between 
the proletariat and the peasantry in their hegemonic relationship during a bourgeois 
revolution; in this he does not differ from other writers who utilise 'hegemony' to 
designate political leadership. However, the expansion of the hegemony concept 
results in a fundamental change to the coercion and consent couplet. Taking from 
Machiavelli the distinction between two ways of fighting - by law or by force -
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where the first is natural to men and the second to beasts, and agreeing that as the 
first way often proves inadequate one must have recourse to the second, Gramsci 
transforms this duality into 'force and consent, authority and hegemony, violence 
and civilisation'. 65 Thus the duality of coercion and consent can be said to be 
valid in any historic epoch for Gramsci.66 Now, separating these dualisms out in 
the way Anderson does makes it appear that on the one hand there is force, 
authority and violence, and on the other there is consent, hegemony and 
civilisation. Hegemony is here distinct from force and within the same 'grouping' 
as consent. So hegemony is consent; consent is achieved through hegemony in 
'civilised' society. It is autonomous from the use of force or violence as the means 
of domination. 
Thus in the narrow conception of the state hegemony appears as the moment of 
consent captured in civil society, counterpoised to coercion that is concentrated in 
the state - hence Gramsci' s suggestion in the passage above that the two 
superstructural levels 'correspond on the one hand to the function of "hegemony" 
which the dominant group operates throughout society and on the other hand to 
that of "direct domination" or command exercised through the state. ,67 The point 
then is that where Gramsci works with the narrow conception of the state he also 
works with a narrow conception of hegemony. The state becomes associated with 
organised coercion, and civil society becomes the arena of hegemony. Such 
formulations partly explain why some commentators have mistakenly concluded 
that hegemony is specifically a concern of civil society. Mouffe, for example, 
suggests that for Gramsci 'the concept of the integral state ... serves primarily to 
demonstrate that civil society .. .is in fact the place where the hegemony of the 
bourgeoisie is exercised', and she maintains that in Gramsci's work the concept 
hegemony has nothing to do with the 'phenomenon of state intervention in the 
social sphere' or any 'enlargement of the state' .68 The problem with such a 
formulation is that it only succeeds if one ignores Gramsci' s expanded state 
concept, precisely that dimension of his work that is the most fruitful. 
As we have seen, when Gramsci works with his expanded conception of the 
state, civil society is read as a moment of the state; the point here is that the 
concept of hegemony undergoes a equivalent expansion. In this conception 
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hegemony incorporates both coercion and consent. For example, Gramsci suggests 
that behind the separation of powers between judiciary, legislature and executive 
there is a fundamental unity of the state, and that 'all three powers are also organs 
of political hegemony'. 69 Since political society is either part of the state70 or is 
identical with the state 71 it would seem that hegemony is also a function of the 
state. Similarly there are occasions in which Gramsci argues that hegemony 
involves the use of force: 
The 'normal' exerCIse of hegemony on the now classical terrain of the 
parliamentary regime is characterised by the combination of force and 
consent which balance each other reciprocally. 72 
Since the means of the legitimate use of force is monopolised by the state, to argue 
that the exercise of hegemony is partly characterised by the use of force must 
imply that hegemony is exercised through the state. And when considering the 
politics of Croce and Gentile, Gramsci is critical of the way Croce's liberalism 
leads him to maintain a distinction between civil and political society, between 
hegemony and dictatorship, and how Gentile's fascistic focus on the state at least 
allows him to recognise that 'hegemony and dictatorship are indistinguishable, 
force and consent are simply equivalent'.73 In other words, the question of 
hegemony is not about coercion or consent, but about coercion and consent. 
Moreover, because it is integrally related to Gramsci' s articulation of the expanded 
state concept, hegemony is incorporated into the state itself. 74 
In many ways this 'problem' of coercion and consent is a side issue, detracting 
from far more substantive points. It undoubtedly has its roots in Gramsci's Italian 
background, stemming from the influence of Machiavelli and Croce. But the issue 
of coercion and consent is of essentially liberal origin and concern. For Marx there 
is no real theoretical problem with coercion and consent as they are two moments 
of the process of class domination. Thus although Marx recognises the state as a 
force of coercion, he also sees how it is presented as a force representing the 
whole community and working for the 'public good'. 75 In adopting the problem 
of Machiavelli's centaur Gramsci problematises the coercion-consent couplet. As 
Hoffman notes, the synthesis of coercion and consent that exists in the classical 
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tradition has to be taken apart to be analysed; this Gramsci does. But in analysing 
them he loses the synthesis found in Marx.76 He is drawn to this because of the 
specifically Italian intellectual context in which he is working. Marx treats coercion 
and consent as synthesised within the unity of domination because he accepts the 
Hegelian principle that social order is constituted through a process of struggle and 
recognition. Classes are constituted not through a process of coercion or consent 
but through struggle for domination. It is through this process that order is 
constituted. Considering the process this way affirms the class nature of this 
struggle and renders the issue of 'coercion or consent' irrelevant. Gramsci 
recognises that it is classes that are hegemonic; but it is precisely the class nature 
of hegemony that runs the danger of being relegated through a focus on the issue 
of coercion-consent. 
Moreover, in relegating the issue of class struggle one is in danger of expanding 
the concept 'hegemony' to the point where it becomes vacuous. Here we can 
extend our criticism of Mouffe initiated above. It is precisely the absence of classes 
that constitutes the key deficiency of the attempt to focus exclusively on hegemony 
as central to socialist strategy in the attempt to move towards a 'radical democratic 
politics'. In this move Gramsci' s call for a war of position is refused on the 
grounds that it supposes the division of the social space into two camps, a 
supposition that is denied. This denial results in a socialist strategy that 
conceptualises hegemony without classes. 77 Yet at the heart of Gramsci' s concept 
of hegemony is class. Again, it is Gramsci' s expanded concept of the state that 
becomes important. As Buci-Glucksman notes, the expanded concept of the integral 
state, (and here we must add: or something like it) becomes the touchstone for a 
Marxist analysis, contra Mouffe's claims above. 78 
Buci-Glucksman is correct to claim that Gramsci's work on hegemony makes 
sense if we accept that in his later work he operates with an expanded concept of 
the state and we examine hegemonic apparatuses rather than hegemony. 79 This is 
useful because, as she points out, Gramsci' s expansion of the concept of the state 
is located within a precise polemical and theoretical context; the expansion of the 
concept of the state is a response to the expansion of the state itself: the expansion 
of the state involves an incorporation of hegemony and its apparatuses into the 
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state.
80 Hegemony, as Adamson notes, 'is a concept whose thrust is to circumvent 
all sharp distinctions of base and superstructure which treat the latter as mere 
epiphenomenon, as in many Second International Marxisms, or which assume that 
a new superstructure can be built independently of the base, as in Lenin's 
voluntarism'. 81 The point being that hegemony is used in conjunction with the 
three couplets, base-superstructure, state-civil society and coercion-consent, and 
directly linked to class. 
The importance of the expansion of the hegemony concept can be illustrated 
through a brief discussion of law. Gramsci is well aware of the coercive moment 
in law. He writes that 
the greatest legislative power belongs to the state personnel (elected and 
career officials), who have at their disposal the legal coercive powers of the 
state ... The state represents the coercive and punitive force of juridical 
regulation of a country. 82 
However, he is also aware that the coercive element is part of a wider function of 
law. Because law provides the basis for the non-coercive constitution of political 
order Gramsci regards the 'juridical problem' as one of 'assimilating the entire 
grouping to its most advanced fraction'. That is, 'through 'law' the ruling group 
is rendered 'homogeneous', and creates a social conformism which is useful to the 
ruling group's line of development'. The state is central to this process but law 'is 
wider than purely State and governmental activity and also includes the activity 
involved in directing civil society'. 83 This reiterates the insights of Hegel and 
Marx and points to their common belief that there is not, pace Foucault, a crude 
distinction to be drawn between (repressive) law and norm; rather law is central to 
norm creation and the technical administration of civil society. 84 
Why then is the expanded concept of the state useful, and can it be utilised for 
a materialist analysis of the state? It has already been noted that Gramsci is 
concerned with the tactics of the communist movement. Central to this must be an 
understanding of the nature of power in capitalist societies, which in turn must 
involve an understanding of the relationship between state and civil society. 
Gramsci is sensitive to the changes that this relationship had undergone and was 
still undergoing; it is significant that when he expands the state concept it is in 
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relation to events after 1848 (or 1870). Gramsci is adamant that the distinction 
between state and civil society is methodological and is highly critical of those who 
regard it as organic. 85 Gramsci is undoubtedly right to insist on the necessity for 
an expanded state concept, for the narrow conception conceptualises civil society 
as depoliticised, outside the sphere of the political, whereby politics is reduced to 
the state. With an expanded concept the political nature of civil society (at least 
potentially so) opens itself to theorisation. Now, there is no doubt that Gramsci is 
engaged in an attempt to understand precisely those changes that the state and civil 
society were undergoing in Western Europe, and he recognises that to do this a 
narrower state concept simply will not do. However, when he discusses the 
manner in which the state and civil society are one and the same we find that he 
incorporates civil society into the state; being encompassed by the state results in 
civil society and the state becoming identified as one and the same. Doing this runs 
the danger of all forms of domination being subsumed within the state. One runs 
the risk of all apparatuses being theorised as state apparatuses, precisely the move 
we will find Althusser makes, from which it becomes impossible to distinguish 
between the differential functioning of different institutions of domination. 
On the one hand, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to theorise the 
differences between the kind of domination found in state apparatuses and the kind 
of domination found in, say, the family or the Church. On the other hand, if one 
conceptualises civil society as subsumed within the state then it becomes impossible 
to theorise the process of penetration of civil society by the state. 86 Any 
theoretical advances achieved through the use of an expanded state concept are far 
outweighed by these two difficulties. The concept hegemony does not overcome 
these difficulties; if anything it adds to them. 
Gramsci is right to focus on the state-civil society couplet, and right to assert its 
Hegelian heritage. In doing so he advances materialist analysis well beyond Lenin. 
However, in utilising this couplet in the attempt to theorise the historical changes 
occurring in capitalist societies it is not an expanded state concept and broadening 
of the concept of hegemony that is needed. Far more fruitful is an approach that 
retains the methodological distinction between state and civil society, and rethinks 
it not through the category 'hegemony', but through the category 'political 
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administration'. The two fundamental problems with Gramsci' s approach just 
outlined are then overcome. Most importantly it becomes possible to theorise the 
way in which the state develops administration mechanisms in response to class 
struggle; key institutions of civil society become politicised, partially absorbed by 
the state and thereafter administered. For this neither an expanded state concept 
not the concept of hegemony are needed. What is needed is an expanded concept 
of the political, which includes administration. 
Moreover this argument does not counterpose state and civil society to base and 
superstructure, nor try to weld one to the other. (Political economy is the key to the 
anatomy of civil society, of which the sphere of needs is but one dimension). 
Separating state-civil society from base-superstructure in the way Gramsci does -
and here his comments that he adopts the former from Hegel and the latter from 
Marx are revealing - requires a syncretic superimposition of one on the other 
(unless of course one seeks to jettison one of the models altogether),87 a task 
which the category 'hegemony' is intended to assist in accomplishing. But this 
leaves a model in which the base becomes a separate sphere requiring separate 
analysis. This loses an essential aspect of the dialectic of state and civil society as 
the relationship of the base to the two 'superstructural' levels remains unclear and, 
ultimately. untheorised. 
Moreover, it could be argued that the slippages and oscillations in Gramsci's 
work allow for later readings in which the distinction between state and civil 
society is denied (Althusser, Foucault) and hegemony is stripped of its class 
dimension (Laclau and Mouffe).88 The following section takes Issue with 
Althusser's work on the state and ideology, where it is shown that despite his 
criticisms of Gramsci, Althusser can be seen to follow in his footsteps. This will 
lead in to the discussion of Foucault's work on power in Part II. 
Ideology and State Apparatuses 
Although Gramsci develops his expanded concept of the state in order to tackle the 
historical problems posed by the changing boundaries of the political, one reading 
of it is that the very distinction between state and civil society has been 
cancelled. 89 The invitation to cancel the distinction has been accepted by a number 
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of writers, such as Althusser and it is taken further by Foucault and his followers. 
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with the manner in which Althusser's 
acceptance of the invitation leads to a series of moves that constitute yet further 
invitations to Foucault. Despite their important political differences, one can trace 
a number of theoretical affinities between Althusser and Foucault. It is for this 
reason that Althusser is being dealt with here. 
Because our concern is with the state it is on this that our attention shall be 
focused. However, there other related affinities. For example, Perry Anderson 
points out that when in 1962 Levi-Strauss unloosed the slogan of the decade, 'the 
ultimate goal of the human sciences is not to constitute man but to dissolve him', 
the Marxist reply, when it came via Althusser in 1965, was not a repudiation but 
a counter-signature of the structuralist claim. Rather than engagmg with 
Levi-Strauss' attacks on history and humanism, Althusser 'endorsed and 
incorporated them into a Marxism that was now itself reinterpreted as a theoretical 
anti-humanism'. For Anderson, Althusserianism 'even at the peak of its 
productivity ... was always constituted in an intimate and fatal dependence on a 
structuralism that both preceded it and would survive it' .90 Althusser's decision 
to develop a version of Marxism which assisted structuralism in abolishing the 
subject merely enabled Foucault to go one step further and proclaim both the end 
of man and the obsolescence of Marxism. 91 
Althusser suggests, as does Foucault, that the concept of 'civil society' IS 
meaningless for political analysis. Having no place in historical materialism it 
should be 'struck from Marxist theoretical vocabulary'. In order to sustain this 
position Althusser must engage in a number of misreadings: reducing civil society 
to individual economic behaviour, suggesting that the concept both disappears from 
and is ambiguous in Marx's mature work, and that in Gramsci the concept 
designates the sphere of economic existence. 92 These are spurious claims, and it 
is perhaps significant that Althusser is led to make them in order to jettison the 
concept. This leads to a number of problems in both Foucault and Althusser. In 
rejecting the concept civil society Foucault simultaneously rejects the concept of 
the state, leaving him with an all-embracing concept of power and the social. In 
comparison, Althusser rejects the civil society concept whilst retaining the state 
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concept. As a consequence he is forced to expand the concept of the state to 
include all those institutions of civil society. This is done not in the fashion of 
Hegel, Marx and Gramsci, in which state and civil society are drawn together yet 
simultaneously conceptually distinguished, but as part of an altogether different 
project. In other words, in rejecting the civil society concept any distinction 
between state and civil society is obliterated. The consequences are enormous. To 
see why they are we must first identify some of the broader features of Althusser' s 
work. 
In order to capture the 'specific effectivity of the superstructures' which he feels 
has been missing in Marxism, Althusser utilises the notion of a social formation 
within which there operate a number of distinct practices: economic, political, 
ideological and theoretical. 'Social practice' involves 'the complex unity of the 
practices existing in a determinate society'. Each of these practices is relatively 
autonomous, operating within the complex unity, although ultimately economIC 
practice is determinant. 93 The social formation for Althusser is a pre-given 
complex structured whole. 94 This is different from the Hegelian concept of a 
social totality, which Althusser characterises as an expressive totality, where each 
of the parts expresses the essence of the totality itself.95 Instead, Althusser argues 
that the Marxist totality, as a pre-given complex structured whole containing no 
essence to be expressed, is a plurality of instances involving a multiplicity of 
practices which are relatively autonomous, though not independent, since the 
economic is determinant in the last instance. Althusser attempts to avoid the charge 
of economism by claiming that although the economic is determinant in the last 
instance it is not always dominant. Other elements of the social formation can be 
dominant although this dominance is never stronger than the economic. Thus the 
whole has the unity of a structure articulated in dominance; the political and 
ideological are determinant as well as determined. Hence the social formation is 
'overdetermined' .96 Althusser thus borrows the concepts of overdetermination and 
determination in the last instance from psychoanalysis and Engels respectively in 
order to articulate the relationship between the economy and the rest of the social 
formation. The consequence is a structure of structures. complex, multiform and 
heterogeneous; that is, overdetermined.97 
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Althusser develops this further by inserting a differential temporality into this 
complexity. Whereas the Hegelian totality involves a notion of time that is 
homogeneous and continuous, the structural complexity of the Marxist whole 
makes it no longer possible 
to think the process of the development of the different levels of the whole 
in the same historical time. Each of these different 'levels' does not have the 
same type of historical existence. On the contrary, we have to assign to each 
level a peculiar time, relatively autonomous and hence relatively 
independent, even in its dependence, of the 'times' of the other levels. 98 
The economic, the ideological, the political, the scientific etc. all have their own 
time and history. Althusser is not only utilising Freud's claim that the time of the 
unconscious cannot be confused with the time of biography as an illustration of the 
way different historical times are in operation, but also supports his argument with 
the work of Foucault, claiming that Foucault's 'remarkable' studies in the history 
of madness and the birth of clinical medicine show the 'distance between the 
elegant sequences of the official chronicle, in which a discipline of a society 
merely reflects its good conscience ... and the absolutely unexpected temporality that 
constitutes the essence of the process of constitution and development of those 
cultural formations'. 99 The link with Foucault here is unsurprising, since part of 
Althusser's intention is to break with Hegel and any traces of Hegel in Marxism. 
But despite his references to the 'whole', Althusser's conceptualisation of 
differential temporality results in an inability to think of either history or social 
formations as a totality. 100 One of the effects of this is that it then becomes 
impossible to think of the transformation of this totality, of one mode of production 
to another. Given this, any discussion of a historical subject effecting that 
transformation is immediately ruled out of court. This last point is developed 
further below. 
How then does Althusser theorise the effectivity of the superstructures? 
Suggesting that the Marxist tradition is strict in its explicit conceptualisation of the 
state as a repressive apparatus,101 Althusser points to this as the central dimension 
of Marx and Lenin's work on the state. The state is thus seen as a set of 'state 
apparatuses': police, courts, prisons, army, government and administration. Such 
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an analysis remains for Althusser 'descriptive', because it is the first phase of the 
theory, is a transitional stage in the theory and it gives us the essential point to be 
developed. Most importantly, this descriptive stage of the theory is a stage which 
needs to be superseded.102 Put another way, something needs to be added to the 
classical definition of the state as an apparatus that is essentially repressive. 
Marxists recognised this in their practice and yet lacked in their theory. 
In their political practice the Marxist classics treated the state as a more 
complex reality than the definition of it given in the Marxist theory of the 
state .... They recognised this complexity in their practice but did not express 
it in a corresponding theory. 103 
In order to overcome this lack of theoretical complexity, which he suggests only 
Gramsci went any way towards, and to advance the theory of the state, Althusser 
suggests that 'another reality' must be taken into account: the ideological state 
apparatuses (ISA's). For the elements of the state outlined above, police, courts, 
army, government and administration, are best understood as the repressive state 
apparatus (RSA). This is because they ultimately function by violence. By contrast 
ISA's are' a certain number of realities which present themselves to the immediate 
observer in the form of distinct and specialised institutions'. 104 Amongst these are 
the religious ISA (the system of churches), the educational ISA (public and private 
schools), the family ISA, the legal ISA, the political ISA (including parties), the 
Trade Union ISA, the communications ISA (mass media) and the cultural ISA 
(literature, arts, sports). 
Now, in many ways it does not matter precisely which institutions Althusser 
places within the various ISAs, and as such specific analyses of the ISAs are 
rendered obsolete,105 for it is established in advance by Althusser that they secure 
the reproduction of the conditions of production. The reason for Althusser 
beginning his essay by pointing to the need for society to reproduce the conditions 
of production, most notably labour-power, takes on a new significance. Having 
rejected the category 'civil society' Althusser is left with the 'economic base' and 
the 'superstructure', and, given that the reproduction of the conditions of 
production does not take place solely within the 'economic' sphere. Althusser 
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points to the effectivity of the superstructure in this process of reproduction. In 
doing so he points to the reality of 'ideology' and 'state'. 
Regarding the distinction between the RSA and the ISAs Althusser suggests that 
the (Repressive) State Apparatus functions massively and predominantly by 
repression (including physical repression) while functioning secondarily by 
ideology .. .In the same way, but inversely, it is essential to say that for their 
part the Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly 
by ideology, but they also function secondarily by repression. l06 
The functioning of ISAs predominantly by ideology enables Althusser to overcome 
the accusation that the institutions included in his list are disparate and diverse, for 
they are unified beneath the ruling ideology, the ideology of the ruling class. The 
ruling class, as possessors of state power, must of necessity be active in the ISAs. 
It follows then that the ISAs can be the site as well as the stake of class struggle. 
The exploited classes find greater occasion and possibility for resistance in the 
ISAs than against the RSA. 
Thus whilst endowing the base with the power of being determinant in the last 
instance, the 'topographical' metaphor of base and superstructure is for Althusser 
the descriptive stage of the theory. He develops this with an essentially 
functionalist argument about the power of the superstructure, the ISAs, in the 
reproduction of the conditions of production. 107 At the same time his stress on 
the possibility of class struggle being waged within and over the ISAs is an 
incorporation not so much of Gramsci's war of position or Kautsky's war of 
attrition, but of Maoist claims that the proletariat must 'meet head-on every 
challenge of the bourgeoisie in the ideological field' and must struggle 'to 
transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure'. 108 
Thus Elliott is correct in claiming that Althusser's work on the ISAs 'is marked by 
an unresolved tension between functionalism - an automaticity of social 
reproduction via state apparatuses - and voluntarism - a contingency of social 
transformation via the deux ex machina of class struggle'. 109 We shall return to 
this functionalist moment in Althusser's work when we have further examined his 
work on ideology. 
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Now, to a large degree Althusser is taking up Gramsci' s problematic of the 
dichotomies of coercion and consent and state and civil society. His 
conceptualisation of ISAs is heavily dependant on Gramsci, but because Althusser 
has rejected the concept of civil society he has no recourse other than to declare 
these institutions to be of the state. In this way it might be argued that the ISAs are 
in fact a crude structuralist appropriation of Gramsci. Moreover, Althusser argues 
that ideological dominance of the ruling class is achieved through the specific 
ISAs. The difference between ISAs and the RSA is largely a matter of degree: in 
ISAs ideology dominates whereas in the RSA force dominates. But this is a far less 
sophisticated account of the relation between coercion and consent than that offered 
by Gramsci, for whom hegemony is achieved through a combination of coercion 
and consent. 110 
More importantly Althusser's positioning of institutions of civil society within 
the state, as state institutions, necessarily obliterates any distinction between state 
and civil society. It is Gramsci's more sophisticated analysis, involving state and 
civil society and an expanded state concept, that allows him to retain this 
distinction. Althusser's expansion of the state through ISAs to cover, in Elliott's 
words, everything from playschools to political parties, opens up the possibility of 
obliterating the difference between various forms of state. The result is that the 
differences between a fully corporate state structure where trade unions, political 
parties and play schools are an arm of the state apparatus, and a state in which 
trade unions, political parties and play schools operate independently of the state 
but in accordance with regulations determined by the state, are effectively denied, 
or at least obscured. 111 Althusser does not go this far, but the very possibility of 
such a conclusion being drawn is suggestive of the weakness of trying to 
conceptualise power in bourgeois society through a functional analysis of ISAs. 
This is further illustrated by Althusser's comments regarding political parties. For 
Althusser. the political ISA includes the different parties, yet it is not at all clear 
how the political parties could be said to reproduce the conditions of production 
in the way that the educational or family ISA could. What could be claimed is that 
political parties, however revolutionary they may seem, help sustain political order 
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by working through and thereby legitimating existing political institutions. 112 But 
this is a far cry from actually reproducing the conditions of production. 
Finally there is a question over Althusser's privileging of the educational ISA 
over all others. The list Althusser gives of ISAs is claimed by him to have a 
relatively large number of apparatuses in comparison with social formations such 
as feudalism which contained a smaller number of ISAs and also different types 
of apparatuses. The church, for example, performed a number of different 
ideological functions, in the fields of education and culture. which are today 
performed by several different apparatuses. The church in feudal society was the 
dominant ISA.113 It is Althusser's contention that the church as the dominant ISA 
has been replaced by the school, or the educational ISA. Through the educational 
apparatus the state has power over the entire population, a captive audience which 
it educates and indoctrinates with ruling class ideology masquerading as 
knowledge, and then ejects them into the world as, when and into whatever sphere 
of work it feels is necessary. 
Althusser accepts that the claim that the educational ISA is the dominant one 
may seem paradoxical given that it seems the political ISA, in particular 
parliamentary democracy and universal suffrage, is the dominant ISA. But he 
points out that bourgeois society has survived with political ISAs other than 
parliamentary democracy and he 'has good reasons'114 for thinking that the 
primary apparatus now is the educational system. Nonetheless Althusser's 
relegation of the political ISA is a little perplexing given the historical importance 
of the development of parliamentary democracy and universal suffrage during the 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. This importance was not lost on Marx 
or liberal theorists in the nineteenth centuries, as was seen in Chapter One. nor on 
the theorists of the Second International. 
It is undoubtedly the events of May 1968, in which students attacked so fiercely 
the power relations within the education system, that leads Althusser to argue that 
the educational ISA was the dominant ISA. This would explain his reference to the 
'unprecedently deep crisis' \vhich was 'shaking the education system of so many 
states across the globe'. 115 Similarly it could be claimed that Althusser was 
responding partly to the French education system in particular, which "-as subject 
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to far greater control by the state than in other Western countries. However. 
whether these factors fully explain his contention that the educational ISA is the 
most dominant is doubtful. The point is not to ascertain which ISA is dominant, 
but that Althusser's privileging of the educational ISA leads to the omission of any 
substantial discussion of the political ISA, a discussion which was fundamental to 
previous Marxist political analysis. 
Althusser's attention to the effectivity of the superstructures is also focused on 
ideology. An account of this concept as it features in Althusser's work will enable 
us to strengthen some of criticisms of the concept of ISAs above and illustrate the 
problems posed by a Marxism that seeks to develop theoretically without taking 
any account of a subject which is both collective and active. 
Rejecting The German Ideology as a pre-Marxist text, Althusser argues that 
ideology has no history; at least ideology in general has no history. Just as for 
Freud the unconscious has no history and is eternal, so ideology is eternal. Whereas 
in his earlier essays he argues that ideology is an organic part of every social 
totality, that all human societies secrete ideology and that even a communist society 
could not do without ideology,116 in his work on the state Althusser develops his 
account of ideology to argue that 'ideology interpellates individuals as subjects'. 
How is this so? First, 'ideology represents the imaginary relation of individuals to 
their real conditions of existence'. Second, 'ideology has a material existence'. 
Every ideology always exists in an apparatus and its practice. Hence its materiality; 
hence the ISAs. Finally, Althusser argues that the function of ideology is to 
constitute individuals into subjects. 117 Each individual with a consciousness and 
a particular set of behaviour patterns participates in a number of (material) practices 
which are those of the IA on which sets of ideas depend. So, for example, if an 
individual believes in God he goes to church; the individual's action is governed 
by the material IA and the material practices concerned. The materiality is 
fundamental here: 
It therefore appears that the subject acts insofar as he is acted by the 
following system: ideology existing in a material ideological apparatus, 
prescribing material practices governed by a material ritual. I18 
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Even more fundamental is that 
the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology but at the same 
time ... the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar 
as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of 'constituting' concrete 
individuals as subjects. 119 
Put simply: ideology constitutes individuals as conscIOUS subjects of society. 
Furthermore 'the interpellation of individuals as subjects presupposes the 
'existence' of a Unique and central Other Subject' .120 An example of this new 
Subject in Christian religion is God. God is the Subject, 'he who is through himself 
and for himself, and his subjects are his 'mirrors', his 'reflections'. 
The result of this is that in their subjection subjects work by themselves; they 
(mis)recognise themselves as free agents. The exception is 'bad subjects' who 
occasionally provoke the intervention of the RSA. Otherwise subjects work by 
themselves in practices governed by the ISAs. But the term 'subject' also implies 
subjection, submission, and therefore the denial of all freedom except that of freely 
accepted submission. 
The individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit 
freely to the commandments of the Subject i.e. in order that he shall (freely) 
accept his subjection .... There are no subjects except by and for their 
subjection. 121 
Like Foucault, Althusser recogmses that to be a subject is to be subjected. By 
constituting individuals as subjects and by creating the illusion in them of freedom, 
ideology secures their subjection to the social order. I22 Thus individuals not only 
undergo subjection in the very process of being constituted as subjects, but their 
constitution as subjects by ideology secures their submission to the social order. 
There are a number of points that need drawing out from this account to enable 
the full theoretical and practical implications of Althusser's understanding of 
ideology to be understood. First, Althusser treats the notion of the subject at the 
individual level. As Hirst notes, Althusser 'rejects the notion of the collective 
subject found in certain forms of "Hegelian" Marxism. This rejection of the 
collective/constitutive subject further reinforces the identification of the subject and 
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the individual'. 123 The full consequences of this will be drawn out below. For the 
moment we can note that the question of the subject which had plagued Western 
Marxism throughout the twentieth century had always remained a problem of the 
collective subject. But this was so because of its essentially Hegelian reading of 
Marx. In seeking to remove all traces of Hegelianism from Marx's own work124 
Althusser was isolated from any concern with the collective subject whatsoever. In 
Althusser's work all discussion of the subject is reduced to the level of the 
individual. 125 
Second, Althusser's conception of the subject involves its decentering. In his 
essay on 'Freud and Lacan' he argues that 
since Marx we have known that the human subject...is not the 'centre of 
history' - and even ... that history has no 'centre' but possesses a structure 
which has no necessary 'centre' except in ideological misrecognition. 126 
Moreover, Althusser argues that Freud has shown us that in its' decentering the 
human subject is constituted by a structure which has no 'centre' either. Now, this 
dec entering of the human subject is a result of his conception of individuals as 
supports of the social structure. 
The structure of the relations of production determines the places and 
functions occupied and adopted by the agents of production, who are never 
anything more than the occupants of these places, insofar as they are the 
'supports' (Trager) of these functions. The true 'subjects' (in the sense of the 
constitutive subjects of the process) are therefore not these occupants or 
functionaries, are not, despite all appearances, the 'obviousness' of the given 
of naive anthropology, 'concrete individuals', 'real men' - but the definition 
and distribution of these places and functions. The true 'subjects' are these 
definers and distributors: the relations of production (and political and 
ideological social relations). But since these are 'relations' they cannot be 
thought of within the category subject. 127. 
However, there is a danger that this 'decentering' in fact operates to eliminate the 
subject altogether. As Balibar puts it, 
To designate these individuals [Marx] systematically used the term Trager, 
which is most often translated into English as . support'. Men do not appear 
in the theory except in the form of supports for the connexions implied by 
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the structure. and the forms of their indiyiduality as determinate effects of the 
, . 
structure. -~ . 
. -'\ major problem here is that. as Kate Soper points out. this claim has no support 
in ~larx' s o\\TI \\Titing. 'It is true that ~larx used the word "Tra~cr" on occasion. 
L 
It is also true that he claims that in Capital he treats indiyiduals "only insofar as 
they are personifications of economic categories. embodiments of particular 
class-relations and class interests". But this does not imply that indiyiduals are 
nothing but "personifications" - if anything it points to the limitations of treating 
them in so abstract a fashion'. If this is so. argues Soper, then ,-'\lthusser is guilty 
of a fraudulent reading of ~ larx. ':0 Indeed. Althusser makes the fundanlental 
error that "\ farxism criticises: he has taken the phenomenal form as essence and 
accepted the key arguments of bourgeois political economy and philosophy. As 
Thompson \\Tites. the notion of human subjects as {l·dger. or carriers of functions 
allocated to them, was at the heart of bourgeois political economy and was 
intended to conyince the \\-orking class of precisely this point - that they are 
PO\\-erless carriers of the laws of bourgeois society. 130 
"\foreoyef. because Althusser de-collecti\-ises the subject. he is forced to treat 
classes as supports of social relations toO.131 Holding implacably to the claim that 
history is a process \\-ithout a subject Althusser simultaneously insists that "class 
struggle is the motor of history'. But \\-ithout any concept of the working class as 
a collectiYe subject. a uniyersal class, the introduction of class struggle appears as 
yet another deux cs machina, a token gesture. Furthermore, giYen its place as a 
mere support of social relations there seems little point in the class struggling, and 
giyen its passiyity one wonders \\-hat this struggle \\ould actually consist of. 
Finally. and here \\e raise an issue to be dealt \\ith below. \\hat is it struggling 
for?l~::' The \\hole point of working class struggle is a refusal to be a mere 
support of structures. to hail as \\-ell as be hailed. to be constitutiYe as well as 
constituted. to be an active subject rather than subjected. 
In claiming that hunlan beings are only the supports of the structure and that 
history is a process \\-ithout a subject Althusser is not simply reformulating the 
argument that since "\ Iarx' s early \\Titings are organised around the categ('t:' "man" 
and rely heayily on the understanding of an historical subject they belong to the 
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realm of ideology rather than SCIence and are not fully Marxist; he is also 
registering yet another conscious rejoinder to the Hegelian Marxist tradition 
prevalent in Western Marxism, which retains the notion of the subject. 133 The 
point of course is that the absence is not only of the collective subject, which 
would necessarily follow from Althusser's reduction of the subject to the level of 
the individual; it is also the denial that any subject can form the subject of history. 
As such the possibility of any meaningful determination of the whole by active 
subj ects is denied. 
The implications of this are crucial. Since the collective subject has been 
rejected, the subject decentred and removed from any creative role in historical 
transformation, what is the purpose of any revolutionary transformation of the 
social order? If 'the freedom of men is not achieved by the complacency of its 
ideological recognition but by knowledge of the laws of their slavery' and that this 
has been understood by the 'great' revolutionary materialist thinkers, theoreticians 
and politicians' 134 then it would seem that revolutionary transformation of the 
social order is either unthinkable or practically undesirable. Unthinkable because 
Althusser has a concept of ideology which is so universal, so necessary, and 
functions as such a powerful social cement that no space has been left for a theory 
and practice of ideology which resists and opposes this.135 If history is a process 
without a subject and human subjects are the mere supports of the structure, one 
wonders where social transformation will actually come from. Undesirable because 
if freedom is simply knowledge of the laws of mens slavery, if men are condemned 
to be the eternal supports of the constraining structures, and if, as Althusser argues, 
communism would be just a change in the mode of production,136 one feels 
inclined to agree with Martin Jay that it is hard to comprehend what a classless 
society would really achieve. 137 
The key problem with Althusser's work in terms of its use in analysing state 
power is that conceiving the capitalist state through the categories repression and 
ideology systematically ignores the importance of the transformation of the state 
from 1832 onwards (in the British case). Yet it is precisely this transformation that 
needs to be understood. This cannot be achieved through the repression-ideology 
couplet. Many of the changes that occurred, that were needed to stabilise and 
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maintain bourgeois social order, were a result not of 'repression' nor "ideological" 
inculcation, but of changes in the performance of the state in capitalist society 
whereby it no longer functions through direct force or ideological dominance. As 
such the repression-ideology couplet is incapable of grasping these changes. 
Moreover, in narrowing the subject down from its collective to individual mode 
and in conceptualising the working class as passively constituted by state 
apparatuses Althusser cannot help but obliterate the process of class struggle in 
these developments. Towards the end of his life Poulantzas grasped the importance 
of this: 
The state ... continually adopts material measures which are of posItIve 
significance for the popular masses, even though these measures represent so 
many concessions imposed by the struggle of the subordinate classes. This 
essential aspect cannot be explained if the relation between state and popular 
masses is reduced to the couplet repression-ideology. 138 
Althusser's failing is largely a result of his reliance on the concept of ideology to 
explain the power of the capitalist state in maintaining social order. His attempts 
to give ideology a material grounding, in the ISAs, is in a sense misleading, for the 
ISAs play a minor role in his theory of ideology overall; it is the theory of 
ideology that is meant to have the explanatory power rather than the ISAs. This is 
illustrated by the way the concept of ideology runs through all Althusser's work 
whereas the ISAs simply do not. As such the ISAs function as a materialist gloss 
in an analysis otherwise free from any trace of materialism. Because subjects are 
constituted in and through their subjection the introduction of ISAs serves merely 
to give ideology an institutional form; but it is the ideology that remains central. 
However, given Althusser's obliteration of civil society and the conceptualisation 
of ideology as the cement in the social order, the ISAs become coterminous with 
society. Althusser develops the concept of ISAs to move beyond the 'repressive 
hypothesis' present in Marxist analyses of the state, but in doing so conceptualises 
an array of institutions of civil society as Ideological State Apparatuses, and thus 
loses the specificity of the political nature of state power. An analogous shift and 
subsequent loss will be traced in the work of Foucault, though with Foucault it is 
not the ISAs that perform this function. 
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Moreover, Althusser's continual references to things 'material' serve the function 
of rendering everything material, even thought itself. It is not just that the word 
then loses all discriminatory force 139 but that it obscures the lack of an actual 
materialist analysis of the state. Likewise in utilising 'ideology' Althusser omits 
an analysis of precisely the way the state, not ISAs, operates. What is needed is not 
an all-embracing 'theory of the state' but concrete analyses of particular 
developments that are sensitive to the theoretical issues involved. The key issue is 
that the state as the centralised organ of power in bourgeois society administers 
civil society. Administration, as we shall see, cannot be understood as either 
ideology or repression. Moreover, with minor modifications 'ideology' can pass 
over into 'discourse' and 'structural complexity' into 'multi-faceted and fragmented 
technologies of power', and the road away from a materialist comprehension of 
power can be almost fully travelled within an approach which fully believes itself 
to be historical materialism. 
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Routledge, 1955), for example at p.184. 
3. M. Foucault, 'Orders of Discourse'. Social Science Information Vol. 1 0 No.2 
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below. 
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the state, it is significant that when Hegel begins to develop the distinction between 
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translation. The translation by T.M. Knox Hegel's Philosophy of Right (Oxford, 
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Hegelian Conception of the State' in Hegel's Political Philosophy: Problems and 
Perspectives, edited by Z. Pelczynski (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1971), p.13-14. 
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9. Para.l83, emphasis in original. 
10. See for example para. 189; Pelczynski op.cit. p.12; S. Benhabib, Critique, Norm 
and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1986), p.96. 
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pAS3. The one 'solution' that Hegel does propose is colonialism and imperialism. 
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these antagonisms. 
37. T.E. \\'artenberg, 'Poverty and Class Structure in Hegel's Theory of Ciyil 
Society', Philosophy and Social Criticism, \'01.18 No.2 (1981). p.178. 
85 
• 
38. 'A Contribution to the Critique of Critique of Heger s Philosophy of Right. 
Introduction' in EW p.256; The German Ideology op.cit. p.94. 
39. Here Hegel and Marx reveal their rootedness in previous political thought. 
where it is also common to find the working class considered as outside of ciyil 
society - see for example the discussion of John Locke in C.B. Macpherson, The 
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford University Press, 1962), p.227 
& 248. Likewise see Kant's comments on the necessity for a citizen to his own 
master (as well as adult and male), a necessity which excludes those whose labour 
is made use of by others, in 'On the Common Saying: "This May be True in 
Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice'" in I. Kant, Political Writings 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.78. For Marx's failure in 
following Hegel here see Cohen op.cit. p.61 and Rundell op.cit. p.90-9l. Later 
writers will also make the same error. In Chapter Two it will be shown how Lenin 
continues in this fashion (,labour aristocracy' notwithstanding). And although 
British 'right-Hegelians' undoubtedly went some way to encouraging the 
incorporation of the working class (see Chapter Five below), they also continue in 
the same fashion: T.H. Green for example suggest that wage-labourers may as well 
be deprived of rights of property altogether - Principles of Political Obligation 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986), Section 220. 
40. In his essay 'Society' Adorno describes the working class as being half outside 
society, in Critical Theory and Society: A Reader, edited by E. Bronner & D.M. 
Kellner (London, Routledge, 1989), p.274. 
4l. 'The Class Struggles in France: 1848 - 1850' SE p.43. 
42. 'The Chartists' SE p.265. 
43. 'The Class Struggles in France' SE p.45. 
44. Capital, Vol 1 (Harmondsworth, Penguin in association with New Left Review, 
1976) p.395 
45. 'The Class Struggles in France' SE p.57, my emphasis. 
46. This is not to overlook completely Marx's debt to Feuerbach. For example, the 
conception of alienation in Marx's work on the state prior to 1844 functions in a 
highly Feuerbachian manner, Marx responding to Hegel's suggestion that .we 
should 'venerate the state as an earthly divinity' (para.272 - the Knox translatIon 
has it as 'secular deity') with an application of Feuerbach's critique of religion to 
political alienation. See 'On the Jewish Question' EW p.220. 
47. Cohen op.cit. p.37. 
48. He notes that the essential feature of bourgeois society is wage-labour. and the 
essential feature of wage-labour is absolute ~overty. Grundrisse (~arI?~ndsworth, 
Penguin in association with New Left ReVIew, 1973); see also CntIque of the 
Gotha Programme' in FIA p.351-2 
86 
49. 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' EW. 
50. Rundell op.cit. p.93. 
51. 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' EW p.385-386. On Marx, Hegel and 
labour see C. 1. Arthur, Dialectics of Labour: Marx and his Relation to Hegel 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1986); Benhabib, op.cit. 
52. 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' EW p.386-392; also The German 
Ideology op.cit. p.60-l. For a more thorough discussion see Arthur ibid. For Marx 
on alienation more generally see I. Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation 
(London, Merlin, 1970) and B. allman, Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in 
Capitalist Society (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971). 
53. See 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' EW p.322-334. 
54. Cohen op.cit. p.37; see also Arthur op.cit. p.1, but also generally. 
55. Rundell op.cit. p.88-9. 
56. 'A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction. 
EW p.250-51. 
57. See G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic (London, Allen & Unwin, 1969), p.107: 
Marx, 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844' in EW, p.393; C.J. 
Arthur, Dialectics of Labour op.cit. p.54. 
58. 'Critique of Hegel's Doctrine' EW p.73. 
59. Ibid. p.11l. 
60. See the first page of The Communist Manifesto. 
61. Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 
1970), p.20; also The German Ideology op.cit p.42. 
62. Notorious because it has been taken as the definitive statement of historical 
materialism yet is decidedly non-marxist, most notably in the absence of any 
reference to classes or their struggles, as G. Sorel has noted in his Preface to the 
First French Edition of The Illusions of Progress (Berkeley California, University 
of California Press, 1969). For a discussion of the possible reasons for this see 
A.M. Printz, 'Background and Ulterior Motive of Marx's "Preface" of 1859', 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 30 (1969). 
63. A. Gouldner, The Two Marxisms (London, Macmillan, 1980), p.359. 
64. As in Althusser for example - see Reading Capital (London. Ne\\" Left Books. 
1970), p.162 and For Marx (Harmondsworth, Penguin. 1966), p.lI0. Reducing 
Hegel's civil society to the market is a common misinterpretation. See. as 
examples, Avineri op.cit: 'what Hegel would call civil society is nothing else than 
87 
the market mechanism' (p.12), and his discussion on p.141-154; K. Kumar, "Ciyil 
Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term'. British Journal of 
Sociology Vo1.44 No.3 (1993), p.378-9; E. Meiksins Wood, The Pristine Culture 
of Capitalism: An Essay on Old Regimes and Modern States (London, Verso, 
1991), p. 88; N. Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London, Verso, 
1973) p.124. 
65. This raises issues central to the development of Marxism in the twentieth 
century. Whilst the critique of political economy may function as an immanent 
critique of civil society it is the growth of state administration which makes the 
critique of political economy insufficient. This makes the necessity to address other 
spheres even more crucial, Here we are concerned with the nature of the political, 
but a similar argument applies to, say, the sphere of culture. This is said to be the 
basis of the "split' between 'Western Marxism' and Marxism-Leninism, orthodox 
and unorthodox Marxism, warm and cold currents of thought. See A. Arato. 
'Political Sociology and Critique of Politics' in The Essential Frankfurt School 
Reader, edited by A. Arato & E. Gebhardt (Oxford, Blackwell, 1978), p.23; S. 
Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia op.cit. p.159; R. Jacoby Dialectic of Defeat 
op.cit. 
66. It will be argued in part three that the family is equally a category of political 
administration. 
67. G. Hunt, "The Development of the Concept of Civil Society in Marx' in Karl 
Marx's Social and Political Thought: Critical Assessments Vol.IV, edited by B. 
Jessop & C. Malcolm-Brown (London, Routledge, 1990). 
68. Ibid. p.34 n.30. The relevant sections are in Marx FIA p.246-7 cf. p.208 & 210. 
69. Ibid. p.34 n.31. The specific examples are p.133 & p.141 of the Moscow 
edition compared to p.231 & p.240 of the Penguin. In the latter case one finds 
"civil society' then 'bourgeois society' respectively. The same 'problem' is found 
in other works, such as the first page of the Grundrisse. 
70. See C.J. Arthur, 'Introduction' to The German Ideology op.cit. p.5. 
71. See for example A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy Appendix 
'Introduction' op.cit. p.188. 
72. Hunt op.cit p.30. 
73. G. Therborn, Science, Class and Society (London, Verso, 1980). p.210. 
74. See for example T. Bottomore, Political Sociology (London, Hutchinson, 1979). 
Introduction; A. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (London, 
Heineman, 1971). p.92. 
75. As we have seen this development was not entirely a product of conceptual 
distinctions. It was heavily rooted in the revolution in France. the nature of \\·hich 
88 
appeared to be 'social', which gave rise to the ever more powerful social force of 
the bourgeoisie. This social nature of the revolution distinguished it from the 
politico-legal and religious revolution in England in the seventeenth century. See 
Therborn op.cit. p.212-3; this is criticised in A. Gouldner, The Two Marxisms 
op.cit. p.374-379. 
76. S. Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge 
University Press, 1968) for example suggests that Marx's critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right 'applies Feuerbach's general critique of Hegelian philosophy 
to politics using Feuerbachian language and developing his materialism from this' 
p.10-12. 
77. See the first 'Thesis' on Feuerbach and the 'Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts' in EW p.349; S. Clarke, Marx, Marginalism and Modern Sociology: 
From Adam Smith to Max Weber (London, MacMillan, 1982 second edition 1991), 
p.57-8. K-H. Ilting, 'Hegel's Concept of the State and Marx's Early Critique' in 
The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy, edited by Z. 
A. Pelczynski (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984), claims that Marx 
spends too much time on Hegel's logic and is too Feuerbachian, thereby missing 
the possibility of a political critique. Whilst there is an element of truth in this it 
relies too heavily on distinguishing Marx's 'Feuerbachianism' from his 'politics'. 
In fact large elements of Marx's critique of Hegel are decidedly political as 
opposed to Feuerbachian, as the argument here shows. 
78. M. Weber, '''Objectivity'' in Social Science and Social Policy' in The 
Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York, Free Press, 1949), p. 68. 
79. To take just one field in sociology, a number of writers have sought to 
investigate 'the body and society': B. Turner, The Body and Society: Explorations 
in Social Theory (Oxford, Blackwell, 1984); P. Brown, The Body and Society: 
Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (London, Faber, 1988); 
A. Synott, The Body Social: Symbolism, Self and Society (London, Routledge, 
1993) In Turner's case the concept 'society' appears interchangeable with 'the 
social' and serves as a general agency responding to needs which appear somehow 
pre-social. What needs to be registered here is that in the context of the sociology 
of the body the work of writers such as Turner, influenced as it is by Foucault, is 
open to the same criticisms as we will make of Foucault - that in seeking to 
analyse the links between daily practices concerning the body on the one hand and 
the exercise of power on the other all the 'practices of power' get reduced to a 
continuum in which they serve the same function. When this problem is put to him 
in an interview Turner appears to vacillate, suggesting, in the fashion of 
Baudrillard, that perhaps the idea of 'society' is becoming increasingly redundant. 
See 'Conclusion. Theory and Epistemology of the Body' in Regulating Bodies: 
Essays in Medical Sociology (London, Routledge, 1992), p.229-260. 
Other sociologists are also aware of this problem with 'society' and seek to 
overcome it in various ways. Giddens for example seeks to use instead the 
categories 'nation-state' 'intersocietal system' and 'time-space' edges. See The 
Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of a ContemporarY Critique of Historical 
89 
Materialism (Los Angeles, University of California, 1985), p.21, 172; The 
Constitution of Society (Cambridge, Polity, 1986) Intro., p.163-69, 244: The 
Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge, Polity, 1990), p.12. Likewise Bauman 
suggests that a sociological theory of postmodernity ought to replace the category 
'society' with that of sociality. Z. Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity (London, 
Routledge, 1992), p.190. Finally Wallerstein seeks to replace it with 'historical 
system'. I. Wallerstein, 'World-Systems Analysis' in A. Giddens & 1.H. Turner 
(eds.) Social Theory Today (Cambridge, Polity, 1987), p.309-324. I am not 
convinced that any of these are successful; all seem to lose what is argued here to 
be the fundamental distinction of state and civil society as categories of analysis, 
with the social as a critical concept. Wallerstein for example admits that replacing 
'society' with 'historical system' is a mere semantic substitution, but rids us of the 
need to link 'society' to 'state' (p.317). Likewise Giddens confusingly suggests that 
civil society refers for the most part to the countryside and that with the rise of the 
modern nation-state 'civil society' in this sense disappears, largely through the 
administrative reach of the state. See The Nation-State and Violence, p.21. 
80. Two points need to be made here. On the one hand it is true to say that many 
Marxists have worked with a state-economy dichotomy which either overlooks 
social dimensions or dissolves them into state or economy. This has had a dire 
effect on some important work within Marxism. For example, in Althusser's work 
key aspects of society are conceptualised as state apparatuses, as will be shown in 
chapter two. Likewise the work of those in the state-derivation debate emphasises 
a 'capital-theoretical' approach, but this work tends to reduce all social life to 
either 'economy' or 'state' and any conception of the 'social' is lost. In their 
'Introduction' to the key collection of essays in this debate John Holloway and Sol 
Picciotto criticise Nicos Poulantzas for failing to focus on the relation between 
political forms and the 'anatomy' of civil society, namely political economy. But 
in his 1859 Preface Marx does not say this. He argues that legal and political 
relations and political forms originate within 'civil society' and that the anatomy 
of civil society must be sought in political economy, that is, the state must be 
related to civil society which in turn must be studied through political economy. 
Marx is therefore working with a concept of the state and civil society rather than 
state and economy. 1. Holloway & S. Picciotto (eds.) State and Capital: A Marxist 
Debate (London, Edward Arnold, 1978), p.3-4 see also Urry, The Anatomy of 
Capitalist States op.cit p.84. 
On the other hand, whilst it may be true to say that sociology has responded to 
this kind of approach by examining the civil society it considers Marxism to have 
forgotten (Gouldner, The Two Marxisms op.cit. p.370; Kumar op.cit. p.380) this 
has often resulted in the nonchalant expansion and use of 'society' or 'the social', 
as discussed above, or it has resulted in attempts to force Marxism and sociology 
together. For example B. Turner suggests that in the absence of a theory of social 
relations per se, the analysis of civil society functions as a sociology inside 
Marxism. See 'Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship' in Citizenship 
and Social Theory, edited by B. Turner, op.cit. p.16 note 4. 
90 
81. This point has been touched upon by a number of writers in the Western 
Marxist tradition. For example, both Gramsci notes the lack of a critical dimension 
in sociology - see SPN p.243-4 and his critique of Bukharin p.419-473. The 
conservative nature of sociology is drawn out by F. Hearn, Reason and Freedom 
in Sociological Thought (London, Allen & Unwin, 1985), ch.2. and A. Gouldner, 
The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology op.cit. p.12-14, 442. Gouldner suggests 
that the way to overcome this is for younger sociologists to change their practice, 
a 'solution' at odds with my argument here. Also in this context see A. 
Swingewood, Marx and Modern Social Theory (London, Macmillan, 1979), ch.9~ 
T. Bottomore, Sociology as Social Criticism (London, Allen and Unwin, 1974), 
ch.5 and Sociology and Socialism (Brighton, Wheatsheaf, 1984), ch.3. 
82. See Chapter Three, below, where, besides considering the work of Foucault, I 
also consider the way some have sought to utilise his work by developing the idea 
of 'the social' and 'administration' whilst jettisoning the state-civil society couplet 
(Donzelot, Rose) or by simply dissolving the political into the social (Lac1au and 
Mouffe). 
83. See Marx's discussion of the demand for a unified science of man, in the 1844 
Manuscripts; EW p.355. 
84. 'On the Jewish Question' EW p.235, emphasis in original. 
85. 'The Civil War in France' FIA p.210. 
86. Ibid. p.206. 
87. Ibid. p.210-1. 
88. First Draft of 'The Civil War in France' FIA p.250. 
89. Grundrisse op.cit. p.157; Capital Vol.l p.163-77. As Benhabib notes, the use 
of the term GemeinshaJtlich is meant as a contrast to burgerliche GesellschaJt, that 
is, a contrast between solidarity and togetherness with the individuality of exchange 
relations and juridical norms - Critique, Norm and Utopia op.cit. p.121. 
90. Grundrisse p.162, 488,832; Capital, Vol.l op.cit. p.171, 929-30. 
91. See the 'Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State' EW p.191. 
92. Ibid. p.112, emphasis added. 
93. 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction'. EW p.255. 
94. Ibid. p.254. 
95. Ibid. p.256. 
91 
96. The Communist Manifesto in Revs 1848 p.77; likewise he suggests that the 
lower middle class, small manufacturers, shopkeepers, artisans and peasants all 
fight against the bourgeoisie to save their own existence. This perspective also 
informs other of his comments. For example he castigates the German bourgeoisie 
for sinking to the level of a social estate and therefore being unable to speak for 
the whole of society - article in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung in MECW 8 p.162. 
97. The German Ideology op.cit. p.83; see I. Meszaros, Philosophy, Ideology and 
Social Science: Essays in Affirmation and Negation (Brighton, Wheatsheaf, 1986), 
p.209; K. Tester, The Life and Times of Post-Modernity (London, Routledge, 
1993), p.43. For Marx's proletariat as myth see D. Lovell, Marx's Proletariat: The 
Making of a Myth (London, Routledge, 1988), esp. ch. 2 and L.P. WesselL 
Prometheus Bound: The Mythic Structure of Karl Marx's Scientific Thinking 
(Louisiana State University Press, 1984), ch.4; Benhabib also makes a similar 
criticism Critique, Norm and Utopia op.cit. p.115, 130-31. 
98. Of course there are major problems here with Marx's assumption that there will 
be no particular interests within the universal class which would require a new 
political mediating mechanism. For a discussion see Cohen op.cit. ch. 2. Likewise 
the idea of the closing off of state and civil society has been heavily criticised, 
some writers describing it as a 'soteriological myth' - see L. Kolakowski 'The 
Myth of Human Self-Identity' in The Socialist Idea: A Reappraisal, edited by L. 
Kolakowski & S. Hampshire (London, Weidenfield & Nicholson, 1974). 
99. Benhabib discusses the socialisation of the universal and the universalisation 
of the political. Critique Norm and Utopia op.cit. p.39; the phrase 'socialised 
freedom' is taken from E. Bloch, On Karl Marx (New York, Herder and Herder, 
1971), p.49; for the socialisation of the political and the politicisation of the social 
see P. Osborne, 'Radicalism Without Limit? Discourse, Democracy and the Politics 
of Identity' in Socialism and the Limits of Liberalism, edited by P. Osborne 
(London, Verso, 1991). 
100. For a discussion of the differences between the materialism of Marx and 
Feuerbach in relation to the philosophy of the subject see Jacoby, Dialectic of 
Defeat op.cit. p.56 and Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia op.cit. p.55 & 
p.123-132. 
101. See 'On the Jewish Question', 'Critical Notes on "The King of Prussia and 
Social Reform'" in EW, 'The Civil War in France' FlA. 
102. 'Critical Notes on "The King of Prussia and Social Reform'" EW p.4ll 
emphasis in original. On the next page he talks of the states impotence in a passage 
that is a far cry from claims concerning the states omnipotence that we noted 
earlier. 
103. The German Ideology op.cit. p.53. 
104. 'Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State' op.cit. p.19l, emphases in original. 
92 
105. MECW VolA (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1975) p.666. In 1865 Marx 
writes to Kugelman that in England the International is creating quite a stir on the 
suffrage question, and comments that this question has quite a different significance 
in England than Prussia. Letter to Kugelman 23 Feb 1865 in FlA. More generally, 
at times he points to the necessity of examining the character of elections, which 
depends not on the name but on the economic foundation or the economic situation 
of the voters, a necessity which is intended ultimately to lose the political character 
of elections; 'Conspectus of Bakunin's Statism and Anarchy' FIA p.336. 
106. On 'conquering political power' see 'The Communist Manifesto' in Revs 
1848, the 'Inaugural Address of the International Working Men's Association' FIA 
p.80 and in On Britain (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962) 
pA91; the 'Provisional Rules' FIA p.82; 'The Chartists' in SE, p.264 and in On 
Britain op.cit. p.361; 'The Class Struggles in France' p.71. 
107. L. Colletti, 'Introduction' to EW pA4; for a discussion of Marx on the vote 
see R.N. Berki, 'Perspectives in the Marxian Critique of Hegel's Political 
Philosophy' in Hegel's Political Philosophy, edited by Z. Pelczynski, op.cit. p.213. 
108. 'Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State' EW p.lll. 
109. 'The Civil War in France' FIA p.210-211. 
110. There is however an essential difference between the theorisation of universal 
suffrage in the early works and how it functions in the Paris Commune. In his 
critique of Hegel universal suffrage is the demand for the dissolution of the 
distinction between civil and political existence, whereas in the Paris Commune 
universal suffrage follows from the destruction of the state. Nonetheless, in both 
cases Marx clearly sees universal suffrage in terms of the role it could play in 
breaking down the distinction between civil society and the state, or private life and 
political expression. 
111. See Hegel, PhR paras. 301-303; see also the 'Proceedings of the Estates 
Assembly in the Kingdom of Wurtemberg, 1815-1816' in Hegel's Political 
Writings op.cit. p.253 & 262; see also Taylor, Hegel op.cit. pA45 and also Wood's 
note to PhR para.30L pA69. 
112. See J.S. Mill's 'Representative Government' and 'Thoughts on Parliamentary 
Reform'. For discussions see A.S. Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism: The Social and 
Political Thought of Jacob Burckhardt. John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocgueville 
(Oxford University Press, 1992); C.B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal 
Democracy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977); 1. Roper, Democracy and It's 
Critics: Anglo-American Democratic Thought in the Nineteenth Century (London, 
Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
113. The Holy Family (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956) 
p.156-7. 
114. 'On the Jewish Question' in EW p.229. 
115. The Holy Family op.cit. p.152. 
116. 'Critique of the Gotha Programme' FIA p.346-7. 
117. E. Bloch, On Karl Marx op.cit. p.49-50. 1. Bernstein points to the telelogy in 
Marx's consideration of rights in 'Right, Revolution and Community: Marx's 'On 
the Jewish Question' in Socialism and the Limits of Liberalism, edited by P. 
Osborne op.cit. See also Meszaros, Philosophy, Ideology and Social Science op.cit. 
ch.5; J. Waldron (ed) Nonsense Upon Stilts: Burke, Bentham and Marx on the 
Rights of Man (London, Methuen, 1987), p.l19-136. Here we can see how as a 
materialist concept 'rights' functions like all materialist concepts: as an accusation 
and an imperative; see H. Marcuse, 'The Concept of Essence' in Negations 
(Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968), p.86. 
94 
Chapter Two 
1. G. Lukacs, Lenin: A Study On the Unity of His Thought (London, New Left 
Books, 1970), p.60-1. 
2. A.1. Polan, Lenin and the End of Politics (London, Methuen, 1984), p.10: also 
R. Miliband, 'The State and Revolution' in his Class Power and State Power 
(London, Verso, 1983). 
3. Lenin, 'The State and Revolution' in Selected Works in Two Volumes, Volume 
II, (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1947), p.144. 
4. Ibid. p.144. 
5. He points out that the only change Marx and Engels made to The Communist 
Manifesto, in the Preface to the German edition of 1872, was based on their 
experience of the Commune. 
6. Ibid. p.165. 
7. Ibid. p.178. 
8. This explains Lenin's emphasis on the Commune in the text. Lenin is drawing 
a continuity between the Commune and the 1905 and February 1917 revolutions 
in Russia, claiming that the forthcoming socialist revolution and state would, as the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, be a continuation of the Commune. This is partly due 
to the need to distance himself, and Marxism, from anarchist slogans concerning 
the 'smashing' of the state, and partly due to the obligation, imposed by Engels, 
of identifying the Commune as the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus Lenin is 
trying to reconcile Commune, state, transitional state and dictatorship of the 
proletariat. This difficulty is increased with the re-emergence of the Soviets in 
1917, convincing Lenin that these were the revolutionary form of proletarian 
power. See P. Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism (London, New Left 
Books, 1976), p.116 Yet at the same time he wishes to argue that the state must 
be smashed and that it withers away; he even suggests that the state should be 
reconstructed (see' State and Revolution' p.171, 173 & 222). Harding suggests that 
a large part of the problem is a semantic one - see Lenin's Political Thought Vol.lI: 
Theory and Practice in the Socialist Revolution (London, Macmillan, 1981), 
p.134-140. Whilst there is undoubtedly a semantic dimension to the problems here 
the point is surely that the confusion results from an undeveloped analysis of the 
state and, it must be said, of the social and political order of communist society. 
Hence Lenin's attempts to look back towards the Commune to see the Soviets as 
its continuation, and to see any difference between the Russian state and the 
bourgeois state as 'progress'. 
9. M. Liebman, Leninism Under Lenin (London, Merlin, 1975), p.191-222: see also 
L. Colletti, 'Lenin's State and Revolution' in From Rousseau to Lenin: Studies in 
Ideology and Society (New York & London, Monthly Revie\\', 1972) and R. 
95 
Miliband, 'Class Struggle From Above' in Social Theory and Social Criticism, 
edited by W. Outhwaite & M. Mulkay (Oxford, Blackwell, 1987), p.180. 
10. 'State and Revolution' op.cit. p.l56. 
11. Ibid. p.157, emphasis in original. 
12. Ibid. p.171-3. 
13. Ibid. p.153. 
14. The classic revisionist text is E. Bernstein, Die Voraussetzungen des 
Socialism us (1899) trans. as Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and Affirmation 
(trans. E. Harvey) (London, Independent Labour Party, 1909). The standard English 
edition has been the one edited by S. Hook (New York, Schoken Books, 1961). 
These two editions omitted between a quarter and a third of the original, in 
particular a chapter on Hegel. This is now available in E. Bernstein, The 
Preconditions of Socialism ed. and trans. by H. Tudor (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), an edition in which the extent of Bernstein's revision is 
made even clearer, given his comments on the 'pitfalls' of the Hegelian dialectic. 
Bernstein's revision developed slowly through the 1890s. This development, and 
related essays, can be traced in the collection of essays Marxism and Social 
Democracy: The Revisionist Debate 1896-1898 ed. and trans. by H. Tudor & lM. 
Tudor (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988). See especially Bernstein's 
essays 'The Social and Political Significance of Space and Number' and 'The 
Struggle of Social Democracy and the Social Revolution I & II'. For discussions 
see the works listed in note 20 below. The best account still remains C. Schorske, 
German Social Democracy: The Development of the Great Schism (Cambridge 
Massachussetts, Harvard, 1955). Also useful are G. Craig, Germany 1866-1945 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981); H. Grebing, History of the German 
Labour Movement: A Survey (Leamington Spa, Berg Publishers, 1985); S. Miller 
& H. Potthoff, A History of German Social Democracy: From 1848 to the Present 
(Leamington Spa, Berg Publishers, 1986). 
15. M. Salvadori, Karl Kautsky and the Socialist Revolution 1880-1938 (London, 
Verso, second edition 1990), p.14, 38. 
16. K. Kautsky, Selected Political Writings ed. P. Goode (London, Macmillan, 
1983), p.30-1. 
17. Lenin, 'State and Revolution' op.cit. p.145. 
18. Ibid. p.155, 213, 214. 
19. Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat (Michigan, Ann Arbor Paperback. 
1964), p.84-5. 
20. Kautsky ibid. p.68. Of course a year later Lenin will accuse Kautsky of being 
a renegade for his criticisms of the revolution and after - see 'The Proletarian 
96 
Revolution and the Renegade Kautski in Selected Works in Two Volumes Vol.II 
- accusing him of misunderstanding the nature of the revolution, apostasy, 
succumbing to a liberal position, subserviency to the bourgeoisie, servility to the 
Kulaks and Menshivism as well as Opportunism. The same accusations can be 
found in Trotsky's Terrorism and Communism (1920). Both Lenin and Trotsky 
argue that Kautsky himself had supported the concept of a dictatorship of the 
proletariat, the necessity for a class state and for a full workers democracy. But far 
from being a renegade Kautsky was in fact largely consistent. As Salvadori notes, 
compelled to confront both Kautsky's 'revolutionary' past and his present position 
as an implacable opponent of the October revolution and Bolshevik tactics they 
sought to 'fracture' the continuity of his work - see Karl Kautsky and the Socialist 
Revolution op.cit. p.252. Kautsky's concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
class state and workers democracy were always different to the conceptions Lenin 
held in 1917 and therefore bound to result in criticisms of October and after. 
Kautsky's criticisms in 1918 were not apostasy at all, but consistency. 
Unfortunately Lenin and Trotsky had to accuse him of being a renegade precisely 
because they had in the past agreed with him on so many issues. On Kautsky's 
relations with the Russian Marxists see M. Donald, Marxism and Revolution: Karl 
Kautsky and the Russian Marxists 1900-1924 (New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press, 1993). On the theoretical disputes in the Second International 
generally see B. Hindess, Parliamentary Democracy and Socialist Politics (London, 
Routledge, 1983), ch.1; R. Miliband, Marxism and Politics (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1977); C. Pierson, Marxist Theory and Democratic Politics 
(Cambridge, Polity, 1986), chs.2 & 3; A. van den Berg The Immanent Utopia: 
From Marxism on the State to the State of Marxism (New Jersey, Princeton 
University Press, 1988), ch.2. 
21. R. Luxemburg, 'The Russian Revolution' in Rosa Luxemburg Speaks ed. M-A. 
Waters (New York & London, Pathfinder Press, 1970), p.387. 
22. Ibid. p.393. On the relationship between Luxemburg and Kautsky see Salvadori 
chs.5-7. 
23. Polan op.cit. p.l55. 
24. G. Therborn, 'The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy', New Left 
Review 103 (1977), p.3-43; see also his 'The Right to Vote and the Four Routes 
To/Through Modernity' in State Theory and State History, edited by R. Torstendahl 
(London, Sage, 1992). 
25. See especially 'The Boycott' (1906), but also 'Should We Boycott the State 
Duma?', 'The Dissolution of the Duma and the Tasks of the Proletariat' and 
'Against the Boycott' all in Selected Works in Twelve Volumes Vol.3 (London, 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1936). 
26. See '''Left-Wing Communism" an Infantile Disorder' ch.7. 
97 
27. N. Bukharin, 'Towards a Theory of the Imperialist State' in his Selected 
Writings on the State and the Transition to Socialism (London, Spokesman, 1982), 
p.25, 31. 
28. 'State and Revolution' op.cit. p.147. See also Harding, Lenin's Political 
Thought op.cit. p.92-109; S.F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A 
Political Biography 1888-1938 (New York, Vintage, 1975), p.39-43; M Sawer, 
'The Genesis of "State and Revolution'" in The Socialist Register (1977), p.213-8. 
Also see Lenin's 'Introduction' to Bukharin's Imperialism and World Economy 
(London, Merlin, 1987). Of course, the issue of imperialism was of concern to 
many other key figures, not least Luxemburg and Pannekoek, yet in terms of 
developing an analysis of the state in capitalist society it was Gramsci who breaks 
with the focus on imperialism, as is shown below. 
29. Harding p.116-8. 
30. Bukharin, 'Towards a Theory of the Imperialist State' op.cit. p.31. 
31. Lenin, 'The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky' op.cit. p.383. 
32. See 'Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism'. The role the 'labour 
aristocracy' plays in Marxist conceptualisations of the working class is critically 
assessed in Chapter Four, below. 
33. The phrase 'microscopic universe' is Polan's. Although in his notebooks Lenin 
emphasises Marx's 'Eighteenth Brumaire' in terms of its analysis of the state, 
suggesting that 'the "state machine" is a bureaucratic-military machine in the 
majority of capitalist states (now in 1917 it is possible to say in all)' (quoted in 
Sawer, 'The Genesis of "State and Revolution'" op.cit. p.217) this point is never 
developed in any real sense. 
34. SPN p.243-4. Gramsci is also critical of sociology's 'vulgar evolutionism'. 
35. W. Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's 
Political and Cultural Theory (Los Angeles & London, University of California 
Press, 1980), p.164. 
36. M. Salvadori, 'Gramsci and the PCI: Two Conceptions of Hegemony' in 
Gramsci and Marxist Theory, edited by C. Mouffe (London, Routledge, 1979), 
p.252; also see Togliatti, On Gramsci and Other Writings (London, Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1979), chs.7 & 8. 
37. Political Writings 1910-20 (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1977), p.83. 262. 
38. Ibid. p.262. 
39. 'The Italian State' in A. Gramsci, Pre-Prison Writings ed. R. Bellamy 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.141-45. Also see his comparison 
of the English, German and Italian states in 'Three Principles and Three Kinds of 
98 
Political Order' in the same volume. Also see C. Buci-Glucksman, Gramsci and the 
State (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1980), p.147. The issue of individual 
nation-states and their 'peculiarities' will become crucial in Chapter Four below, 
where we consider the 'peculiarities' of the English, an argument leaning heavily 
on a neo-Gramscian reading. 
40. Political Writings 1910-20 op.cit. p.191. 
41. R. Bocock, Hegemony (London, Tavistock, 1986), p.25; P. Anderson, 'The 
Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci', New Left Review, 100 (1976-77), p.19-21. 
42. Quoted in Buci-Glucksman op.cit. p.177. 
43. Lenin's 'Two Tactics' is the key text here. However, Bobbio argues that in fact 
Lenin does not use the term, and that this is a problem of translation. Nonetheless, 
the issue of leadership is crucial for Lenin as for Plekhanov, and Gramsci's 
intended meaning seems clear. 
44. A. Davidson, The Theory and Practice of Italian Communism (London, Merlin, 
1982), p.97; also M. Clark, Antonio Gramsci and the Revolution That Failed (New 
Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1977). 
45. Political Writings 1921-26 (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1978), p.408-9. 
46. SPN p.238. 
47. On war of position and Kautsky see Anderson p.59-63. 
48. SPN p.221; see also p.243. 
49. Ibid. p.235. 
50. Ibid. p.243-4; see also p.79. 
51. On Gramsci's extension of 'hegemony' see Buci-Glucksman, Gramsci and the 
State op.cit. ch.8; also see Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution op.cit. p.170-5; 
Anderson, 'The Antinomies' op.cit. p.21-7; J.F. Femia, Gramsci's Political 
Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness and the Revolutionary Process (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1987), p.25; J. Hoffman, The Gramscian Challenge: Coercion and 
Consent in Marxist Political Theory (Oxford, Blackwell, 1984), p.55; C. Mouffe, 
'Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci' in Gramsci and Marxist Theory, edited by 
C. Mouffe op.cit. p.178-9. 
52. SPN p.160. 
53. SPN p.263. 
54. SPN. p.239. 
99 
55. SPN p.244. For a discussion of the integral state see Buci-Glucksman p.91-110. 
For Gramsci's Hegelianism, and its Italian form, see R. Bellamy, Modem Italian 
Social Theory: Ideology and Politics From Pareto to the Present (Cambridge, 
Polity, 1987); R. Bellamy, 'Gramsci, Croce and the Italian Political Tradition', 
History of Political Thought Vol.ll No.2 (1990); R. Bellamy & D. Schecter, 
Gramsci and the Italian State (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993); N. 
Bobbio, 'Gramsci and the Concept of Civil Society' in Civil Society and the State, 
edited by 1. Keane (London, Verso, 1988), also in Gramsci and Marxist Theory, 
edited by C. Mouffe op.cit. and in his own Which Socialism? (Cambridge, Polity, 
1986); P. Piccone, Italian Marxism (Los Angeles & London, University of 
California Press, 1983); D. Schecter, 'Gramsci, Gentile and the Theory of the 
Ethical State in Italy', History of Political Thought Vol.lI No.3 (1990). 
56. SPN p.12. 
57. See for example SPN p.52. 
58. Anderson p.17. Anderson accuses Gramsci of oscillation and conceptual 
slippage. This not only fails to pay sufficient attention to the context or chronology 
of his argument (see Bellamy and Schecter, Gramsci and the Italian State op.cit. 
p.120) but also obscures the important theoretical point that Gramcsi is working 
with two concepts of the state and hegemony, in the manner of Hegel, as I am here 
attempting to show. In an interesting discussion Adamson (Hegemony and 
Revolution op.cit. p.216-7) suggests that this can only be understood through the 
category of intellectuals and Gramsci's ideas on political education. 
59. Bobbio 'Gramsci and the Concept of Civil Society' op.cit. p.83-4. However, 
Bobbio goes too far in suggesting that Gramsci was reversing the Marxist primacy 
of structure over superstructure; see Adamson p.218. 
60. And the kind of economism found in liberalism and Italian theorists. See 
Buci-Glucksman ch.12 and A. Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci's Politics (London, 
Croom Helm, 1980), p.180-193. 
61. SPN p.408. 
62. SPN p.158-68; See also Adamson ch.7; C. Boggs, Gramsci's Marxism 
(London, Pluto Press, 1976), p.l06 & 116. This places Gramsci firmly in the 
tradition of Western Marxism's concern for the insufficiency of the critique of 
political economy, as noted in Chapter One above. Typical of Gramsci's focus here 
is his suggestion that 1917 represents a 'Revolution Against Capital'. Gramsci's 
critique of economism also shows the Italian influence on his thought, an influence 
that can be traced back to Machiavelli: 'what Machiavelli does is to bring 
everything back to politics' (SPN p.249). 
63. SPN p.259. 
64. See Bobbio op.cit. p.84-5. 
100 
65. SPN p.170; although this is claimed to have its roots in Machiavelli, there is 
a strong sense of the Hegelian recognition here. 
66. Anderson op.cit. p.25. 
67. SPN p.12. 
68. Mouffe 'Introduction' to Mouffe (ed.) op.cit. p.10-II; see also her essay 
'Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci' in the same volume p.187. The same 
(mis)reading of hegemony as concentrated in civil society can be found in a large 
number of commentators - see for example C. Pierson, Marxist Theory and 
Democratic Politics op.cit. p.89; B. Jessop, The Capitalist State (Oxford, Blackwell, 
1982), p.148-9 and State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in Their Place 
(Cambridge, Polity, 1990), p.5I; J.G. Merquior, Western Marxism (London, 
Paladin, 1986), p.10l. 
69. SPN p.246. 
70. SPN p.263. 
71. SPN p.I2. 
72. SPN p.80. 
73. SPN p.271, 80. 
74. Buci-Glucksman p.93; Showstack Sassoon p.I11-14. 
75. For a discussion of this aspect of Gramsci' s work see Hoffman, The Gramscian 
Challenge op.cit. 
76. Hoffman ibid. p.60. 
77. E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics (London, Verso, 1985), p.I36-38. This is consolidated in 
Laclau and Mouffe's dissolution of the political into the social, following Foucault, 
a point developed in Chapter Three, below. 
78. Buci-Glucksman p.70. 
79. Ibid. p.49, 63. 
80. Buci-Glucksman p.70. 
81. Adamson p.I75, 178. 
82. SPN p.266-7. 
83. SPN p.195; for a discussion see M. Cain, 'Gramsci, The State and the Place of 
101 
Law' in Legality, Ideology and the State, edited by D. Sugarman (London, 
Academic Press, 1983). 
84. This point will be developed in Chapters Three and Five below, where a 
critique of Foucault's concept of law and its relation to administration will be 
central (Chapter Three) and an attempt is made to develop a stronger account of 
the relationship between law and administration (Chapter Five). 
85. SPN p.160. 
86. See Cain op.cit. p.101. 
87. G. Hunt, 'Gramsci, Civil Society and Bureaucracy' in Praxis International 
Vo1.6 No.2 (1986) describes the state-civil society couplet as part of the 'standard 
conceptual apparatus of unthinking 'Marxism" p.210. 
88. These points are developed further below. For an argument pertaining to the 
ambivalence in Gramsci's work, inviting a liberal reading, see Hunt ibid. 
89. Anderson, 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci' op.cit. p.36. 
90. P. Anderson, In the Tracks of Historical Materialism (London, Verso, 1983), 
p.38. 
91. See The Order of Things p.261; this point is developed in Chapter Three, 
below. 
92. See Chapter One, above. Compare FM p.llO: 'the concept of 'civil society' 
disappears from Marx's work' with RC p.162: 'the concept 'civil society' as found 
in Marx's mature writings .. .is ambiguous'. 
93. FM p.113, 167; RC p.58. ' 
94. FM p.193. 
95. FM p.203; RC p.94. 
96. FM p.209. 
97. A. Callinicos, Is There A Future For Marxism? (London, Macmillan, 1982), 
p.60; G. Elliott, Althusser: The Detour of Theory (London, Verso, 1987), p.153-4. 
98. RC p.99, emphasis in original. 
99. RC p.103. 
100. See P. Osborne, 'Modernity is a Qualitative, Not a Chronological Category', 
New Left Review, 192 (1992), p.81-3; also Elliott p.156-8. 
102 
101. LP p.131. Althusser refers to the 'Eighteenth Brumaire', The Communist 
Manifesto, all Marx's later writings and Lenin's 'State and Revolution'. 
102. LP p.133. 
103. LP p.13S-6. 
104. LP p.136. 
lOS. Callinicos op.cit. p.7S. 
106. LP p.138. 
107. T. Benton, The Rise and Fall of Structural Marxism: Althusser and his 
Influence (London, Macmillan, 1984), p.99-103; Elliott op.cit. p.22S. 
108. Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, quoted in Benton ibid. 
p.97-8. 
109. Elliott op.cit. p.22S. 
110. Benton op.cit. p.101. 
111. See Benton p.103, Elliott. p.233, Anderson, 'Antinomies' op.cit. 
112. If this is so then, as Benton points out, it is difficult to see what could justify 
Althusser remaining within the Communist Party of France (PCF) (p.103). See also 
P. Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism op.cit. p.39 and S. Khilnani, 
Arguing Revolution: The Intellectual Left in Postwar France (New Haven & 
London, Yale University Press, 1993), p.87. Khilnani makes the interesting point 
that the 'Ideology and ISAs' text was intended to identify the Party as the unique 
agent of political change. This has a bearing on my comments below regarding the 
subject of history, but for the moment we might want to suggest that some sense 
might be made of Althusser' s comments here if one distinguishes between parties 
and The Party, the latter playing a fundamentally different role to the former. 
However, years later in a 'Note on the ISAs' in which he rejects the charge of 
functionalism, Althusser denies he ever identified political parties, including 
revolutionary ones, as ISAs. He writes that 'I have never written that a political 
party is an ideological state apparatus. I have even said something quite different 
(if only briefly I admit), namely that the political parties are only 'components' of 
a specific ideological state apparatus: of the political ideological state apparatus, 
which realises the political ideology of the ruling class, so to speak in its 
'constitutional regime' (quoted in Elliott p.23Sn). 
113. LP p. 144. 
114. LP p.14S. 
lIS. LP p.149. 
103 
116. LP p.232. 
117. LP p.153-9. 
118. LP p.159. 
119. LP p.160. 
120. LP p.167. 
121. LP p.169. 
122. See Callinicos op.cit. p.66 and Elliott op.cit. p.229. 
123. P. Hirst, On Law and Ideology (London, Macmillan 1979), p.60. 
124. As is well known he came to regard only the 'Critique of the Gotha 
Programme' and the marginal Notes on Wagner as free from any traces. 
125. It is precisely this move that leads his followers to deny the existence of the 
working class altogether - see Hirst op.cit. p.57. Likewise there are undoubtedly 
links with 'Post-Marxist' rejections of classism in this. 
126. LP p.201; also RC p.253. 
127. RC p.180. 
128. RC p.252. 
129. K. Soper, Humanism and Anti-Humanism (London, Hutchinson, 1986), 
p.104-6. 
130. E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays (London, Merlin, 
1978), p.147-8. 
131. RC p.233, 267. 
132. Thompson op.cit. p.1 03-7; Elliott op.cit. p.169. 
133. See M. Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs 
to Habermas ( Cambridge, Polity, 1984), ch.13. 
134. LP p.219. 
135. Benton op.cit. p.1 05; Elliott op.cit. p.232. 
136. Quoted in Elliott op.cit. p.181. 
137. See Jay op.cit. p.4l1; see also Elliott op.cit. p.181, Soper op,.cit. p.l06. In 
similar fashion we can provisionally note that one of Foucault's problems is that 
104 
if we are condemned to be subjected to power, if resisting one set of power 
relations will only result in a new set, why bother resisting? 
138. N. Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism (London, Verso, 1980) p.31. 
139. T. Eagleton, Ideology (London, Verso, 1991), p.l49. 
105 
Part II: Power 
Introduction 
Foucault describes the objective of his work as the creation of "a history of the 
different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects', and 
describes three modes through which this occurs: the modes of enquiry having the 
status of sciences; the practices of division (sickihealthy, mad/sane etc); the 
mechanisms through which human beings turn themselves into subjects, for 
example by considering themselves as sexual subjects. 1 
Whilst he uses this to claim that his writings have been about the subject rather 
than power, his work is pre-eminently about the way the subject and power 
interact; more precisely, how power operates on and through the subject, how the 
subject is constituted as a subject by power. For this purpose the word 
assujetissement captures the meaning of the individual as "subjectified' in relation 
to forms of knowledge and discourse, "subjected' in technologies of domination, 
and "subjectifies' him/herself in relation to rules of conduct. 2 It is in pointing to 
the constituted nature of the subject, and the subjected nature of subjectivity, that 
Foucault considerably advances our understanding of power, for three reasons. 
First, he points to the way order is maintained through relations of power and 
structured through power mechanisms; second, he places administration at the heart 
of the constitution of this order; third, he indicates the manner in which the subject 
is constructed as part of this order. This is useful because it advances our 
understanding of the way the constitution of the body as labour power can only 
take place within a network of power relations and therefore in a system of 
subjection.3 
Likewise III developing his account Foucault points to the changes in the 
mechanisms of power in particular historical periods. Although in general his 
concern is with the broad period from the late-eighteenth century onwards, when 
being more specific Foucault suggests that the period he is concerned with is 
identical to that which concerns us here, when changes in state administration made 
necessary a rethinking of the state-civil society couplet. For example, he variously 
points to the way detention came to occupy almost the whole field of possible 
punishments in 1810, to cellular internment which was laid down in principle in 
1844, to three books on prison reform published in 1838, and to the replacement 
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of the chain gang with the police carrIage (a 'mobile Panopticon') in 1837. 
Foucault opts for the date 22 January 1840 as the date of completion of the 
carceral system, but the choice of such a specific date is a stylistic curlicue, the 
point being that the transformation was most pronounced from the 1840s.4 He also 
recognises that developments thereafter are not merely concerned with the franchise 
and rights, economic and political reform, but also with areas he feels had 
traditionally been ignored - health, sexuality, criminality, madness, welfare, 
statistics: crucially, those aspects of life subject to administration. Thus Foucault's 
positive contribution points to the networks of administrative power mechanisms 
that operate in the ordering of capitalist society. 
However, the major contention in this chapter will be that these insights are 
seriously weakened by Foucault's rejection of the state concept and, alongside this, 
the conceptual distinction between state and civil society. Instead of state and civil 
society, Foucault's analysis rests on power and the social. It will be argued that his 
insights into the centrality of administration to the mechanisms through which order 
is constituted and maintained are weakened because his concept of administration 
operates without any account of its role vis a vis the state-civil society relation. 
This weakness is exacerbated by Foucault's difficulties concerning law, for 
although he is highly sensitive to the problems posed for the concept of law by the 
growth in administration, he avoids conceptualising this, resulting in a fundamental 
ambiguity concerning the place of law in his analysis. The reason for this can be 
traced back to his rejection of the state-civil society distinction. Essentially, it will 
be argued that in Foucault's work there is a process whereby concepts fundamental 
to political analysis undergo a dual series of dissolutions: state is dissolved into 
power and thence into the 'social body'; law is dissolved into norm and thence into 
administration. 
On the other hand, Foucault follows much contemporary social and political 
thought in individualising the subject, as we saw in the case of Althusser. There 
is no concept of a collective subject in Foucault's work. I make this point here for 
two reasons. One of the concerns in Part III will be to show how working class 
individuals were constituted as citizens, and how the working class was constituted 
as a class, a dual process intended to incorporate the working class into civil 
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society and the state; this will be done in order to show the constitutive power of 
the state in bourgeois society. Foucault fails to recognise the central role of the 
state in the constitution of subjects, and fails to address the question of collective 
subjects. Moreover, in his concern to show how subjects are constituted by power 
he fails to recognise the extent to which subjects are equally constitutive of that 
power. In Part III I will be concerned to show not only that the working class was 
constituted by the state, but that the state was equally constituted by the working 
class, through struggle. 
It is for this reason that this chapter ends with a critique of Foucault's concept 
of resistance. For the argument seeks to shed new light on a number of tensions 
that are now generally held to be Foucault's 'weak spots': notably, his 'ethical 
quandary'; the problem as to why one should resist. The accusation of nihilism and 
despair and the crypto-normativism that is said to be hidden in Foucault's work 
will be given a different reading on the grounds of the arguments developed 
concerning the category of the social. This will centre on his account of resistance, 
where it will be argued that Foucault's account is a weak alternative to the 
materialist use of the category of struggle, a weakness which partly derives from 
his inability to develop an account of critical knowledge. 
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Chapter Three 
Foucault and the Question of Power 
Foucault's Contribution to the Critique of Political Theory 
Where precisely does Foucault stand on the question of the state? There is no 
agreement amongst commentators on this issue. On the one hand Foucault is 
accused of ignoring and devaluing the general importance and specific form of the 
state, whilst on the other hand he is said to theorise the key role of the state. 1 Such 
differing interpretations are a product of the ambiguity of Foucault's work 
regarding the state. The contention here is that this ambiguity exists because 
Foucault's research into the nature of modern power leads him to reject the 
state-civil society distinction rather than rethink it. 
Questioned on 'the theoretical opposition between the state and civil society' 
Foucault rej ects its significance on the grounds that it is neither 'very fruitful' nor 
'pertinent' .2 In a later interview, he points out that the opposition between state 
and civil society developed in the late-eighteenth century and assisted liberal 
economists in limiting the state's sphere of action, but adds that he is not 
convinced that the opposition is still operational. It served a historical purpose for 
theorists and now only serves to afflict the notion of 'state' with a pejorative 
connotation whilst idealising 'society' as a good, living, warm whole.3 
What Foucault does find useful in the category 'civil society' however, is the 
fact that, for him, it occupies a central space in the attempts by early liberals to 
consider the technology of government, for what it makes possible is a social 
government: 
Thus 
Civil society is the concrete ensemble within which these abstract points, 
economic men, need to be positioned in order to be made adequately 
manageable.4 
Rather than embrace the distinction between state and civil society as an 
historical and political universal. .. one can attempt to see a form of 
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schematization proper to the particular technology of government. 5 
Now, there are two features that are worth indicating at this point. The first is the 
absence in Foucault's discussions of the Hegelian and Marxist heritage of the 
category 'civil society'. This absence will become more significant in Foucault's 
discussions of administration and police. Second, what Foucault is indicating here 
is the realm of the social. This category will come to play a prominent part in 
Foucault's work, and that of his followers. The provisional point to be made here 
is that for Foucault 'civil society' is useful not in its own right, but as an indicator 
of a new sphere, to be designated 'the social'. 
But if civil society is to be displaced by the social, what of the state? There are 
occasions in Foucault's work on power where the state is seen as occupying a 
fundamental place. In Discipline and Punish, for example, he suggests that the 
replacing of the scaffold with a new technique of punishment which symbolized 
a different physics of power created an enclosed, complex, hierarchized structure 
'that was integrated into the very body of the state apparatus'. 6 Likewise in The 
History of Sexuality he notes that the growth of the discourse on sexuality helped 
develop a 'medicaL.project for organising a state management of marriages, births 
and life-expectancies' and that the issue of degenerescence throughout the discourse 
on sexuality took the form of a 'state-directed racism'. 7 
Yet at other times Foucault claims that his work is not about the state, and that 
it is simply wrong to focus on it. This is spelled out quite clearly in his published 
interviews and lectures. 
The idea that the state must, as the source or point of confluence of power, 
be invoked to account for all the apparatuses in which power is organised, 
does not seem to me to be fruitful for history, or one might rather say that 
its fruitfulness has been exhausted. 8 
Similarly he claims that the state is overvalued, an overvaluation which regards the 
state as a unity and thereby attaches an importance to it as an object of both theory 
and practice. He even suggests that the state may be a mythical abstraction. 9 
To these two positions we can add a third, for at times Foucault's ambiguity is 
present in his very formulation of the problem. When asked about the relationship 
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between discipline and the state Foucault replies 
I don't want to say that the state isn't important; what I want to say is that 
relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, 
necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state. In two senses: first of all 
because the state, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from 
being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and further 
because the state can only operate on the basis of other, already existing 
power relations. The state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of 
networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, 
technology and so forth. 10 
So the state is important but, despite its 'omnipotence', does not occupy the whole 
field of power relations; it is superstructural to these power relations. Hence 
analysis must be directed away from the state. 
The ambiguity here seems to be over three different formulations regarding the 
state in Foucault's work. These can be delineated as the central significance of the 
state, the denial of any significance of the state, the recognition of some importance 
(unspecified) but a methodological shift away from it. The first position is 
undoubtedly not Foucault's; the second often appears to be his position but is best 
read as part of his polemical attempt to distance himself from those who stress the 
state; the third formulation seems the one to which Foucault adheres most 
consistently. This is significant because it is this position that has the ambiguity 
built into it ('I don't want to say the state isn't important'), and because it also 
involves the methodological shift that is the basis of Foucault's difficulties 
concerning state power. Foucault's weaknesses in developing a political analysis 
of the state in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries all stem from this 
shift. 
In many ways these last comments alert us to what is in fact a replication of 
some of Marx's key methodological moves. When Foucault claims that the state 
can only exist on the basis of other already existing power relations, and that the 
state is therefore superstructural to these other power relations, there are echoes of 
Marx's critique of Hegel and one of the central claims of historical materialism. 11 
Likewise his methodological shift away from the state as the centre of analysis to 
these other power relations could be read as analogous to the shift to the critique 
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of political economy found in Marx - witness his comment that 'the disciplines 
provide, at the base, a guarantee of the submission of forces and bodies. The real 
corporeal disciplines constituted the foundation of the formal, juridical liberties'. 12 
F or this reason when Foucault reflects on his own work his identification of his 
own 'guiding principle' can be read as analogous to Marx's identification of his 
'guiding thread' in the 1859 Preface. \3 Moreover, Foucault points to the way the 
formal equality of law and 'representative regimes' serves to conceal the actual 
procedures of power. However, the nature of the other powers that Foucault seeks 
to examine is fundamentally different to those that concern Marx, for rather than 
develop a critique of political economy Foucault seeks to examine the disciplinary 
mechanisms that operate throughout the whole social body. Moreover, whereas 
Marx's shift leads him to retain the state-civil society distinction in a new form, 
Foucault's leads him to reject it. 
Foucault seeks to address the nature of these 'other power relations', the 
'micro-physics of power', by contrasting the mode of punishment based on torture 
and execution and that based on a meticulous regimenting of the minutest details 
of a prisoners life. Conceptualising power as a micro-physics presupposes that 
power is not a property, something that a class or group may hold, but a strategy; 
power is not appropriated but functions in tactics, manoeuvres, techniques, it is 
exercised rather than possessed, an exercise met with resistance. Finally such power 
is not focused on one point but has innumerable points of confrontation and 
struggles. 
This means that these relations go right down into the depths of society, that 
they are not localised in the relations between the state and its citizens or 
on the frontier between classes and that they do not merely reproduce ... the 
general form of law or government. 14 
In this sense the sub-title of the English edition of Discipline and Punish is 
misleading, for the work is not simply about the 'birth of the prison'. Rather the 
prison is to be used as a methodological tool for an analysis of the power structures 
and relations of modern society. For Foucault, power relations are constituted 
largely through a set of institutions and disciplinary apparatuses. Honneth has 
suggested that Foucault's choice of the prison betrays his prejudice from the outset, 
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for he has chosen to represent the life of developed societies according to the 
model of total institutions. 15 Whilst this is true, and leads to some deleterious 
consequences in Foucault's understanding of law, administration and the social 
body, as we shall see below, it is also a partial distortion of Foucault's method. For 
Foucault's reading of power does not arise purely from the prison; indeed his 
reading of the prison does not arise purely from the prison. Foucault focuses on the 
prison in order to illustrate the technique of punishment. Thus the focus is not on 
punishment as such, nor the reason for it, but on its techniques, through which the 
similarities between incarceration and other non-penal practices can be drawn 
OUt. 16 Thus Foucault frequently makes the claim that power 'is exercised on those 
punished - and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, 
over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are 
stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives'. 17 This enables him 
to develop far wider theses concerning the effects of power relations. Moreover, 
if there is one institution that Foucault uses as his model it is the military rather 
than the prison. He argues that politics sought to implement the mechanism of the 
perfect army, the disciplined mass, the docile useful troop, attaining thereby the 
control of bodies and forces. 18 
The prison is therefore read as epitomising the power relations of modern 
society; as one of the chief institutional mechanisms of discipline it illustrates most 
profoundly the disciplinary processes at work. The juxtaposition of the public 
torture and execution of Damiens and the regulated timetable of anonymous 
prisoners enables Foucault to draw out some differences in the regimes of power 
in which these differing punishments operate. The crime in the classical age was 
a crime against the sovereign; by attacking the law the criminal attacks the will of 
the sovereign. The punishment of the crime was not therefore the intervention of 
the king as an arbiter between two adversaries but a direct reply to the criminal and 
a re-establishment and reiteration of the sovereign's power. 
The public execution, then, has a juridico-political function. It is a 
ceremonial by which a momentarily injured sovereignty is reconstituted. It 
restores that sovereignty by manifesting it at its most spectacular .. .Its aim 
is not so much to re-establish a balance as to bring into play, as its extreme 
point, the dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the law 
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and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his strength. 19 
The execution was above all else an expression and reassertion of power. It was 
a political operation. 20 The characteristics of such punishment exhibit the 
characteristics of a particular form of power. Such a form of power exerted itself 
directly on bodies, manifested itself visibly, was directly associated with force, 
violence and war, was linked to 'personal' bonds making disobedience a disloyalty. 
Most significantly, it exhibited these traits because of an absence of continual 
supervision. 21 
By 'continual supervision' Foucault has in mind the sort of power strategies and 
techniques that develop in the modern period. The concern in the Constituent 
Assembly in 1790 over the 'irregular' nature of power and justice - there was a 
plethora of overlapping and conflicting authorities, many in private hands - led to 
calls for an improvement in the economy of power, in order to ensure its better 
distribution; it would be homogeneous, operating everywhere, in a continuous way 
and down to the finest grain of the social body. Thus there was 
the emergence of a new strategy for the exercise of the power to 
punish ... with its primary objectives: to make of the punishment and 
repression of illegalities a regular function, coextensive with society; not to 
punish less but to punish better; to punish with an attenuated severity 
perhaps, but in order to punish with more universality and necessity; to 
insert the power to punish more deeply into the social body.22 
It was, in other words, a new way of administering illegalities.23 At the heart of 
this, though not occupying the whole space, is the prison. Thus 'the scaffold ... was 
replaced by a great enclosed, complex and hierarchized structure ... A quite different 
materiality, a quite different physics of power' .24 Foucault uses the model of the 
panopticon, an architectural device developed by Bentham to ensure the most 
effective surveillance in institutions such as the prison, to illustrate the regularised 
nature of modern power. Individualised prisoners are located in a specific space; 
they are seen but the 'eye' that sees them is unseen by them. Force is no longer 
necessary as efficient control is achieved across the surface of the application of 
power. The panopticon is, as Bentham noted, applicable to all establishments III 
which a number of persons are to be kept under inspection - schoolchildren, 
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· h' k b 25 patIents, t e Insane, wor ers, eggars. Here the category . surveillance' of 
Surveil/er et Punir becomes important, intended as it is to capture a diverse range 
of related meanings: 'inspect', 'supervise', 'observe' .26 
Given that for Foucault the panoptic schema represents a new physics of power. 
and is spread throughout the social body, its importance cannot be overestimated. 
It represents the 'ideal type' of a form of power completely opposed to that of 
sovereignty and the kings body. Power is no longer concentrated but dispersed; no 
longer at the apex of a hierarchy but spread throughout the whole lower region; not 
localised in the body of the king but expressed relationally on irregular bodies in 
the social whole. Discipline has replaced sovereignty. 27 
Foucault regards the displacement of sovereignty by discipline and surveillance 
as the key historical transformation. 
The movement from one project to another ... rests on a historical 
transformation: the gradual extension of the mechanisms of discipline 
throughout the whole social body, the formation of what might be called in 
general the disciplinary society. 28 
Thus Foucault's thesis rests on the understanding that there was a key historical 
transformation which introduced a new network of power relations throughout the 
social body, creating a carceral system, a carceral archipelago. 29 Such networks 
of power operate on the body, producing a knowledge of the individual, 
normalising behaviour through these power-knowledge mechanisms. The judges of 
normality are everywhere, both inside and outside of the disciplinary institutions. 
We are in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the 'social 
worker' -judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is 
based; each individual. wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his 
body, his gestures, his behaviour, his aptitudes, his achievements. The 
carceral network, in its compact or disseminated forms, with its systems of 
insertion, distribution, surveillance, observation, has been the greatest 
support, in modern society, of normalizing power. 30 
Likewise in Volume One of The History of Sexuality Foucault points to the way 
the transformation to this type of power led to the creation of . sexuality'. through 
the 'deployment of sexuality', in turn leading to its administration. In the last 150 
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years society has developed a machine of power and knowledge that produces 
discourses concerning sexuality. In other words, sexuality is inextricably bound up 
with modem devices of power. Foucault seeks to illustrate this through the concept 
'bio-power', with its double focus: on the body as a machine, and thereby its 
disciplining and integration into systems of control; and on the population, the 
species body, and thereby the administration of births, deaths, health, life 
expectancy. Thus 'the old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was 
now carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated 
management of life'. Foucault reiterates that this operated through institutions -
schools, barracks, workshops - and with a number of tactical focuses - health, 
housing and so on. As in Discipline and Punish this involves a shift in focus away 
from law to what Foucault calls norm. The normalizing society is the historical 
outcome of a technology of power centred on life. A micro-power designed to 
normalise. 31 
It is with his shift to the analysis of power, to its material effects from, roughly, 
1970, that Foucault regards himself as contributing to the critique of political 
theory. This is not to downplay his earlier work; it is, rather, to identify his concern 
from 1970 as the conscious attempt to tackle the question of power head on.32 For 
Foucault regards this conceptualisation of power as a radical break with traditional 
political theory, a break in theory adequate to the actual changes that have occurred 
in the organisation of power. His concern with the techniques of power, with power 
in its micro-physics and at the capillaries of the social body, forms the basis of a 
concerted effort to totally transform the analysis of power. 33 
Foucault seeks to end the domination of what he calls the 'juridico-discursive' 
conception of power, defined in the following way: 
In the case of the classic, juridical theory, power is taken to be a right, 
which one is able to possess like a commodity, and which one can in 
consequence transfer or alienate, either wholly or partially, through a legal 
act or through some act that establishes a right, such as takes place through 
cession or contract... This theoretical construct is essentially based on the 
idea that the constitution of political power obeys the model of a legal 
transaction involving a contractual type of exchange. 34 
He suggest that this conception is common to a number of competing analyses, 
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most notably liberal and Marxist, adding that in the 'generar Marxist conception 
power is usually taken to have an economic function, maintaining the relations of 
production and class domination. 
At issue here is what Foucault considers to be the sovereign-subject relationship, 
and in particular the displacement of the category 'sovereignty' into the concept 
'state sovereignty'. Foucault considers 'sovereignty' an obsolete concept. Put 
simplistically, an analysis that depends upon the sovereign-subject relationship 
conceives of power as regulated through law; law emanates from the sovereign; the 
subjects, in obeying the law, are therefore obedient to the sovereign. The 
consequence of this is that power is perceived as concentrated in the sovereign. But 
the ambiguity over the state already identified is reflected in his ambiguity over the 
precise meaning of 'sovereignty'. On the one hand Foucault appears to equate 
sovereignty with monarchy. 
Political theory has never ceased to be obsessed with the person of the 
sovereign. Such theories still continue today to busy themselves with the 
problem of sovereignty. What we need, however, is a political philosophy 
that isn't erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around 
the problem of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the kings head: III 
political theory that has still to be done. 35 
On the other hand he appears to regard any theoretical focus on the state, 
regardless of the type of state, as a continuation of the 'obsession' political theory 
has had with sovereignty. Hence 'to pose the problem [of political power] in terms 
of the state means to continue posing it in terms of sovereign and sovereignty, that 
is to say in terms of law' .36 This becomes even clearer in the following passage: 
I would say that we should direct our researches on the nature of power not 
towards the juridical edifice of sovereignty, the state apparatuses and the 
ideologies which accompany them ... We must escape from the limited field 
of juridical sovereignty and state institutions. 37 
In this way Foucault's shift of focus away from the sovereign is equally a shift 
away from the state. His central claim is that we need a political philosophy which 
is no longer erected around the problem of the state as the locus of a sovereign 
power. 38 Why does Foucault believe that this is the case? The key lies in his 
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belief that seeing the problem as one of sovereignty (or the state) means conceiving 
power as law and prohibition. According to Foucault the juridical conception sees 
power only in negative terms: 'it "excludes", it "represses", it "censors", it 
"abstracts"', it "masks", it "conceals"'. 39 Likewise 'in defining the effects of 
power as repression, one adopts a purely juridical conception of...power, one 
identifies power with a law which says no, power is taken above all as carrying the 
force of a prohibition'. 40 Foucault believes that such a conception of power 
follows automatically from conceiving power in juridical terms, with law at its 
heart and sovereignty at its apex. Law, for Foucault, always refers to the sword, it 
cannot help but be armed.41 
Instead of a prohibitive negative view Foucault suggests that an analysis of the 
disciplinary nature of power reveals that power produces. It 'traverses and produces 
things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It [is a] 
productive network which runs through the whole social body'. Ultimately power 
produces reality.42 The distinction between the 'negative prohibitive/repressive' 
view of power and Foucault's 'positive productive' view can be brought out via a 
discussion on sexuality, for the key theme of Volume One of The History of 
Sexuality is the attempt to illustrate that power does not merely repress sexuality, 
but, by acting on the body, can measure and shape that body, can organise and 
re-organise it; in the final analysis it can produce resistances to it. 
The trajectory of Volume One of The History of Sexuality is interesting here. It 
begins with a critique of the repressive hypothesis, moves to an examination of the 
juridico-discursive conception of power, and then finally shifts to an outline of the 
reading of power as productive and norm-creating, through an account of the 
deployment of sexuality. The 'repressive hypothesis' assumes that bourgeois society 
has developed a repressive attitude towards sexuality, especially in the Victorian 
era, with a triple edict of taboo, non-existence and silence. Repression provides a 
link between power, knowledge and sexuality. Foucault suggests this formulation 
provides critics of society, especially Marxists, with a comfortable double belief: 
that this 'repression' clearly coincides with capitalism and bourgeois society; and 
that therefore we must transgress the laws and break the prohibitions. 43 In The 
History of Sexuality Foucault does not direct his criticism in any particular 
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direction - he mentions Reich twice. But in interviews he is far more open about 
which specific theories he has in mind, claiming that one of his intentions is to 
'distinguish myself from para-Marxists like Marcuse who give the notion of 
repression an exaggerated role' and expressing his disatisfaction with the Reichian 
analysis of sexuality. 44 So Foucault clearly associates the repressive hypothesis in 
the analysis of sexuality with Marxist accounts of power and what he considers to 
be their assumptions about the negative, prohibitory nature of power. 
Yet despite this there are occasions when Foucault sounds very much like Reich 
or Marcuse himself. For example, he equates the era of bio-power with the 
subjugation of bodies, and suggests that bio-power was without question an 
indispensable element in the development of capitalism. 45 More generally, 
although his critique of the juridico-discursive concept of power is intended to 
function as a critique of Marxism, Foucault's analysis often lends itself to a 
Marxist reading. It is clear that, despite the fact that he variously calls this power 
'carceral', 'panoptic', 'capillary', a 'punitive city' and other such terms, he directly 
associates new disciplinary power with the growth of bourgeois society in the 
nineteenth century. Disciplinary power is variously described as a response to the 
growing threat of working class disorder, related to the development of the 
productive apparatus and the accumulation of capital, a fundamental instrument in 
the constitution of industrial capitalism, linked to the problem of a rising bourgeois 
class's concern with its own 'blood' or 'caste' purity that led to greater 
interventions in the social body. At times he even identifies the bourgeois class as 
the conscious agency in the development of disciplinary methods, as in his claim 
above that the mechanisms were a product of the bourgeoisie as it sought to 
consolidate its power. 46 
However, Foucault makes no attempt to theorise how, why and who directed 
these disciplinary techniques. Their 'specific role in profit' remains unspecified. 47 
This is partly due to Foucault's deep structuralist neglect of the question of agency. 
His continual claim that we should not ask 'who has power?' or 'for what purposes 
is power exercised?' leads him away from positive identification of the social 
groups whose practical initiatives lay behind the developments of the disciplinary 
institutions. 48 The fact that such questions would not yield simple answers, due 
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to the complex political and social struggles in European states at the time49 is, 
in an immediate sense, irrelevant, for Foucault does not even get that far. Instead 
he ignores the question of agency altogether and shifts away from any analysis of 
individual, group or class action to an analysis of institutions. But this merely shifts 
the problem. Hence, when he discusses the disciplinary mechanisms he declares 
that they are 'more efficient', 'more effective' or 'increasing its effectiveness'. 50 
Honneth points to two possible explanations for such descriptions. One is that the 
effectiveness of the means of social control is measured by criteria fixed by the 
institutional framework of a given social order, in which case the standard and 
measure of the effectiveness would depend upon particular social and political 
conditions. The other is that the criteria for assessment of social control is 
independent of a specific social order and is historically invariant. But, as Honneth 
argues, 
It is unwarranted to claim that the newly developed procedures of control 
are more effective than the instruments of social control found in 
pre-bourgeois forms of domination, since they serve the maintenance and 
stability of a different social order, a new institutional framework. However 
Foucault seems to claim precisely this. 51 
The point is that because Foucault shies away from any discussion of agency, and 
because he wants at all costs to avoid developing anything that could be construed 
as a 'Marxist' analysis, he equates the carceral society with bourgeois society but 
then ignores precisely the question of why bourgeois society developed in this way. 
He is thus forced to discuss the disciplinary methods increased 'effectiveness' 
without ever adequately explaining what this means. 
Moreover, one of the features of the development of bourgeois society IS 
precisely the development of the modern state and its separation from civil society. 
By hinting at the importance of disciplinary regimes to bourgeois society but then 
shifting away from any further analysis as to what this might mean, Foucault not 
only fails to address the question of agency in terms of both its general nature and 
its historical specifics, he also fails to address how this new disciplinary regime is 
linked to a central feature of modernity, the modern state. This increases the 
significance of his rejection of the state-civil society distinction and the ambiguity 
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over the state. 
Foucault and the End of Politics 
Law - Norm - Administration 
One of the outcomes of Foucault's suggestion that we move from a 
juridico-discursive to a disciplinary conception of power is that the centrality of 
law to the practice of power is rejected. Yet it soon becomes clear that the legal 
sphere cannot be treated in such a fashion. The result is a fundamental ambiguity 
regarding the place of law. In this section we will expose this ambiguity following 
Foucault's rejection of law before going on to show how Foucault in fact dissolves 
law into norm, which is in turn dissolved into administration. 
In Discipline and Punish, The History of Sexuality, his essays and lectures, and 
his later work on governmentality Foucault is concerned to show how his analyses 
of disciplinary mechanisms and bio-power are superior to previous analyses of 
punishment and sex because they do not privilege the law. He claims that 
punishment is a tactic of power rather than the product of law. It is a product of 
a disciplinary network that effects a suspension of the law.52 The analysis of 
modern power means we must 
rid ourselves of a juridical and negative representation of power, and cease 
to conceive of it in terms of law, prohibition, liberty, and sovereignty ... 
Power in modern societies has not in fact governed sexuality through law 
and sovereignty ... We must...conceive of sex without the law, and power 
without the king. 53 
This means that 'the discourse of discipline has nothing in common with that of 
law' .54 And in his work on 'governmentality' Foucault writes that 'the instruments 
of government, instead of being laws, now come to be a range of multiform tactics. 
Within the perspective of government, law is not what is important'. 55 
The point, then, is that the new technologies of power are 'foreign' to the 
concept of law. 56 This has two consequences. First, law assumes a problematic 
place in Foucault's analysis; law appears to be subordinated or displaced, and for 
this reason one can talk of Foucault's 'expulsion of law' .57 Second, when Foucault 
does address law it is often in highly ambiguous terms. Thus although he claims 
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that the new disciplinary mechanisms displace law, he also points to the emergence 
of an 'infra-law', a 'counter-law' or even a 'new form of law' which is internal to 
the disciplinary mechanisms. 
In appearance the disciplines constitute nothing more than an infra-law. 
They seem to extend the general forms defined by law to the infinitesimal 
level of individual lives ... The disciplines should be regarded as a sort of 
counter-law. They have the precise role of introducing insuperable 
asymmetries and excluding reciprocities ... Whereas the judicial systems 
define juridical subjects according to universal norms, the disciplines 
characterise, classify, specialise... In any case, in the space and during the 
time in which they exercise their control and bring into play the 
asymmetries of their power, they effect a suspension of the law that is never 
total, but is never annulled either. Regular and institutional as it may be, the 
discipline, in its mechanism, is a 'counter-law'. 58 
In the final chapter in Discipline and Punish Foucault suggests that the new 
economy of power 'permitted the emergence of a new form of 'law': a mixture of 
legality and nature, prescription and constitution, the norm. This had a whole series 
of effects: the internal dislocation of the judicial power, or at least of its 
functioning' .59 It does this because the carceral system plays the two registers in 
which it is deployed - the register of justice and the extra-legal register of 
discipline - against one another, giving legal sanction to the disciplinary 
mechanisms and the judgements they enforce through which they become 
'relatively autonomous and independent'. 60 The ambiguities surrounding the idea 
of a 'new form of law' or a 'counter-law' are exacerbated by suggestions that law 
is partly engaged in 'absorbing' the new disciplines, 61 and yet the procedures of 
normalisation 'colonise' the law,62 
These ambiguities lead to a number of difficulties. In his concern with 
punishment as a mode of practice of modern power, Foucault obscures the fact that 
punishment, as discipline, is legitimised through the law. There are, after all, legal 
and illegal forms of punishment, and however much an institution has its 'own' 
rules and officials administering them the institution itself, as well as its internal 
order, is legitimised through law. 63 Moreover, Foucault is rather misled through his 
own choice of institutional model. His rhetorical question as to whether it is 
surprising that with their regular chronologies, forced labour, authorities of 
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surveillance and registration and experts in normality, prisons 'resemble factories, 
schools, barracks, hospitals' ,64 is, as Honneth notes, rooted in a failure to 
distinguish 'between social organisations in which membership is regulated on the 
basis of juridically free contracts and total institutions in which membership is 
coerced on the basis of legal orders'. 65 This is partly the case because of his 
refusal to deal with the centrality to modern law of the juridically free subject, for 
in turning away from the juridico-discursive conception of power Foucault also 
turns away from some of its central components. 
Foucault's criticism of the way the juridical subject has played such a central 
role in political theory is partly due to the way political theory has laboured under 
the notion of the contract, a notion which Foucault is right to criticise. But in 
criticising it he declares the juridical subject to be a fiction, suggesting its 
replacement with the more materialist focus on bodies and the controls over 
them.66 This facilitates the turn to an analysis of the techniques of power in terms 
of both an anatomo-politics of the human body and a bio-politics of the 
population. 67 But in doing so Foucault fails to address the importance of the 
juridical subject in the development of the state and administration. He fails to 
appreciate that legal contracts, most significantly the labour contract, can only be 
made by formal legal subjects. Moreover, the legal and administrative institutions 
that regulate the relations between legal subjects are far from 'fictitious'. Legal 
subjects are not simply a fiction, they are at the heart of the constitution of 
bourgeois social order. To ignore this, and the institutions that constitute and 
regulate the legal subject, is to ignore the very material effects of the 'fiction'. 
In fact Foucault's replacement of the legal subject with bodies is, as Gillian Rose 
notes, a spurious materialism. By deliberately reviving the theological opposition 
between body and soul as some kind of replacement for the legal subject - as in his 
comments that the soul is the prison of the bodl8 - Foucault automatically 
abandons the attempt to analyse the historical origins and political significance of 
the legal subject. To transcribe individual experience in terms of the body reaffirms 
the body/soul dichotomy and replaces a fiction with a chimera. 69 This replacement 
also fails to recognise that not all legal subjects are human beings and therefore 
cannot be treated as 'bodies'. Legal subjectivity is a far more complex category 
124 
than Foucault allows for, including as it does both human individuals and 
(non-human) corporate entities. To replace such a 'fiction' with the category of the 
body is not a step forward in materialist analysis but, given its over-simplification 
of the concept of legal subjectivity, can only be a step backwards. 70 
As part of his attempt to distinguish his own work from the 'juridico-discursive' 
concept of power Foucault separates law and norm: 'Another consequence of this 
development of bio-power was the growing importance assumed by the action of 
the norm, at the expense of the juridical system of the law'.71 The discourse of 
discipline is concerned not with law but norm and the society of normalisation, for 
the 'procedures of normalisation corne to be ever more constantly engaged in the 
colonisation of those of law' .72 
Foucault's distinction between law and norm rests heavily upon his equation of 
law with the state and sovereignty, and therefore 'repression', an equation which 
he claims obscures the productive aspects of power. 
The juridical system .. .is utterly incongruous with the new methods of power 
whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by 
normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are employed 
on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus. 73 
Yet the equivalence drawn between law and repression, upon which his separation 
of law and norm is based, is unwarranted. It is simply untrue to argue that law is 
concerned only with saying 'no', with prohibiting, with death. Undoubtedly some 
laws do these things, but others do not, and law in general can not be reduced to 
this without a resultant loss of understanding. 74 Law acts as a constitutive force 
across and throughout the whole of society. Far from being separate from norm 
creation, law is bound up with it. One might want to say that, like power, law 
produces, and one of the things it produces is norms. In many ways Foucault is 
guilty of the very sin he accuses others of, for it becomes clear that the image of 
law as 'command', in which law is regarded as a set of commands which forbid 
or demand certain acts under threat of punishment, is in fact Foucault's image. 75 
Given such an image it is apparent that the disciplinary network of norm-creating 
power relations must be separate from law. But this is only the case if one holds 
a command theory of law. If one has a broader conception of law involving a 
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recognition of its wider policing and regulative functions, then the separation 
between them cannot be sustained. In other words, Foucault's distinction between 
law and norm rests on the very conception of law of which he is critical and which 
in fact affirms the dichotomy repression/creation rather than overcomes it.76 
Foucault is forced into such a position because his rejection of the state-civil 
society distinction leaves him without the conceptual tools to address the issue of 
law adequately. Hence his decision to equate law with the 'old' regime of 
sovereign power necessarily results in a dismissal of law with the 'old' way of 
thinking about power. 
Now, it is true that on occasion Foucault suggests that it is not that law fades 
into the background, but that it 'tends to operate more and more as a norm, and 
that the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of 
apparatuses,.77 But such claims are infrequent and run against the general thrust 
of his argument that law is displaced by normalisation. Foucault's difficulty here 
is exacerbated by his tendency to integrate the juridico-discursive conception of 
power with the law itself, the result of which is that the rejection of the former 
leads to denigration of the latter78 resulting in a failure to appreciate the 
complexities of both. 
The argument thus far is that the law is never simply juridico-discursive (and 
therefore 'repressive'). Law defines the very agents that can be regarded as 
juridical subjects, that is, it defines the very agents of its regulation. In this sense, 
law constitutes the very objects of its concern. One might want to say, in the lingua 
franca of French theory, that it is legal interpellation that constitutes the social 
relation that is juridical subjectivity. This is most clearly shown in the constitution 
of the citizen as both subject of right and object of administration, as shall be 
argued in Part III. Furthermore laws set norms of conduct on these subjects, 
whether these be behavioural norms (in private as well as public) on human 
subjects or norms of administration on corporate enterprises. 79 
This is partly illustrated by the ambiguous meaning of Foucault's use of the term 
'norm' itself, oscillating between compulsorily fixed patterns of conduct and the 
norm of moral action. 80 This both allows and encourages ambiguous formulations, 
thus 
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The power of the Norm appears through the disciplines. Is this the new law 
of modern society? Let us say rather that, since the eighteenth century, it 
has joined the other powers - the Law, the Word (Parole) and the Text, 
Tradition - imposing new delimitations on them. 81 
And he goes on to discuss the Normal as establishing both a principle of coercion 
and standardization. This ambiguity, whilst seemingly separating law and norm, in 
fact draws them together, in the process incorporating law into norm. Foucault thus 
appears to dissolve law into norm. 
A similar and related set of problems appear III the use of the category 
'administration' in Foucault's work, for the distinction drawn between law and 
norm runs parallel to the distinction drawn between law and administration. The 
distinction between a juridico-discursive analysis of power and an analysis based 
on its positive norm-creating aspects in Discipline and Punish and The History of 
Sexuality (Volume One) is both mirrored in, and rests upon, the supposition 
regarding an historical transformation from a juridical system to a society of 
administration. Thus Foucault suggests that the older operation of power which 
allowed the sovereign to inflict death has been replaced by 'the function of 
administering life'. 82 The transformation to disciplinary power carves out a series 
of spaces for the administration of men, in particular the administration of 
sexuality. 83 Thus administration serves the function of norm-creation and 
norm-governing, making it central to the constitution of order, yet distinct from law 
for precisely that reason. 
Law by definition is always referred to a juridical system, and order is 
referred to an administrative system, to a state's specific order. .. It is 
impossible to reconcile law and order because when you try to do so it is 
only in the form of an integration of law into the state's order. 84 
It is because Foucault has so effectively separated law and administration and 
warned us away from the state that he resists placing law with administration and 
linking the two to the state and its constitutive power over order. Foucault's binary 
opposition, this time between law and administration, once again serves to obscure 
the complex relationship between the two aspects of the opposition. For law and 
administration cannot be counterposed in any simple manner. In practical terms 
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there is no separation between law and administration, to the extent that one cannot 
comprehend the developments in the state from 1832 onwards if one assumes that 
this distinction can be made. The British state developed a law-and-administration 
continuum in the process of its reconstitution of political order in the 
late-nineteenth century. It is precisely this that has caused so many theoretical 
difficulties, for Marxists and non-Marxists alike. This argument is developed in 
Part III below. Here we can briefly note that administration is law in three ways: 
it creates law, is subject to law, and acts through legal forms.85 We can use the 
example of tribunals to demonstrate this. Historically the growth of tribunals arose 
alongside the development of the welfare state during the early part of the twentieth 
century, dealing with, in many cases, the very areas of Foucault's concern: health, 
social security, professional discipline. They came to administer disputes between 
the individual and the state outside the ordinary court system. Likewise industrial 
tribunals came to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in matters concerning the labour 
contract. 86 In this sense the legal subject of modern society is not only a subject 
of rights, but also an object of administration. Both right (law) and administration 
are developments of the British state from 1832, functioning as the medium 
through which the state maintains social and political order. As such it is 
impossible to present them as distinct realms and processes in the way Foucault 
seems to; rather they act together. These points will be developed in detail in Part 
III. 
When Foucault writes that the paradox concernmg power is that smce the 
eighteenth century society 'has created so many technologies of power that are 
foreign to the concept of law' 87 he is undoubtedly identifying a key problem, 
which he attempts to solve by developing the categories norm and administration. 
He is right to focus on the nature of administration and its centrality to modern 
power. However, his account is conceptually weakened by the loss of the 
conceptual distinction between state and civil society. Although the initial outcome 
of this is an ambiguity concerning the state in Foucault's work, the ultimate 
outcome is that the state is dissolved into power, and then into the social. 
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State - Power - The Social 
The ambiguity regarding the state in his work allows Foucault to develop an 
account of the growth of the institutions of disciplinary society independently of 
any analysis of the state. Indeed, it is by downplaying the role of the state in the 
shaping and regulating of the development of disciplinary apparatuses that Foucault 
stresses their local and diverse points of origin. Just as Foucault obscures the fact 
that even 'modern' power is legitimised though law, so his account of the 
institutions of discipline is given independently of the process of their social 
establishment, an account which would necessarily lead him to address the question 
of the state. 88 Foucault is assisted in this through his expansion of the category 
'discipline', whereby although it appears to centre on institutions it in fact is 
'de-institutionalised', 'swarming freely' throughout the social body.89 Whether 
Foucault is a pluralist in his denial of the existence of a centre90 is less important 
than the fact that the treatment of the state as just one locus of power amongst 
many others, undoubtedly an effect of his decision to restrict the concept of 
sovereignty to the old system of power, loses the very meaning of the state; a state 
that is merely a locus of power like any other locus of power is no state at all. 91 
Even where Foucault appears to emphasise the role of the state, in his work on 
governmentality, he simultaneously, and surreptitiously, plays down its significance. 
In his work on governmental rationality - the concern with policing and economy, 
the surveillance, control of, and intervention in, the population - Foucault points to 
the way the art of government leads to the development of a whole range of 
savoirs and complex governmental apparatuses, institutions and procedures which 
allow the exercise of power over a population. The place of the state should be 
analysed, if it is to be analysed at all, in terms of the governmentalisation of the 
state from the late-eighteenth century. 'Maybe what is really important for our 
modernity .. .is not so much the 'etatisation' of society, as the 'governmentalisation' 
of the state'. For Foucault it is not that civil society has become subject to 
increased administration by the state, but that the growing administration of society 
takes place at a number of different levels, often outside of the state. It is this 
governmentality that has allowed the state to survive. 92 
Now, on the one hand this appears to acknowledge that the state has some 
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importance, and on occaSIOn Foucault even suggests that In this 
governmentalisation the population is intended to be active 'in the interest of the 
state's power', to which end health, birth-rate and hygiene play an important 
role. 93 By linking these claims to his earlier work it can be argued that the 
position of the state in the transformation to the disciplinary society is that it 
becomes 'governmentalised', a reading which supposedly answers those critics who 
had accused him of overlooking or ignoring the state.94 On the other hand, 
conceptualising the state as 'governmentalised' in fact consolidates Foucault's 
downplaying of the state, for his argument rests on the supposition that the state 
lacks any unity and lacks any function other than to be a tactic of 
governmentality.95 
Similarly, when Foucault asks what type of political rationality the developing 
state produced he points to the reason of state and the theory of police. The latter 
is read through seventeenth and eighteenth century writers, allowing Foucault to 
stress its non-institutional nature. Thus the police 'appears as an administration 
heading the state, together with the judiciary, the army, and the exchequer', 'the 
police includes everything', is intended to provide the city with adornment and 
splendour but also to foster working relations between men in their most general 
sense: it must see to religion, morals, health, supplies, roads, public safety, 
factories, the poor. In other words, the police must regulate social relations. 96 
Such comments shed light on some of the passages in Discipline and Punish where 
Foucault suggests that discipline can be taken over by a number of apparatuses or 
institutions, including the state, 'whose major, if not exclusive, function is to assure 
that discipline reigns over society as a whole (the police)' .97 Now, such a 
conception of police is not far from that offered by Hegel, identifying the police 
with 'the whole body of societi and linking the 'happiness' of the state with the 
happiness of its citizens. But the key difference is that Hegel provides an 
understanding as to why such policing is necessary. For Hegel, as for Marx, 
policing is necessary because of the contradictions of poverty, and the existence 
of classes and struggle on the one hand, and those caused through the separation 
of state and civil society on the other. Foucault's similar reading of police is 
notable for the absence of these aspects. In particular, Foucault develops a 
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conception of police independently of any real conception of the state. Far from 
opening up the analysis of the state in a way that 'state-focused' theory and 
analysis could not,98 Foucault in fact closes it off. 
One of the outcomes of ignoring the state in this way is that Foucault is left with 
an all-embracing concept of power. In one of his final interviews he claims that 
When one speaks of 'power' people think immediately of a political 
structure, a government, a dominant social class, the master facing the slave 
and so on. That is not at all what I think when I speak of 'relationships of 
power'. I mean that in human relationships, whatever they are ... power is 
always present. 99 
Whilst Foucault is to be credited with stressing the existence of power in all human 
relations, the danger is that the significant differences between different forms, 
modalities, institutions and exercises of power, most obviously the difference 
between the power of the state in relation to civil society and the relative power of 
individuals and groups within civil society, will be overlooked; such a metaphysics 
of power lOO runs the risk of losing the specificity of political. In this sense it can 
be argued that Foucault dissolves politics into power. 
Yet this dissolution is taken one step further in the claim that because power 
operates in all human relationships it permeates the whole social body. His 
rejection of the state as a centre of analysis does not leave him with an analysis at 
the level of civil society; as we have seen, the lack of focus on the state is both a 
result of and a party to the rejection of the state-civil society dichotomy. Given 
this, the only conceptual tool Foucault is left with is 'the social' (sometimes 
designated as 'the social body'). Thus the disciplinary mechanisms outlined in 
Discipline and Punish are described as operating throughout the whole social body. 
The panoptic schema ... was destined to spread throughout the social body. 
In penal justice the prison transformed the punitive procedure into a 
penitentiary technique; the carceral archipelago transported this technique 
from the penal institution to the entire social body. 101 
In the same vein Foucault points to the way 'that power is co-extensive with the 
social body,102 Thus simultaneous with the dissolution of the political into 
'power' is the expansion of the concept 'power' throughout the whole social body. 
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One might therefore say that it is through an expanded concept of power that 
Foucault dissolves the political into the social. 
Now, if one is talking of the disciplinarization of the state and the etatisation of 
society then in effect one has dissolved state into society, for the state can be read 
as coterminous with the social body. This is a direction actively developed by some 
of those working with the conceptual apparatus developed by Foucault. Pasquino, 
for example, writes that 
If one rids oneself of the idea of the State as an apparatus or instance 
separate from the social body, the focus of all political struggle, which must 
be either democratised or destroyed, once its veritable nature has been 
revealed, or which must be appropriated, in order to take power; if one rids 
oneself of this old idea ... one can perhaps recover another meaning of this 
word State which was more or less that which it had in the 17th 
century ... the 'entire body of civil society'. This would resituate the analysis 
of relations of power wholly within the interior of this social body.103 
One of the difficulties this raises is that rejecting the state-civil society distinction 
and conceptualising all relations as 'power' relations renders one unable to 
distinguish between different state forms. When questioned on this Foucault 
suggests that his characterisation of society as a 'carceral archipelago' is a 
conscious attempt effort to point to the existence of disciplinary power in different 
state forms, to indicate the way the penal methods of Nazism and Stalinism were 
adoptions of the methods developed in bourgeois society, and to show how the 
revolutionary transformation that was 1917 left myriad other power relations 
exactly as they were.104 But the problem still remains as to how to distinguish 
between state forms, the very problem found in Althusser's conceptual apparatus 
following his rejection of the state and civil society distinction too. The crucial 
difference between Althusser and Foucault here is that whereas Althusser 
conceptualises various aspects of civil society as part of the state, or at least part 
of the ideological state apparatus, in the writings of Foucault and his followers it 
is the various aspects of the state apparatus that are subsumed into the social body. 
Although the 'direction' is different the identical results draw out quite clearly the 
difficulties in rejecting the state-civil society distinction. 105 
The use of the category 'social body' is on the one hand an unintentional product 
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of Foucault's rejection of the state-civil society distinction. On the other hand it is 
a deliberate move in his later work to designate a field of research into the 
constitution of the social. As Dews notes, the social in Foucault's earlier work is 
portrayed as constituted by systems independent of human consciousness and 
agency. Introducing the concept of power allows the social to be portrayed as 
constituted by power and administration. 106 In this sense it is different from 
'society' in that it refers to a specific historical event or period in which there 
emerged a network of and through which power and administration could be 
exercised.107 Nonetheless it also appears to be one of Foucault's key theoretical 
categories. 
This dissolution of the political into the social, and the dual meamng of the 
social, has had serious consequences for social and political thought. For example, 
in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Laclau and Mouffe seek to tackle the problem 
posed within Marxism by the polity/economy distinction, a variation on the 
state/civil society distinction. Struggling to find a way out of the choice between 
the monism of determination in the last instance and the dualism of separate 
spheres, Laclau and Mouffe's key theoretical move is to reject the polity/economy 
distinction altogether. In doing so their conception of the political, seen as a 
practice of creation, reproduction and transformation of social relations, is in fact 
dissolved into the social. Thus 'the problem of the political is the problem of the 
institution of the social'. 108 The difficulty with this is that the semantic wealth of 
the term 'institution' is lost if one reads it solely as 'actively instituting' without 
regard for actual institutional structures. Laclau and Mouffe' s choice of the word 
'institution', whilst playing on the semantic wealth of the term, in fact obscures the 
lack of reference to actual, political, institutions. As Mouzelis notes 
the well-trodden idea that there is a political dimension in all social 
interaction .. .is no reason to ignore or even deny the existence, in all 
capitalist societies, of a differentiated set of institutional structures which 
have a predominantly political character i.e. which are geared to the 
production and reproduction of the overall system of domination... The fact 
that we often use the term politics to refer both to a differentiated 
institutional sphere and to the 'political' as an inherent dimension of all 
social situations is no good reason for rejecting the former in favour of the 
latter. 109 
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As was noted in Chapter Two, the socialist project as conceived by Laclau and 
Mouffe rests on a reading of Gramsci's concept of hegemony, without classes. 
Here we can add that whilst it may appear that Laclau and Mouffe' s reading of the 
social and the political opens the way for an exploration of the ongoing 
socialisation of the political and politicisation of the social,IIO in fact they obscure 
this very issue by following Foucault in dissolving the political into the social. 
In his critique of Foucault, Habermas claims that Foucault has a very 
unsociological concept of the social. 111 In fact, it would appear that the 
conception of the social found in the work of Foucault and his followers is 
decidedly sociological in that, following our discussion in Chapter One, it fails to 
have any categories with which to analyse society as a whole, and ends with an 
all-embracing concept, 'the social', against which something (bodies, 
administration) can be played off. Whilst this dual series of dissolutions - from 
law to administration, through norm; from the state to the social, through power -
has been traced separately here, in Foucault's work they are part of one and the 
same process. For the result of Foucault's work is precisely the link that is made 
between the social and administration. At the end of Part II of Discipline and 
Punish, rhetorically asking why it is that the disciplinary mode of punishment took 
off when it did, Foucault contrasts the two options: 'we have then the sovereign 
and his force, the social body and the administrative apparatus'. 112 The new mode 
of power is one of the administration of the social. This contrasts quite starkly with 
the argument here, for instead of a materialist analysis which rests on the 
conceptual distinction between state and civil society but that seeks to rethink this 
distinction through the category of political administration (and which retains the 
category of the social as a fundamental point of critique, positing a future 
overcoming of dichotomies), the analysis found in the work of Foucault and his 
followers is simply that of administration and the social. This can be seen in the 
work of some of those who seek to work within a framework of F oucauldian 
analysis or with a Foucauldian 'tool-kit'. We will take Jacques Donzelot and 
Nikolas Rose as our examples. 113 
In both Donzelot and Rose the social is taken as the grounds for administration; 
in this the family plays a central role. When discussing the constitution of order 
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both Donzelot and Rose refuse to employ the notion of the state as an agent in this 
constitution. For example, philanthropy is regarded as having emerged from neither 
the state nor the 'private'. Instead philanthropy is 'considered as a deliberately 
depoliticizing strategy for establishing public services and facilities at a sensitive 
point midway between private initiative and the state' .114 Philanthropy was one 
of the forces through which order was constituted, and this is so because it 
functioned through the family. Rose: 
The reconstruction of the working class family in the nineteenth century 
took place not through the activities of the state, but through an initiative 
that maintained a certain distance from the organs of political power -
philanthropy .... In England and France philanthropists sought. .. to organize 
the conjugal, domestic, and parental relations of the pOOr. 115 
Both Donzelot and Rose are at pains to stress that in the campaigns waged by 
philanthropists and other 'specialists' the state or public authority was not involved, 
other than providing a legal framework for the activities. For Rose 
by the start of the twentieth century the family was administered and 
policed by practices and agencies that were not 'private' (many of their 
powers were constructed legally, they were often recipients of public funds, 
and their agents were frequently publicly accredited by some form of 
licensing), but nor were they organs of central political power. 116 
The point here is that in dispensing with the state/civil society distinction, and in 
seeking to remove the state from the centre of analysis, both writers are left with 
the catch-all concept of 'the social' as a self-regulating power through varIOUS 
technologies of government, administration and subjectification. 117 
One of the problems posed by rejecting the notion of the state as agent is that 
Foucault's difficulties over the question of agency in general are replicated in an 
even more direct form. Denying the centrality of the state means denying its 
constitutive power over society. Yet for both Donzelot and Rose the individual and 
the family are still constituted, indeed reconstituted. The focus therefore turns to 
the administrative intervention of the miscellaneous entities, the 'alliances and 
forces', but why they intervene is never explained. So for Donzelot the family is 
. made functional' with respect to 'social requirements', it is 'the essential figure 
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of our societies' and an 'indispensable correlate of parliamentary democracy'. 118 
What these 'social requirements' are, why they are as they are and not otherwise, 
why the family is 'essential', and a host of related problems all remain unclear. 119 
Apart from the obvious problem of an overt functionalism in a text that claims to 
be breaking with functional analysis, a text in which the language of 'effects' is 
used when the concept of 'cause' is denied,120 these miscellaneous forces and 
alliances seem free to float in the social body yet with a certain, but unspecified, 
direction. Moreover, Donzelot uses explicitly political concepts concerning state 
forms such as 'parliamentary democracy' without relating these to the general 
thesis at all. 
Perhaps the clearest indication of the problems arising from employing such an 
analysis is that having rejected the state/civil society distinction, and having placed 
the family at the centre of an analysis of 'the social', it merely remains for the 
'social' to be conflated with the 'family'. Whilst Rose writes of the 'familialisation 
of society' Donzelot argues that 'with its saturation by hygienic, psychological, and 
pedagogical norms, it becomes harder to distinguish the family from the 
disciplinary continuum of the social apparatuses. 121 It is symptomatic that 
Donzelot admits that his own theoretical approach makes it difficult to form 
distinctions of this sort. His rejection of all other major theoretical traditions and 
their conceptual distinctions has left him free to develop a set of theoretical 
categories in which no conceptual distinctions can be made whatsoever: everything 
is the social, the social is everywhere in the family, the family must be everywhere 
in the social. 
Further problems anse from an analysis that hinges on 'the socialisation of 
politics' (Donzelot) or 'the governmentalisation of the state' (Rose),122 which is 
that, understandably, any notion of the constitutive power of the state is absent, the 
result being a state that is essentially passive. When, for example, Donzelot seeks 
to discuss employment and wage labour contracts he can only conceive of the state 
as a force standing outside or above: the state 'supports' collective work contracts, 
it is the 'guarantor' of the progress of social relations. 123 Likewise for Rose, the 
programmes and schemes of social government 'were gradually linked up to the 
apparatus of the state' yet 'the state apparatus did not, could not, eliminate all other 
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centres of power or decision'. 124 Any actively constitutive power of the state is 
denied and its actual action (it did not eliminate all other centres of power) is read 
as the limits to its action (it could not eliminate them). As Donzelot notes, his 
perception of the state supporting collective work contracts reinforces the liberal 
discourse of the contract; he clearly does not recognise that, for all his claims to 
be part of, along with Foucault and the Foucauldians, an attempt to forge a break 
in political theory in general and Marxism in particular, the new conceptual 
apparatus simply leaves them with an essentially liberal conception of the state. 
In terms of law and administration, both writers, following Foucault, find the 
category 'administration' indispensable, but there remains some ambiguity over 
'law', the relationship between them, and their relations to the state. Donzelot and 
Rose recognise that law sanctions surveillance and supplies administrative agencies 
with their powers. Moreover, the courts function as a supportive agency in the 
tutelary complex. But there is no attempt to grapple with the theoretical Issues 
involved. To those who argue that the law provides a framework for the activities 
of regulatory agencies and that this legal framework is established by the state, 
thereby creating a set of mechanisms through which social control can be 
maintained, Rose notes that the issue is more than one of control, that it is about 
the constitutive power that these technologies have in the formation of citizens. 
However, when it comes to specifying which bodies have this power he downplays 
the state and emphasises the other agencies, understood as administrative rather 
than juridical. 125 
I t seems to me that the domain of the social is, in a very real sense, 
constituted in and through the apparatuses of administration ... which, over 
the last hundred years or so, have progressively installed themselves 
between law and the population. Whilst the apparatuses of the juridical 
instance operate according to criteria which are, at least in principle, 
specifiable in law, this is not the case in the social sphere. For the practices 
here, though they may be constituted by law, operate according to criteria 
which, from the point of view of law, are indeterminate. 126 
Thus we have apparatuses of administration that have installed themselves between 
law and the population. The apparatuses of administration are in the social sphere, 
the apparatuses of the juridical instance are not. Yet the law constitutes the social 
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(or at least may constitute the practices in it). Law exists in a realm that is not of 
the social and in a realm that is, well, legal. This whole conceptual schema appears 
to miss the crucial dimension of the universality of the state. In separating law and 
administration in this way Rose is unable to see that law and administration are 
integrally linked, that they are so at the level of the state, and that this integral link 
between the two provides the state with its constitutive power. Rose is assisted here 
through his use of the terminology of 'governmentalisation of the state', for this 
enables him to discuss 'legislation' and 'government' without 'state': 
the enactment of legislation is a powerful resource in the creation of centres, 
to the extent that law translates aspects of a governmental programme into 
mechanisms that establish, constrain, or empower certain agents or entities 
and set some of the key terms of their deliberations. 127 
I t is because of formulations such as these that when Rose does hint at the 
existence of the state it is in essentially passive terms, as noted above. 
This is not to say that all law is straightforwardly state law and can therefore be 
discussed as such but it is to say that legal order is constituted as such by the state, 
and that law, like administration, is fundamentally entwined in/with the state. 
On the Subject of Resistance and War 
Foucault insists that the corollary of power is resistance; wherever there is power 
there is the possibility of resistance. 'In the relations of power there is necessarily 
the possibility of resistance, for if there were no possibility of resistance ... there 
would be no relations of power. 128 However, given that power operates in all 
relations, so must resistance. Since power is everywhere so resistance IS 
everywhere. 129 Whilst this may allow Foucault a means of escaping the 
accusations of nihilism, passivity and political quietism,130 it leaves him with a 
fundamental problem concerning the nature of resistance. The argument here will 
be that the category 'resistance' as it features in Foucault's work lacks the kind of 
specificity needed for such a central concept, a lack illustrated through Foucault's 
simultaneous use of the categories of warfare. This will be illustrated through a 
comparison with the alternative category 'struggle'. 
As it features in Foucault's work resistance has received perhaps the most severe 
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criticism, centring around the tension between this category and that of power. If 
power is taken to exist in all relations then in and of itself it cannot be a bad thing, 
in which case on what grounds does resistance take place? Foucault's supposed 
'ethical quandary' is taken to rest on his lack of any normative basis for the 
resistance to power. The point has been made most succinctly by Fraser: 
Why is struggle to be preferred to submission? Why ought domination to 
be resisted? Only with the introduction of normative notions of some kind 
could Foucault begin to answer this question. Only with the introduction of 
normative notions could he begin to tell us what is wrong with the modern 
power/knowledge regime and why we ought to oppose it. 131 
As Fraser argues, either Foucault has to accept that his position is nihilistic or 
pessimistic, or he has to make an appeal to some idea of 'liberation' on the 
grounds of which one might resist. Whilst such a criticism has some strength, the 
argument here is that the theoretical contours of his work preclude Foucault from 
making such a choice; his metaphysics of power can only be mirrored in a 
metaphysics of resistance. This makes the category of resistance weaker than that 
of the essentially social category of struggle found in Hegel and Marx. 
Just as Foucault is unable to specify who holds power and for what purpose, so 
he cannot identify who resists and why. In one way Foucault comes to depend 
upon the answer 'the body and its pleasures'. We aim at a 'general economy of 
pleasure not based on sexual norms'. We develop the care of the self towards an 
aesthetics of existence.132 There are numerous problems with this: first, as he 
himself shows in later volumes of The History of Sexuality, the body and its 
pleasures are exceedingly historically variant; second, how or why resistance comes 
from docile bodies, constructed as such by the operations of power, is never 
addressed; third, surely any aesthetics of existence is again part of the process in 
which individuals subjectify themselves, in which case it is as much a process of 
power as resistance; finally, to fall back on to bodies and their pleasures runs the 
risk of echoing the very claims of those who hold a 'repressive hypothesis'. 
Hinting at a more political answer Foucault suggests we look to the 'plebs', 'the 
permanent, ever silent target for apparatuses of power', on the grounds that 'there 
is indeed always something in the social body, in classes, groups and individuals 
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themselves which in some sense escapes relations of power'. The reference to 
classes or groups here should not mislead, for as soon as Foucault appears to 
identify something like an agency he resorts to an inversion of his theology of 
power, mystifying once again: 'there is certainly no such thing as "the" plebs; 
rather there is, as it were, a certain plebian quality or aspect. There is plebs in 
bodies, in souls, in individuals, in the proletariat, in the bourgeoisie, but 
everywhere in a diversity of forms and extensions, of energIes and 
irreducibilities'. 133 Resistance occurs because the plebian 'quality or aspect' has 
taken hold, a quality that is so like the spirit of power that it can take hold of 
anyone, anytime, anyplace. Now, one of the problems here is that on Foucault's 
own account of power there is nothing that escapes the networks of power, 
certainly not bodies or the plebs. 134 But the real problem with Foucualt's 
formulations concerning the body or the plebs is that both are a way of letting back 
in, through the back door, a subject ejected from the outset. 13S This is ultimately 
bound up with Foucault's concept of subjectification, for although he points to the 
resistance that power meets and the constitution of subjects by power, in fact what 
are constituted in Foucault is not so much subjects as objects. In Discipline and 
Punish he writes that 'the prisoner is seen but does not see; he is the object of 
information but never a subject in communication'. 136 One is tempted to argue 
that, conceptualised as docile bodies, one finds in Foucault the constitution of 
(passive) objects rather than (active) subjects. 
Poulantzas suggests that Foucault's 'resistances' remam a strictly gratuitous 
assertion in the sense that they are given no foundation; they are a pure affirmation 
of principle. 137 Foucault is left in this position because he has no conceptual 
means for describing resistances as anything other than counter-strategies of 
power. 138 Yet his resort to a kind of theological fall-back position is a result not 
so much of Foucault's lack of a normative framework, but because he has followed 
Nietzsche in so convincingly tying knowledge to the demands of power (his 
hyphenated category 'power-knowledge' is indicative here), and has so powerfully 
portrayed the victorious struggle of reason over its other, unreason, especially in 
Madness and Civilisation, that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, for him to 
conceIve of a knowledge that is not instrumental in any particular relationship of 
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domination but is instead based on a critical understanding of the nature of existing 
relations and an attempt to critically reflect on their future overcoming. Aside from 
the methodological issue that Foucault is engaged in genealogy rather than critique, 
ultimately two mutually exclusive methodologies, he does occasionally allow for 
such a critical knowledge, but the conception is both dependent on and as obscure 
as his claims about the plebs: witness his suggestion that there exist 'a whole set 
of knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy', such as that of the psychiatric 
patient, of the ill person, of the nurse, of the doctor, and that it is through the 
re-emergence of these low-ranking yet popular knowledges, these subjugated, 
unqualified, even directly disqualified knowledges, that criticism performs its work. 
Aside from the question as to how a doctor's knowledge can count as a 
'low-ranking' or 'disqualified', this is a severely limited conception of knowledge 
and criticism, opposed as it is 'not to the contents, methods or concepts of a 
science, but to the effects of the centralising powers which are linked to the 
institution'.139 Thus even when Foucault does have what appears to be a critical 
concept of knowledge, it is merely concerned with resisting the effects of 
power-knowledge rather than its central conceptual and methodological apparatus. 
What Foucault fails to take account of is that, as Mannfred Frank notes, struggles 
are always directed 'against a certain state of order that stands in the service of an 
alternative order and an alternative organisation of our social interchange' .140 
However weakly conceived that alternative may be, there must be some reason for 
resisting that knowledge seeks to comprehend, so that consciousness can play its 
role. Although Foucault may not wish to subscribe to the view that the task of 
critical theory is 'the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age'141 
he must do more than simply point to the spontaneity of 'plebian spirits' .142 
Even when in his later work on Kant and Enlightenment, where Foucault 
considers the possibility of critique, this is done in terms of the use of reason by 
'the subject himself as an individual', clearing the space for the presentation of 
Baudelaire as just such an individual. 143 The result of this is not to posit the use 
of knowledge as crucial to resistance, but the insistence that part of a critical 
reflection on it leads to the necessity to turn one's life into an art-form. 
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F or me intellectual work is related to what you could call aestheticism, 
meaning transforming yourself... I know very well ... that knowledge can do 
nothing for transforming the world. Maybe I am wrong. And I am sure I am 
wrong from a theoretical point of view for I know very well that knowledge 
has transformed the world. But if I refer to my personal experience I have 
the feeling knowledge can't do anything for us and that power may destroy 
us. All the knowledge in the world can't do anything against that. 144 
The equivocation belies the general thrust of the comments against a critical theory 
of knowledge. 
Moreover, even if one was to concede that such comments contain a critical 
moment, they also indicate the consolidation of the individualism within the 
philosophy of the subject. Transforming oneself may be an admirable exercise, and 
encouraging everyone to turn their lives into an art-form equally so, but one 
purpose of a collective subject, as conceptualised in historical materialism, is to 
overcome the conditions of exploitation that make turning one's life into an 
art-form rather difficult; as Callinicos points out, to invite a street child in Bombay 
to make a work of art of their lives would be an insult. 145 To overcome such 
conditions, to create the conditions whereby everyone could make their lives an 
art-form, requires action by a collective subject. Likewise his denigration of 
'progress' as an outmoded 'humanist' category, and 'humanity' as a name for just 
another form of rational calculation of power, makes it impossible for him to fall 
back on anything like 'human' values with which to make such a case for social 
change. But because (admittedly at its worst moments in Foucault) the Gulag 
appears to be the socialist version of the carceral society, because his understanding 
of the collective subject as conceptualised in Marx is so heavily determined by his 
experience in and around the PCF and because, most importantly, we are all 
enmeshed in a series of power relations whereby 'we all fight each other', 146 any 
concept of a collective subject struggling for progressive social change, for human 
emancipation, is rejected from the outset. 
In terms of how one might resist the actual disciplinary powers the focus is on 
resistance where power is exercised: at the capillaries. 147 Again, because Foucault 
universalises power without distinguishing between its different institutions, modes 
and practices, any attempt to critically reflect on a future society which overturns 
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the powers of disciplinary (bourgeois) society is ruled out of court: 
Revolution is a different type of codification of the [same] power relations. 
This implies that there are many different kinds of revolution, roughly 
speaking as many kinds as there are possible subversive recodifications of 
power relations, and further that one can perfectly well conceive of 
revolutions which leave essentially untouched the power relations which 
form the basis for the functioning of the state. 148 
Thus even the faith in plebian spirit is overshadowed by the understanding that any 
one set of power relations will be replaced by another, of which there is no 
guarantee of any 'improvement'. To accept this is to accept the very myth which 
power would have us believe, that it is omnipotent and omniscient, that one may 
as well accept it as struggle against it. 149 In this sense one can point to the 
absence in genealogy of precisely the factors that make historical materialism a 
critique, the fact that 'all historical materialist concepts contain an accusation and 
an imperative' .150 Although Foucault's concepts appear to contain an accusation 
and an imperative - people resist because of hunger, humiliation and even the 
promise of the millennium - ultimately 'there is no explanation for the man who 
revolts' .151 In comparison historical materialism points to the exploitation and 
alienation that constitutes capitalist social relations, and that this is what makes the 
working class 'dangerous'. Struggle can then be identified as struggle over 
exploitation and alienation, for the liberation from these conditions - witness 
Marx's account over the struggles over the length of the working day in Volume 
One of Capital. Failing to provide a goal for resistance, genealogy can do no such 
thing. The pessimism in Foucault's work that commentators have identified is not 
the result of analysis; it is built into his conceptual foundations, rooted in his 
failure to identify any redemptive possibilities contained in the changes brought 
about by capitalism. 152 The criticism can also be related to Foucault's rejection 
of the state-civil society distinction and its replacement with power and the social. 
For the place capitalism creates for its own demise, its own 'gravediggers', is 
within civil society. In contrast, the social as conceptualised by Foucault and his 
followers is so well policed and so effectively administered that the idea of it 
producing its own gravediggers is unthinkable. Moreover one of the strengths of 
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historical materialism is that it can point to the development of administrative 
mechanisms as an outcome of the struggles taking place within civil society; the 
administrative mechanisms that mediate struggle are, like the state itself,153 a 
relation of struggle. 
To sustain his account of power and resistance Foucault relies on the categories 
of warfare, (a decision mutually dependent on his use of the military model in 
Discipline and Punish) but does so in such a way that warfare becomes yet another 
abstract universal. Although Foucault occasionally used the categories of warfare 
in his earlier work, the shift away from an analysis of language and meaning 
towards an analysis of power at the same time indicates a conscious turn to the 
categories of warfare. Thus he suggests that 'one's point of reference should not 
be to the great model of language and signs, but to that of war and battle. The 
history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of 
language: relations of power, not relations of meaning' .154 Yet although the 
language of warfare - battle, strategy, tactics, deployment - is continually used by 
Foucault, no battle is ever fought and therefore none ever lost or won. 155 In 
Foucault one gets battle rather than battles. 
In utilising the language of warfare this way Foucault seeks both to extend his 
distinction between the juridico-discursive and the disciplinary mode of power, and 
to further distance himself from Marxism. By inverting Clausewitz's dictum that 
war is politics by other means Foucault points, at least implicitly, to the existence 
of warfare within societies as well as between states. In the process he suggests we 
think of power through the concepts struggle, conflict and war as opposed to 
cession, contract and alienation. 156 This is strengthened by his contrasting the 
'juridico-political theory of sovereignty' with the discourse on war. 157 One of the 
functions of universalising war in this way is that Foucault appears decidedly 
Hobbesian in his conceptualisation of war of all against all, transferring Hobbes' 
state of nature to the state of society.158 This provides the basis for his critique 
of Hobbes, who 'has circumvented this discourse of permanent struggle and civil 
war ... thereby saving the theory of the State' .159 The criticism of Hobbes here is 
that far from being a theorist of war, his concern with the theory of the state leads 
him to eliminate war as a historical reality. 
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Foucault's linking of war with struggle is useful because it rests on the 
understanding that social order is constituted in and through struggle. But because 
he avoids any question of the subjects of struggle, and because the struggle can 
take place between any of those who operate techniques of power and any of those 
who, gripped by the plebian spirit, resist this, the outcome is in fact less adequate 
than Hobbes, Hegel or Marx. Far from eliminating war, Hobbes was acutely aware 
of its significance in the constitution of political order: the state is necessary 
precisely because war and struggle takes place. Hegel could at least point to the 
significance of, on the one hand the struggle for recognition and, on the other, 
social divisions. It was Marx's achievement to specify the class nature of this 
struggle, and thus the necessity for the state in bourgeois society. Foucault's 
conceptualisation of struggle as the paradigm of the social 160 is weaker than 
Marx's conceptualisation of struggle between exploiting and exploited classes as 
the essence of civil society, (which might be described as struggle for the social), 
a struggle in which the state is inherently involved. This does not mean the 
reduction of all struggles to class struggles; it is one of Foucault's stronger 
demands that we avoid such crude over-simplification. It is, however, to insist that 
we do not conflate all struggles into one universal struggle, and leave it at that. 
This comparison is perhaps brought out most startlingly by the absence in 
Foucault's most important work of any account of actual struggle (or warfare, or 
resistance) in the development of the mechanisms of discipline and bio-power, an 
absence reproduced in the work of his followers. When Foucault asks how it is that 
one form of punishment was adopted over another 161 his answer shifts to an 
account of disciplinary power rather than the resistance to it. But why were certain 
administrative mechanisms chosen over others? Did the working class support or 
resist them, or even some sections of the class? Ditto the bourgeois class? And the 
aristocracy (where applicable)? If we are eschewing the model of class analysis 
then was it administrators, professionals, the judiciary, civil servants, organised 
groups? The key absence is not of a normative framework but of analysis: Foucault 
claims that his conception of resistance places it as much at the centre of analysis 
as power, but his own research belies that claim. In his analysis we . hear the 
distant roar of thunder,162 but we never see the storm. Whilst there may be no 
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power without resistance, Foucault's own work shows there can be analyses of 
power without analyses of resistance, as neither the disqualified knowledges nor the 
plebian spirits make a concrete appearance. This contrasts with some important 
work on prisons which does point to the significance of struggle. For example, 
Patricia O'Brien draws out the importance of prisoners organisations and 
communications, some of which lend themselves to a deeply Foucauldian reading: 
in the case of tattooing, for example, 'in contrast to branding as a state-imposed 
mark of infamy and means of ostracism, tattooing was a self-imposed form of 
identification. It is likely that tattooing constituted a reaction to the institution and 
its power'. Likewise in the case of Britain, David Garland points to the resistance 
that went on not within the prison at the level of bodies but within and across the 
various sections of the ruling class. 163 
More importantly, the absence of analysis of concrete struggles in Foucault's 
work contrasts quite explicitly with the large body of historical work written from 
a materialist perspective, and with the account developed in Part III below. For in 
Part III we shall be concerned with crucial features that are missing from 
Foucault's account of the productive nature of power: the state (and therefore civil 
society), class, and struggle. It will be argued that we do indeed need a conception 
of power as productive, that recognises the constitution of subjects of right and 
objects of administration by power, but that this needs to be developed through an 
understanding of state power in its relation to civil society. The state and civil 
society distinction needs to be rethought rather than rejected, and to be so through 
the category administration, in particular in terms of its relation to law. This shall 
be done by positing the centrality of struggle, class struggle, to the administrative 
mechanisms that developed as mediating institutions. 
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Part III: Administration 
Introduction 
In March 1794 a passport was issued to Robert Listen Esquire, the last passport to 
be personally signed by the monarch. From this time the King's signature was no 
longer needed in the granting of permission to travel. We might say, following 
Foucault, that the King's hand has been symbolically chopped off; the royal 
sovereign no longer permits or forbids travel to foreign destinations. But since that 
date passports have been issued by the executive, by the Secretary of State. 
Although the monarch's permission is no longer needed, is indeed irrelevant, the 
granting of the permission to travel is now an act of administration. The focus 
therefore needs to shift from the monarch as the embodiment of power to the state 
in general, and from the monarch as the embodiment of sovereignty to the process 
of administration as an expression of state power. The sovereignty embodied in the 
monarch and illustrated in the granting of the permission to travel to particular 
persons has been replaced by an administrative decision which applies universally 
unless an individual has broken the law or is suspected of doing so. 
The language of particularity and universality is useful here. Hegel regarded 
Fichte as going a little too far in suggesting that suspect persons not only have their 
descriptions on their passports but also have their likenesses painted on them. 1 Yet 
the outbreak of war in 1914 saw the introduction of photographs on passports, and 
the new style passports from 1915 required a description of the holder too. Hegel 
was criticising Fichte for being overly 'constructive' in his philosophical concerns: 
giving good advice on such detail was beyond the concern of philosophy. But the 
passport is one of the significant political-administrative forms that has emerged 
in the period under consideration, and therefore requires our attention. 
This is so because the possession of a passport signifies the possession of 
citizenship. Modern citizens possess a range of certificates which, beyond their 
particular functions, serve to certify the holder as 'citizen': the birth certificate, 
msurance number, marriage certificate, passport. The passport serves as 
documentary evidence that one is a bona fide citizen. The passport in general is a 
universal symbol of citizenship; the photograph, description and signature are a 
recognition of particularity. The granting of the passport is the granting of a right 
(to travel) dependent upon the fulfilling of duties (behaving as a good citizen). It 
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is dependent upon the satisfactory fulfilment of duty that the right remains valid. 2 
Yet the decision as to whether one is a good citizen is a legal one; here we 
encounter the mythic integration of law and administration, an integration that will 
be explored in the following chapters. 
The passport, along with other documents such as those named above, is of 
course a product and function of the state, a form of state administration, a system 
for registering individual citizens. It is through such systems that we can recognise 
the role of the state in the constitution of individual subjects. The absence of the 
monarch's signature does not, pace Foucault, signal the death of sovereignty. 
Rather it signals the development of rational bureaucratic processes for the 
constitution and administration of the individual subject of modern capitalism. The 
point of Part III will be to show how this constitution and administration IS a 
function of, and is therefore premised upon the existence of, the state. 
In 1982 Foucault wrote that his work over the previous twenty years had dealt 
with the modes through which human beings are transformed into subjects, 
suggesting that it is not so much power but the subject which has been the general 
theme of his research. 3 The concern here is not so much with the subject but with 
(state) power. One of the arguments will be that the human being is constituted as 
a subject by the state through administrative mechanisms. Moreover, it will also be 
argued that the working class was constituted by the state. The two processes 
involved here - the constitution of the individual subject and the constitution of 
collective working class organisations - are in fact parts of the same process, in 
which the state plays the fundamental determining role. The significant feature of 
modern citizenship is that it marks an individual as a member of society. As Turner 
notes, becoming a citizen involves a process of getting in to society. 4 This much 
was pointed out by T.H. Marshall: 'citizenship is a status bestowed on those who 
are full members of a community'. 5 It is partly for this reason that the issue of 
citizenship has been such a vexed one for Marxist theory. As was seen in Chapter 
One, one of the reasons that Marx believed the working class was the revolutionary 
class was that it was a class in but not of civil society. It is the partly the 
development of citizenship that problematises this, for becoming a bona fide citizen 
means taking one's place as a member of civil society. Now, we have encountered 
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the links between citizenship and civil society (burgerliche Gesellschaft) in Chapter 
One. In the following two chapters the idea that being a citizen means equally 
being a 'member' of the state will also be explored. Turner writes that 'in both 
German and Dutch, there is the option of regarding the citizen as a bourgeois 
member of the city or regarding the citizen as a member of the state. The citizen 
as member of the state is bound by the rules and regulations of the emerging 
nation-state bureaucracy which is committed to order and stability'. 6 This is a far 
more fruitful way of thinking about citizenship, involving as it does an expanded 
state concept and a more complex appreciation of the nature of citizenship. For it 
is by taking the form of citizens that human individuals could become both subjects 
of right and objects of administration, a process rooted in the constitutive power 
of the state and its role in developing and sustaining bourgeois society. 
Yet at the same time, in its constitution of trade unions as the legal subjectivity 
of the working class the state also recognised the social power of collective labour; 
by specifying the nature and form that this power could legally take the state 
shaped working class collective action into a series of organs which, while able to 
formally express the social power of labour, also limit it in accordance with state 
policy. Moreover, as if to place the triumphal icing on the cake of victory, the state 
then uses trade unions as part of the administrative process. 
By 1918 the English working class had been incorporated into civil society and 
the state. But the argument here does not succumb to the myth of working class 
passivity or rest on the idea of a supine working class. One of the functions of the 
following two chapters will to show how this conception of working class passivity 
is misguided. It will be argued, following Thompson, that the working class was 
an active agent in its own making,7 but, pace Thompson, that the working class 
was not 'made' until at least the 1870s. The struggles involved in its making also 
resulted in a reshaping of the institutional structures of the British state. The 
development of the administrative forms that shaped individual and collectiye 
SUbjectivity in turn meant that the development of the state was structured through 
the process of class struggle. In other words, it \yill be argued that the constitution 
of the working class was central to the development of the state. If the \yorking 
class was 'made'. it was so by the state; but the state \\"as 'made' by the working 
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class through its struggles. The only way to incorporate the English working class 
was for the state to alter its institutional form accordingly. Administration ,\fill 
therefore be read as the outcome of struggles within civil society and their 
transformation into another form. Administration, then, acts as the fulcrum around 
which both the working class and the modem state were ordered. 
The incorporation of the working class occurred between 1832 and 1918. For 
Foucault, as we saw, the 1830s saw the culmination of the development of 
'modern' power, with 22 January 1840 given as the completion date of the carceral 
system. In Britain the 1830s was also the origins of fundamental changes in the 
operation of power. Employing a F oucauldian curlicue we can register the burning 
down of the Houses of Parliament in October 1834 as the symbolic date of these 
changes. For this can be read as the beginning of the new era in the development 
of the British state, one that was to involve it in the development of new political 
forms in its attempt to administer the working class. For 1834 also sees the 
emergence of the administrative mechanisms introduced through the new Poor Law, 
the very mechanisms that constitute the heart of political administration. 
Within this period the process of Parliamentary reform resulting III the 
transformation of Britain into a liberal democratic regime is of obvious importance, 
and later changes, notably the Second and Third Reform Acts and the 
Representation of the People Acts, would have a profound effect on the position 
of the working class within civil society and the state. Despite the fact that the 
Reform Act of 1832 related solely to the bourgeoisie, and then only a small 
proportion of it, it was a crucial moment in the process of consolidating the 
bourgeois social order and towards a different exercise of power. But the Reform 
Act and its aftermath also serves as an entry-point into a broader about concerning 
the theoretical issues involved in thinking about the state and the working class. 
Included in this is the concept of bourgeois revolution and the idea that the British 
state followed a 'peculiar' route in its 'transformation' into a modem capitalist 
polity. In Chapter Four it will be argued that the concern over the concept 
bourgeois revolution is rooted in a confusion regarding what this concept actually 
refers to. A narrow reading, focusing only on particular moments of political 
change and reducing the 'political' to a limited number of institutions, is likely to 
167 
result in the claim that Britain never experienced a bourgeois revolution, or 
experienced an incomplete one; the bourgeois revolution was either absent or it 
failed. To this end the lack of bourgeois personnel in Parliament, government and 
the Cabinet after 1832 can be introduced in support of the claim. However, we will 
seek to overcome such confusions in two ways. One will be to rethink the category 
bourgeois revolution such that it refers not so much to particular moments of 
political transformation, but to the process whereby social and economic relations 
are transformed into the relations of private property, commodity production and 
wage-labour. Within this broad process one can think of particular political 
moments of transformation in which the state is adapted accordingly. From this it 
follows that capitalism can work with a number of different state forms; if this is 
so then the 'peculiarities' of English, German or any other countries history are not 
peculiarities at all. 
The second way will be to expand the concept of the political such that it is not 
restricted to Parliament, government and the Cabinet but also includes the 
mechanisms of administration. This allows the changes introduced in 1832 to be 
related to the wider context of the emergence of administrative mechanisms 
concerned with policing the working class, mechanisms often outside immediate 
Parliamentary control that are quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial in their nature. 
This allows the process of liberal democratisation, in which the working class is 
incorporated as individual citizens into the body politic, to be analysed alongside 
the process in which there emerge mechanisms for administering working class 
citizens, both individually and collectively. The focus is on the institutional 
mechanisms for administering poverty and work, the very heart of the existence of 
the working class, for it is these two aspects that most concern the state and the 
power of social labour. The three-fold purpose of political administration traced in 
Chapter Five - the fashioning of labour, the subsumption of struggle and the 
constitution of legal subjects - indicates this most clearly. 
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Chapter Four 
The Normality of the English: 
Rethinking State and Class in Britain 1832-1918 
'Bourgeois Revolution' and the 'Peculiarities' of the English 
The political atmosphere between 1830 and 1832 was heavily imbued with the 
threat of revolutionary violence. The July days in France reminded the bourgeoisie 
of the ever-present potential of violent overthrow, a reminder given impetus by 
Belgium's rising against the Dutch, Poland's rising against Russia and a threatened 
revolution in Italy. The power of these events to produce images in the minds of 
the ruling class in Britain was exacerbated by Captain Swing, in which rural 
workers made their presence felt through a period of machine breaking. 1 
Moreover, there was the increasingly important question of reforming a Parliament 
widely felt to be corrupt, with 'rotten boroughs' widespread. Powerful groups had 
developed in favour of reform, regarding themselves at the forefront of the 
economic development of Britain yet without any significant political power. Their 
discontent was aided by the fact that they still suffered from the after-effects of the 
1826 depression, and experienced continual industrial troubles ever since. The 
strength of the reform movement was assisted by the Catholic emancipation of the 
previous years which had torn apart the Conservative faction in Parliament, leading 
to the debilitation of the one body most vehemently opposed to reform. Finally 
there was the fall of Wellington's government, in November 1830, said to be 
largely due to his Burkean criticism of ideas of reform, and its replacement with 
a government committed to reform under Lord Grey. 
In this historical conjuncture the Duke of Wellington, who had spoken against 
reform. was to suggest that 'we are assured that there will be a reyolution in the 
country. Produced by \yhat? By force and yiolence'. 2 Although it is correct to 
therefore suggest that social discontent fed movements for parliamentary reform,3 
it is important to note that this discontent was scattered among different classes and 
ex isted for different reasons. The discontent of the \yorking class, both urban and 
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rural, was very different in nature to the discontent of the middle classes due to , 
their positions within the capitalist process. The point however is that the threat of 
working class revolution could be used by (middle class) reformers to substantiate 
their claims that if reform did not occur then revolution would. The working class 
itself, given its relatively unformed state,4 could be kept down with direct force 
and the law. But the middle class could use the threat of the revolutionary potential 
of the working class in order to strengthen its own demands for reform. In this way 
reform in 1832, has its roots in a particular perception of the working class, a 
perception to a great extent shared by the various factions of the middle and ruling 
class. We will return to this point below. 
The introduction of the Reform Bill into Parliament was justified not on the 
grounds of a remodelling of the system, but to remove what were regarded as its 
defects and abuses. There is no need to discuss the intricacies of the actual bill, nor 
its stormy passage involving the two Houses and the monarchy. Grey himself 
recognised that the key elements of the Bill - the disenfranchisement of the rotten 
boroughs, the enfranchisement of the new towns, and the common £ 1 0 household 
franchise - were important for two main reasons: they could be achieved within 
the framework of the old system, and they would suffice to create a polity which 
embraced the middle classes. These two features illustrate the extent to which the 
Bill was an attempt to reconcile the growing influential forces in society to the old 
aristocratic system. The increasing economic power of the middle classes could be 
recognised and balanced by their political influence. 
One interpretation of the Reform Act involves the assumption that it was 
intended to shift power to the middle class, an interpretation which took hold even 
in the nineteenth century. Macaulay, writing in 1831, suggests that the Act was 'to 
admit the middle class to a large and direct share in the Representation, without 
any violent shock to the institutions of our country', a point reiterated by Bagehot. 5 
This is the interpretation that has become commonplace. Yet at the Parliamentary 
level there was no great change in the sociological composition of the House of 
Commons - landed families continued to occupy a large majority of seats: 6 the 
power of the Lords remained, despite its symbolic defeat in the passage of the Act. 
Similarly there was enormous differences in the sizes of constituencies. Bribery and 
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corruption not only failed to decrease, but in fact possibly increased as personal, 
familial and local contact remained the major factor at elections. 7 Thus the Act 
appears to have changed very little. Given the emotional scenes in Parliament 
when the Bill was being debated, the involvement of the King in trying to have 
Wellington form a government so as to avoid reform, an election fought almost 
solely on the issue of reform and the background of unrest, the Act itself can 
appear to be far more revolutionary than it actually was. As Gash writes, 
The exaggerated hopes and fears that surrounded the Reform Bill owed 
much to the turbulence of its passage. Only gradually was it realized that 
the act was not the subversive event it seemed in 1831. Its importance was 
largely psychological: it satisfied a pent-up demand ... Divorced from its 
contemporary context and analysed dispassionately, the Reform Act 
represented no more than a clumsy but vigorous hacking at the old structure 
to make it a roughly more acceptable shape. 8 
Here we encounter the fundamental issue concerning the nature and implications 
of the Reform Act: was it a reform for the bourgeois class, the completion of the 
bourgeois revolution, or merely a hacking at the old aristocratic structure to avoid 
bourgeois power? 
One of the ways 1832 has been considered within historical materialism is as the 
completion of the bourgeois revolution in Britain, a revolution started in 1640. The 
concept 'bourgeois revolution' developed not with Marx and Engels, but with 
Lenin and Plekhanov at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth 
centuries. 9 Faced with the possibility of a revolution in Tsarist Russia, they 
understood this as a bourgeois revolution since they believed a bourgeois period 
was necessary in the historical transition from feudalism to socialism. From this 
it has become customary to speak of bourgeois revolutions, in which the bourgeois 
class is said to have ousted the aristocracy from power in order to instill capitalist 
relations of production; the French revolution is taken as the classic example. To 
fit the British case into this framework the Reform Act of 1832 is said to have 
been the moment when the British bourgeoisie ousted the old aristocracy from the 
seat of power, consolidating the process started in 1640. 
In his review of Guizot's book on the English revolution tvlarx criticises Guizot 
for implying that English history comes to an end with the constitutional monarchy, 
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because 'in reality .. .the momentous development and transformation of bourgeois 
society in England only began with the consolidation of the constitutional 
monarchy'. After this 'a new bourgeoisie of colossal proportions arose' which 
'became so omnipotent that, even before it gained direct political power as a result 
of the Reform Bill, it forced its opponents to legislate in its interests and in 
accordance with its requirements'. 10 However, such an analysis has been subjected 
to criticism: were 1832 a victory for the bourgeoisie, it is suggested, then 
Parliaments after this would have far greater numbers of industrialists, financiers, 
merchants and so on; since it did not then 1832 could not have been a victory for 
the bourgeoisie. A great deal of empirical evidence can be used to sustain this 
claim. It has been suggested that the first election after the reform act produced no 
more merchants, and may have produced less, than several Parliaments before 
1833,11 and that throughout the 1840s approximately 71 % of the Parliament was 
aristocratic or from the landed classes. 12 In relation to the Cabinet, even the most 
'democratic' of cabinets contained only a minority of 'non-aristocrats' (5 out of 13) 
and between 1833 and 1892 the average number of aristocrats was 71 %. 13 
Because of this claims have been made concerning the 'myth' of the triumphant 
middle class. "The British House of Commons had been reformed in 1832, but in 
truth the eighteenth century still stalked many of the constituencies of Great Britain 
and Ireland'. 14 D.C. Moore claims that the 'concession' thesis has polemical 
value, but as an analytical tool for understanding 1832 it has limited use. He 
suggests that 1832 was widely perceived at the time not as a concession but as a 
'cure' for the deficiencies of the electoral system, in particular in relation to 
constituencies, for what was happening was the breakdown of representation of 
local communities. 15 
In fact, the paradoxical outcome of the 1832 Act was not lost on Marx, nor 
many other commentators of the time. Despite the claim made by Marx that the 
Reform Act allowed the bourgeoisie to gain political power, in other writings on 
British politics the ambiguous nature of the post-1832 period shows through. He 
claims for example that the British Constitution is 
only an antiquated and obsolete compromise between the bourgeoisie, which 
rules in actual practice, although not official~1'. in all the decisive spheres of 
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bourgeois society, and the landed aristocracy, which forms the official 
government. 16 
In other words, the Reform gave the bourgeoisie recognition as the ruling class as 
long as the business of government remained in the hands of the landed aristocracy. 
1832 was therefore a compromise between the two classes, largely to avoid a 
confrontation with the working class,17 a compromise in which power is delegated 
from the truly ruling interests - the bourgeoisie - to another class - the aristocracy 
- to do the governing for it. 18 Perry Anderson and Tom Nairn have used this 
ambiguity as the basis for their analysis of the 'peculiar' nature of the English route 
to industrial capitalism. 19 The lack of direct bourgeois power after the 1832 
Reform Bill is explained by Anderson and Nairn through a different 
conceptualisation of the relationship between the bourgeois and aristocratic classes. 
The reason the House of Commons was not rapidly taken over by representatives 
of the bourgeoisie, they suggest, is because after 1832 there was a gradual 
convergence of the two classes which functioned to cut the working class off from 
society. Given the particular social order in England of a hierarchy of social estates 
within a societal pyramid involving deference to a patrician elite based on personal 
(or quasi-personal) relations and modes of domination, the convergence of the two 
classes allowed this form of rule to continue. The two classes undergo a 
'systematic symbiosis', they are 'horizontally intertwined', they 'fuse', they 
'amalgamate' they become a 'detotalized totality'. 
The end result of these convergent mutations was the eventual creation of 
a single hegemonic class, distinguished by a perpetually recreated virtual 
homogeneity and actual - determinate - porousness ... The aristocracy became 
- and remained - the vanguard of the bourgeoisie. 20 
Crucially, within this the bourgeoisie remain the supine class. Nairn suggests that 
conceSSIOn or compromise between the bourgeoisie and aristocracy was not 
possible. 
No 'compromise' or 'alliance' ... was, in fact, possible as between contrasting 
civilisations. No conscious tactical arrangement, no deal lasting for a season, 
was conceivable between forces of this complexity and magnitude. 
Amalganlation was the only real possibility, a fusion of different classes and 
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their diverse cultures into one social order capable of guaranteeing social 
stability and keeping the proletariat in its place. 21 
E.P. Thompson calls this a dialectical trick, in which two forces that are so 
incompatible that no compromise was possible can still become fused. 22 In fact, 
as shall be suggested below, given Anderson and Nairn's conceptualisation and the 
theoretical framework that they use, such a fusion is in fact possible. 
Anderson and Nairn argue that this is the distinctive feature of the development 
of British society, and indeed continues to be the fundamental stumbling block to 
the development of both British capitalism vis a vis the rest of the capitalist 
order,23 and the development of a working class movement beyond a merely 
reformist labourism. For example, Anderson suggests that the rise of imperialism 
from the end of the 1880s helped to consolidate the 'preternaturally hierarchical 
character of the traditional social order, and in particular its typical model of 
leadership'. Imperialism 'not only preserved but reinforced the already pronounced 
personality type of the governing class: aristocratic, amateur, and "normatively" 
agrarian' .24 But because by this time the aristocracy and bourgeoisie had 
fused/intertwined etc. these characteristics became the defining characteristics of 
the 'ruling bloc', creating 'lasting contours' and stamping a 'lasting imprint' on 
social life, thereby shaping the consciousness of the whole of British society, the 
working class and socialist groups included. 
It is argued that this fusion and hegemony was possible because there was a 
strong common interest between the two groups, consisting of three facets: the 
successful expansion and defence of Empire; the degree of already existing 
homogeneity between the two groups: and their common potential threat of the 
working class. Nairn suggests that this last feature is the key to understanding 
society-state relations from the 1840s. 25 
Now one of the central features of Anderson and Nairn's account is that it rests , 
on the idea that Britain followed a 'peculiar' route to capitalism, in tum resting on 
the idea that there is an normal route. The normal route has at its heart the concept 
bourgeois revolution, or, more generally, the bourgeois paradigm.26 The paradigm 
is that the route to industrial capitalism is one in which the social forces of 
capitalist property ownership gradually replace those of feudalism. In this the 
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bourgeois revolution consists of the necessary modernisation of the state, that is, 
its liberal democratisation and growth of rational bureaucratic procedures, within 
which the bourgeoisie can assume power. For Anderson and Nairn British history 
is peculiar in that it never experienced the required bourgeois revolution; its 
transformation was mediated by the aristocracy, a mediation which allowed for the 
persistence of the ancien regime, and which in turn has haunted all aspects of 
British politics and society ever since. 
There are a number of problems with such claims. First, as E.P. Thompson 
points out, this uses a normative conception of bourgeois revolution, the idea that 
there is a pure model against which the British route failed to match up; the result 
is the cutting of one's history to fit the model. 27 Yet the model fails to match up 
with any country whatsoever, as witnessed by the fact that the model allows one 
to discuss the 'peculiarities' of the Germans as much as the peculiarities of the 
English.28 Indeed, it can be argued that the whole of Europe is peculiar, in the 
sense that the ancien regime persisted well after the supposed 'bourgeois 
revolution(s)'.29 
Anderson and Nairn's argument that there was a symbiotic fusion of the 
aristocratic and bourgeois classes to form a single hegemonic class with aristocratic 
'virtues' appears to provide a useful means of understanding why after 1832 the 
bastions of power in the British state were not flooded with the 'new men' of the 
rising middle classes, but the argument is undermined by the lack of specificity in 
their anatomy of classes in this period: 'landed gentry', 'aristocracy' 'agrarian 
capitalists', 'landed classes' are all used without being clearly delineated. 
Thompson points out that in fact the eighteenth century contained a capitalist 
agricultural class formed from the gentry, combining urban and rural lifestyles. 30 
If this is so then Anderson and Nairn's two classes which could not compromise 
but which could fuse are in fact a number of classes whose form of existence is 
fundamentally different, a difference rooted in their economic positions. But 
Anderson and Nairn can argue for this fusion because for the most part their 
treatment of classes is at the level of ideology and consciousness. Central to this 
treatment is the concept hegemony. 
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The power structure of English society today can be most accurately 
described as an elastic and all-embracing hegemonic order. Hegemony was 
defined by Gramsci as the dominance of one social bloc over another, not 
simply by means of force or wealth, but by a wider authority whose 
ultimate resource is cultural... The hegemonic class is the primary 
determinant of consciousness, character and customs throughout the 
society. 3) 
This hegemony retains strong elements of feudal-aristocratic traditions. The fusion 
of aristocracy and bourgeoisie sustains an essentially feudal consciousness which 
in turn has an ideological offshoot of traditionalism with a leadership style that is 
patrician and amateurish. Yet, as Poulantzas notes, this reduces Gramsci' s concept 
of hegemony to 'class consciousness' and implies that this class consciousness 
becomes imposed upon the society as a whole. Reducing hegemony to ideology 
and consciousness in this way makes it epistemologically possible for Anderson 
and Nairn to argue that the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie fuse to become one 
historic bloc within which the aristocracy is dominant. 32 Moreover, this 
understanding of hegemony affects Anderson and Nairn's conceptualisation of the 
working class. For them, the English working class is a 'corporate class'. 'If 
hegemonic class can be defined as one which imposes its own ends and vision on 
society as a whole, a corporate class is conversely one which pursues its own ends 
within a social totality whose overall determination lies outside it'. The English 
working class is 'distinguished by an immovable class consciousness and almost 
no hegemonic ideology'. 33 This has its origins in the 'peculiarities' of the English 
route, for as the first industrial working class, the English working class had no 
examples to follow; it 'matured' too early to grasp revolutionary Marxism and was 
subject to the 'fusion' of the dominant classes above. Given this set of historical 
and theoretical determinants the working class absorbed the ideological norms 
developed by the hegemonic class. It was distracted away from conscious 
engagement, became deferential in its outlook, accepted the patrician style of 
leadership, and reinforced the notion of tradition in which classes become perceived 
as fixed estates. For Nairn 'the corporative aspect of working class politics meant 
that it was weak in ideological leadership, and relatively unaware of the 
problematic of power'. 34 As can be seen, the interpretation of 'corporate' here 
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follows logically from the interpretation of 'hegemony' and the conceptualisation 
of the working class is of an essentially passive object, acted on but with little 
capacity for acting on other classes or the social and political institutions. After the 
defeat of Chartism the working class 'went through a kind of prolonged catatonic 
withdrawal', it became 'numbed' and 'docile', 'consciously subordinate'. It could 
then be quite easily absorbed as a 'defeated' force. 35 Because of this the history 
of labour organisations is a history of minor defensive groupings such as insurance 
societies and trade unions, or one large grouping, the Labour Party, which went on 
to pursue a series of major historical failures; even the claimed successes of the 
Labour movement, such as universal welfare provision, are attributed to 
liberalism. 36 
Structure, Struggle and Working Class Incorporation 
We will return to the Anderson-Nairn thesis to consider more directly the question 
of the state, revolution and the nature of the political. First, however, we must 
examine the question of struggle and working class incorporation. Our argument 
will be that the working class was incorporated, that this incorporation was of a 
class in struggle rather than a supine body. But this raises the question as to what 
is involved in the concept of incorporation? 
The general thrust of the Anderson-Nairn thesis, that the working class has been 
supine, deferential and lacking a hegemonic ideology is replicated in other 
approaches to the working class and the development of state power in Britain. 
Here we will consider two approaches - social control theory and that which 
focuses on the 'labour aristocracy'. These will be shown to lack theoretical 
specificity, and in some cases empirical and historical specificity too; in the worst 
instance they appear as concepts in search of theories. 37 
Social Control 
Those writers who seek to utilise a 'social control theory,38 start from the basic 
problem of how social order is maintained against a potentially revolutionary 
working class. The question is therefore implicitly about the nature of struggle and 
the absence of revolution in Britain. The answer given, in its most general form, 
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is that the working class has been 'controlled', a control which takes place not only 
through the forces of coercion such as the police, but through a whole range of 
social institutions. Thus J.R.Hay writes that 
To Marx the conflict between the classes over the control of the means of 
production is fundamental to the development of society and the process of 
social change. It, is, therefore, essential for the ruling class in any society 
to possess a battery of economic, social, political, legal and ideological 
controls to maintain their hold over the property on which their position 
depends. 39 
Occasionally a reference is found in the primary literature to reinforce the claim -
such as G.R. Askwith's Cabinet paper on the industrial unrest in 1911 in which 
he writes that given industrial unrest 'we are driven to the conclusion that some 
effort should be made to maintain control,40 - but such direct uses of the very 
word 'control' in the primary literature are rare, and even if they were frequent in 
itself this would not necessitate the use of the concept to understand those changes. 
Instead the concept works in a catch-all way, where because it is assumed that 
working class struggle needs to be 'controlled', any new social policy or the 
development of any new institution is read as contributing to this 'control'. In an 
essay on 'Social Control and the Modernisation of Social Policy 1890-1929', for 
example, John Brown writes that 
The continuing social control function of social policy is most obvious in 
the coercive power of the law ... More intangible constraints on conduct, 
powerful though difficult to trace, came from contact with the bureaucracies 
which administered the new policies. 41 
Once this is stated it only remains for a broad history of the social policy of the 
period to be outlined, for it is already decided it is about 'control', with the 
consequence that any attempt by the bourgeoisie to influence, regulate, administer 
or police the working class is understood as 'social control'. 42 We will return to 
this point. 
Lacking any real specificity, 'social control' either fails to explain that which it 
seeks to, or it produces confusion rather than meaningful analysis. For example, 
'upper class', 'middle class', 'ruling classes', 'rich', 'employers' are all used, with 
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varying frequency. Yet at the same time differences between various fractions of 
the 'ruling class' (or perhaps the differences are between these groups themselves?) 
are overlooked, such as in the late-nineteenth century when some sections were 
demanding that labour camps be established to solve the problem of 
unemployment. In an essay on the Salvation Army, Victor Bailey argues the Army 
is an institution designed to inculcate control upon the working class, and yet he 
also makes it clear that the Army's attempt to do this, especially through its attack 
on working class culture, was also resisted by the local elites. So here we have an 
agency of social control which is being resisted by the local ruling classes, yet we 
are not told why.43 
There is also a lack of historical specificity. Hay, for example, claims that 
'certain forms of control seem specific to certain social formations or stages of 
society'. This sounds plausible but once again is left at such a level of generality 
that it does not actually explain anything. Even developing the point into the claim 
that 'social control can be exerted in different ideological forms from repression 
to the pure liberal individualism so common in the early twentieth century' is 
equally of little help. For if the ruling class must exert control then it would seem 
obvious that this control will change throughout history. 44 
The key problem it would seem is that, as Stedman Jones writes, 
It is not difficult to demonstrate that a casual usage of 'social control' 
metaphors leads to non-explanation and incoherence. There is no political 
or ideological institution which could not in some way be interpreted as an 
agency of social control. 45 
As such it is unsurprising that the empirical work fails to do it much justice. 
Furthermore, the concept is so out of place within a historical materialist analysis 
that there is no way of integrating the concept theoretically with concepts such as 
class and state. Yet what Stedman Jones calls the concept's 'incompatible 
sociological tradition' has in fact been welcomed as one of its positive features by 
some. Donajgrodski, for example, is happy pointing to the concept's origin within 
a conservative sociological tradition, whilst Moorhouse, denying that the concept 
necessitates a functionalist approach, accepts that other theoretical traditions may 
use it. 46 The problems outlined here suggest that this theoretical openness, far 
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from being the basis of a healthy eclecticism, is in fact the grounds for theoretical 
confusion. In particular, it becomes difficult to distinguish between state 
mechanisms and institutions, and those of civil society. It is not that we need to 
supplement the concept with historical and political material, as its defenders 
claim,47 for even then its theoretical vacuity remains: because all institutions are 
(or can be?) institutions of control, there seems little point in distinguishing 
between them - they are simply institutions of social control. Indeed, there is no 
way to distinguish between them. This reproduces some of the conceptual errors 
that emerge from the work of Althusser and Foucault, for 'social control' comes 
to function as a sociological alternative to 'ideological apparatus' and 'power'. The 
same could also be said for the way 'hegemony' is used in its neo-Gramscian 
mode. Each works at a level of generality that often blurs the distinction between 
state and civil society. Hegemony at least implies an agent, and a class one at that. 
Social control, as a form of sociological systems functionalism, merely serves to 
obliterate any concern with agency whatsoever. 48 
F or this reason it is not surprising to find that there is a tendency to fall back on 
Foucault's 'disciplinary power' and/or Gramsci's 'hegemony' as theoretical 
supports for 'social control' arguments. Hay claims that the type of social control 
he is examining produces dominance and legitimacy, and suggests that this is what 
he takes Gramsci to mean by 'bourgeois hegemony', whilst Donajgrodzki suggests 
that Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' is compatible with the social control 
concept.49 It is possible for them to suggest this because ultimately what 
'hegemony' and 'social control' mean for them is 'ideological domination', broadly 
conceived. As such the words become interchangeable. 50 Now, one function of 
this link between social control and hegemony is the effect it has of making the 
concept of social control appear compatible with a historical materialist approach. 
Indeed, the shift from the former concept to the later is often performed via a 
fleeting hint of Marxist analysis. In his essay on education and social control, for 
example, Richard Johnson suggests that 
Educational expertise ... does fit the description 'social control'; especially if. 
for 'social' we read 'class'. and, for 'control', 'transformation'. But of all 
the available theorisations, not excluding Althusser's . reproduction" , it is 
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Gramsci's concept 'hegemony' that provides the greatest insight, especially 
in relation to 'state'. 51 
This would appear to be a long route to an account of hegemony, in the process 
turning a far stronger and theoretically more complex concept than 'social control' 
into a purely descriptive category. 52 
In respect of Foucault, Melossi seeks to show how the development of a panoptic 
form of power constitutes a form of 'social control without the state'. The shift 
away from Leviathan and sovereignty towards disciplinary power was 
simultaneously a shift in social control. With the onset of democracy one gets 
control based on consent - 'social control' proper - a more powerful form of 
control because it produces behaviour rather than prohibits it. 53 Melossi's attempt 
to develop an account of power based on the social control concept thus serves to 
remove the state - conceptualised as an absolutist monolithic power - from 
historical and political analysis. 54 To this end he introduces the idea of the public 
versus the private, only to reject it as a conceptual tool, suggesting that almost 
every aspect of social life is administered through a mixture of private and public 
channels. 55 This explains his claim that instead of the concept of the state we 
ought to consider the state of social control, based upon the essentially F oucauldian 
idea concerning the mastery of oneself. 56 
The Labour Aristocracy 
Whilst the concept labour aristocracy initially appears to have a truer Marxist 
provenance than social control, it too is subject to the same vagaries and 
indeterminacy as found in social control and the neo-Gramscian usage of 
hegemony. The intention behind the use of the concept is clear: to explain the 
failure of the British working class to effect a revolution. In his study of Oldham, 
John Foster argues that the bourgeoisie used the labour aristocracy as a stabilising 
influence. The 'social resolution' of the process of restabilisation was 'worked out 
in terms of industrial organisation. Its key component was the creation of a 
privileged grade within the labour force - the labour aristocracy - and it was around 
this dimension of inequality that social structure later crystallised'. 57 Similarly 
Robert Gray suggests that 'the labour aristocracy .. .implanted accommodative 
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responses to capitalism, and subsequently transmitted them to a broader class 
movement... [It] mediated accommodative responses to capitalist society'. 58 
Such claims have their roots in Engels and Lenin. Writing in 1885 Engels drew 
attention to the advances of skilled workers organised in unions, suggesting that 
they 'form an aristocracy of the working class', as indicated by their 'relatively 
comfortable position' which they 'accept...as final'. Because of this they are 'very 
nice people indeed nowadays to deal with, for any sensible capitalists in particular 
and for the whole capitalist class in general'. 59 In his work on imperialism Lenin 
draws out the implications of Engels' suggestions, claiming that the aristocracy of 
labour constitutes a stratum of workers who 'turn bourgeois'. Superior in earnings 
and philistine in outlook the labour aristocracy becomes the 'prop of the 
bourgeoisie', the 'labour lieutenants of the capitalist class' and the 'real channels 
of reformism and chauvinism'. 'Bribed' by the capitalists the labour aristocrats, for 
Lenin, are the 'real agents of the bourgeoisie in the working class'. 60 
Whilst it may initially appear clear what or who constitutes the labour aristocracy 
and the political implications of their aristocratic nature - they do deals with the 
capitalist class - this masks a welter of difficulties. As Gregor McLellan points out, 
it is unclear who is bought off: 'labour leaders', the 'upper stratum of the labour 
aristocracy', the 'upper strata of the workers', the 'bulk of the membership of 
co-operatives, trade unions, sporting clubs and numerous sects'. 61 This problem 
has continued throughout the work of those who seek to use the labour aristocracy 
as an explanatory tool. Whilst Hobsbawm identifies six criteria with which we can 
establish which workers belong to the labour aristocracy - the level and regularity 
of earnings, prospects of social security, conditions of work, relations with strata 
above and below, general living conditions, and future prospects - he points to the 
first of these as the most important and about which we can gain comprehensive 
information. 62 In contrast, Foster points to the authoritative (and thus 
authoritarian) position of the aristocrats within the production process; Gray is 
concerned with the process by which the labour aristocracy helped form an 
essentially reformist set of working class political structures; Geoffrey Crossick 
suggests that there is 'more to a labour aristocracy than high earnings' and that we 
should look for the formation of a 'social stratum' with 'exclusive values, patterns 
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of behaviour and social aspirations'; Francis Hearn, after pointing to the economic 
and industrial developments that gave rise to the labour aristocracy, suggests that 
it is a status group and that we should identify it according to leisure and 
consumption patterns (yet he later points to the crucial political effects this had, 
such as the Reform Act of 1867); finally, Tony Lane focuses on the 'top-hatted 
trade unionist' forming the heart of the 'labour establishment' and giving it a 
permanent and stable leadership. 63 
A related difficulty occurs in specifying the historical period in which the labour 
aristocracy became important. For Engels it was clearly in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, for Lenin, the imperialist phase of capitalist development. 
Identifying the 'classical period' as 1840-1890, Hobsbawm also suggests that the 
labour aristocracy can be found in some form 'throughout the century' and that 'its 
elements already existed' before 1840; he also discusses it in the period 1890 to 
1914.64 In contrast, whilst Foster follows Lenin in relating the labour aristocracy 
to imperialism, his suggestion that the decline of pre-modern forms of social 
control (such as Church-going) implies that 'the need for a network of 
establishment henchmen inside the labour community' occurred much earlier. 65 
Likewise, Thompson writes of both an old and a new labour aristocracy in 
1800-1850. 66 
As a concept 'labour aristocracy' is inflated to the degree that it becomes almost 
vacuous - almost any aspect of the working class that appears somehow different 
to the rest of that class can be conceptually sectioned off, rendered 'aristocratic' 
and held responsible for the 'failings' of the class as a whole. At best the concept 
lacks clarity; at worst it is contradictory. As Stedman Jones writes, the use of the 
idea of a labour aristocracy 'has been ambiguous and unsatisfactory. Its status is 
uncertain and it has been employed at will, descriptively, polemically or 
theoretically, without ever finding a firm anchorage'. He goes on to add that it is 
questionable whether there could ever be a definitive theory of the labour 
aristocracy, for it is not evident what such a theory would be aiming to answer. 67 
Yet in a sense it is evident what such a theory would be aiming to answer, namely, 
the failure of the British working class to effect a revolution and, more generally, 
to attempt some clarification of the nature of the working class in advanced 
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capitalism and the outcome of its struggles. It is the concept's vacuity that stops 
it from even beginning to do this. Now, it is precisely this vacuity that also 
explains the tendency amongst some writers who employ the 'labour aristocracy' 
to also use 'social control' or 'hegemony'. Foster's extensive and impressive 
empirical research into the nature of the labour aristocracy cannot mask the 
theoretical weaknesses that require the social control concept to be brought forth 
in order to strengthen the argument concerning the labour aristocracy. His 
specifying of the mechanisms of social control in the pre-industrial period IS 
designed to assist the argument that as these declined a new form of control IS 
needed; enter the labour aristocracy. 'To sum up the situation in 1914. The labour 
aristocracy, as a means of control, was quite different to what it had been fifty 
years before'. 68 In exactly the same way as the account of 'social control' given 
above has indicated, this serves to obscure, even obliterate, some fundamental 
differences, not least between the 'labour aristocracy' and institutions of the state. 
One weakness from which approaches which use either social control and labour 
aristocracy suffer is that whilst they both rest on the assumption of struggle and 
working class incorporation, they have difficulty integrating class struggle into their 
accounts. On the one hand, struggle is always present in the accounts, on the other 
it is always absent, in that it is rare to find it dealt with head on. Because the 
working class has been incorporated it is assumed that this must have occurred 
because the working class allowed itself to be so, regardless of the existence of 
struggle; the assumption, as found in Anderson and Nairn, is that the working class 
is essentially supine. 
However, whilst it may appear that the suggestion that the working class has 
been incorporated implies a supine body69 this is not the case; quite the opposite, 
in fact. For the working class was incorporated because it was not supine, because 
it was engaged in struggles, of varying intensities, which meant it had to be 
incorporated lest it realise its revolutionary potential. After all, why would the 
bourgeoisie bother to incorporate a supine working class? It is true that most 
accounts of incorporation suggest a supine working class, but this is because they 
fail to address the relationship between struggle and incorporation, and thus the 
political structures this gave rise to. For it is not that the working class was 
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struggling for incorporation into the structures of the British state, but that in its 
struggle for recognition it found itself incorporated. 
This is a problem wider than the question of working class incorporation, 
involving as it does the necessity of conceptualising (working class) struggle and 
(state) structures, the issues that form part of the core of Marxism and which have 
been dealt with often in highly nuanced ways, with writers tending to stress either 
struggle or structure. 70 But these need to be related in a concrete way. The British 
state, faced with struggling classes, succeeded in adapting itself to pre-empt 
revolutionary change by subsuming class struggle under the state through the 
development of administrative structures and mechanisms. The growth of the state 
from the late-nineteenth centuries can be traced to the incorporation of working 
class struggle into its very structures, as increasing elements of civil society found 
themselves structured, restructured and submerged. With typical flexibility and a 
seemingly endless ability to adapt itself, the British state and constitution responded 
by creating a space within itself for this purpose. In the very act of being 
incorporated the working class was constituted; the making of the working class 
was its incorporation. Not only does this mean that such a making can therefore 
only be understood, pace Thompson,71 as occurring after 1832 and, pace 
Hobsbawm,72 through the development in state power in Britain. It also signals 
a shift away from approaches which presuppose the working class as already 
constituted before the state 'acts' on it. 
Yet the other moment of this constitution was the (re )constitution of the modern 
state. Far from being supine, in the process of its struggle for recognition the 
working class forced the emergence of new state structures, and through these a 
reordering, far more fundamental than that forced by the bourgeoisie in its struggle, 
of the relation between state and civil society. Thus we can say that although the 
working class was constituted by the state, the state itself was constituted through 
class struggle. Poulantzas is right in claiming that 'struggles are inscribed in the 
institutional materiality of the state, even though they are not concluded in it; it is 
a materiality that carries the traces of these muted and multiform struggles'. 73 This 
insight can be strengthened by positing administration as the outcome of working 
class struggle. As Kay and Mott note, 'Administration is working-class power post 
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festum; working-class political victories captured and formalised at their moment 
of triumph'. 74 In these administrative structures the state appropriates and nullifies 
the struggle of the working class; as such they are the fossilised remnants of class 
struggle; they are working class struggle abolished and preserved. 75 Born of the 
struggle of the working class these structures are then left with the task of 
administering that same class, a task performed in relation to both collective 
organisations of the working class and its decomposed elements known as 
'citizens'. It is therefore through the very process of struggle that the working class 
and not just its 'aristocratic' elements, now most definitely of civil society as well 
as in it, also finds its struggles incorporated into the state, transformed into 
administrative structures and turned against it. Thus in its struggle to become a 
class of civil society, the class discovers itself also to be a class of the state. 
To justify these claims we must consider in more detail the development of the 
state in Britain from 1832. We shall do this by returning briefly to the question of 
the 'absence' of a revolution in Britain. 
Whither the Revolution? 
One of the outcomes of the problems concernmg the 'normal' and 'peculiar' 
histories of nation-states is that one may be tempted to reject the concept bourgeois 
revolution, thereby eliminating any concern with the 'failures' of different national 
bourgeoisies. 76 As one writer puts it: 
One could dispense with the search for the bourgeois revolution in the 
Stuart period. One could dispense with the search for failed or absent 
revolutions in the nineteenth century. If the bourgeoisie was not 
revolutionary, ifit did not seek a revolutionary overthrow of the old regime, 
it is hardly problematic that such revolutions did not appear. It also means 
that one can dispense with that angry scolding found in Marxist (and some 
Scholarly) literature.77 
However, we shall resist this temptation m favour of moving towards a more 
sophisticated concept of bourgeois revolution, which enables us to address the 
persistence of the 'pre-modern' features after 1832 without succumbing to a 
'peCUliarities' argument. For one of the problems in much of the literature is that 
bourgeois revolution is taken to refer to an exclusively 'political' event; the very 
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reason why the French revolution is taken as so important an example. It is this 
reading that prompts the game of Hunt the Bourgeoisie. 78 Yet one of the strengths 
of Marx's own account of revolution in general is his distinction between political 
and social revolution, in which the former represents a transformation of political 
power relations and the latter a transformation in the socio-economic relations of 
production. There seems to be no reason why this distinction cannot be used in 
thinking about bourgeois revolution. One might think of revolution as both process 
and moment, a distinction that can be traced in Marx's own work. Whilst Marx 
undoubtedly describes 1640 and 1789 as revolutionary moments, his overall 
concern, the general thrust of his argument, is of the long process by which 
capitalist relations of production come to dominate. It is for this reason that he 
points to an 'era of social revolution', 79 and this provides the key to Marx's 
comment that the bourgeoisie rules80 in all the decisive spheres of bourgeois 
society but allows the aristocracy to do the governing for it. 
This would identify bourgeois revolution with the long, slow and often 'silent' 
process, often across national boundaries, by which a particular mode of production 
and its concomitant property relations place their stamp on human relations. Within 
this process one can identify moments of political rupture or crisis in which 
relations of political power and authority undergo substantial alteration. As Geoff 
Eley puts it, 
Abstractly this means distinguishing between two levels of determination 
and significance - between the revolution as a specific crises of the state, 
involving widespread popular mobilisation and a reconstitution of political 
relationships, and on the other hand the deeper processes of structural 
change, involving the increasing predominance of the capitalist mode of 
production. 81 
This allows a retention of Marxism's central concern, namely the struggle between 
exploiting and exploited classes, and the contradictions this gives rise to, a struggle 
within civil society. 
It also allows us to give up the concern over the supposed contradiction between 
the 1832 Act and the continuation of aristocratic elements. For there is no 
inconsistency in the Act being an act of reform and yet 'the most aristocratic act 
187 
ever offered to the nation'. 82 It was the most aristocratic act because the 
aristocracy managed to survive a potentially revolutionary moment unscathed. But 
the price for avoiding upheaval was to come to terms with bourgeois economic 
power, the increasing domination of the capitalist process in civil society. For 
capitalism to triumph the aristocracy and bourgeoisie recognised their common 
interests vis a vis the working class. The chessboard model of the nineteenth 
century is faulty not only because it perceives of new classes sweeping away the 
01d,83 but because a chessboard model is a space in which only two agencies can 
operate. As Marx writes, 
In every violent movement they [the bourgeoisie] are obliged to appeal to 
the working class. And if the aristocracy is their vanishing opponent, the 
working class is their rising enemy. They prefer to compromise with the 
vanishing opponent rather than to strengthen the arising enemy, to whom 
the future belongs, by concessions of a more than apparent importance. 84 
It is not so much that 1832 provided a major step to the fusion of aristocracy and 
bourgeoisie into a detotalised totality in which the style of the aristocracy became 
the fixed style of the whole of British society, but that it changed the rules of the 
game, creating a new framework within which the dominant economic classes 
could function, in particular in counterposition to the working class. 85 As such the 
bourgeoisie had no need for direct political power; nor did it lack the courage to 
make an attempt at this power, as Anderson would have it. As a number of 
commentators have pointed out, what need had they for politics or courage when 
they had money. 86 
This point should not be underestimated, for the economIC power of the 
bourgeoisie can and did reap the necessary rewards. Nowhere is this more clearly 
seen than in the repeal of the corn laws. The laws restricting the import of corn 
were opposed by manufacturers on the grounds that they led to reduced levels of 
exports and higher bread prices. The higher prices, rents and tithes meant the corn 
laws found favour with the farmers and landlords and discontent on the part of 
industrialists on the grounds of lower trade. The Anti -Corn Law League's campaign 
for the repeal of the corn laws represents the attempt by free traders to overcome 
the old protectionism; in this they stood for the rising industrial classes. This turned 
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into a clash not simply between protection and free trade, but also between the 
principles of the aristocracy or landed gentry and the bourgeoisie, between the old 
and the new, tradition and modernity, paternalistic government and the modem 
state. It was class struggle. It is therefore not surprising that the repeal had a 
stormy passage through Parliament, given the social make-up outlined above. Peel's 
recognition that repeal was a politically realistic concession which would avert a 
much deeper crisis was to many Tories the ultimate betrayal. 87 Given the nature 
of Parliament the bourgeoisie could not rely on Parliamentary influence; a 
Parliament still full of landed interests was clearly not the most sympathetic arena. 
Thus the Leaguers 'lost their sense of constitutionality' advocating courses of 
action outside the sphere of Parliament and legality: refusal of taxes, promotion of 
strikes, the plan to create a liquidity crisis through a demand for gold in return for 
bankers notes and, ultimately, the threat to use disturbances amongst the working 
class. 88 
The point of course is that the repeal of the corn laws reveals the 'subordination 
of the landed interest to the moneyed interest, of property to commerce, of 
agriculture to manufacturing industry, of the country to the city' .89 It was a total 
victory for the political economy of the bourgeoisie. And ultimately Parliament, 
regardless of its social make-up, recognised the necessity of this outcome. 
Expanding the Concept of the Political: Administration 
Amidst all this the question of state administration is notably absent. For Anderson 
and Nairn the state is dealt with via their concern for the absent or failed bourgeois 
revolution. But this allows them to forego any detailed analysis of the state, on the 
grounds that its most significant features are precisely the aspects of the ancien 
regime. This serves to obscure some of the fundamental developments in state 
power that occurred in nineteenth century Britain. As Michael Barratt Brown points 
out, Anderson discusses Bank Charter Acts but not Company Acts, private 
financing of railways but not the Railway Acts; nor does he address the Enclosure 
Acts the rise of policing institutions, the administration of the Poor Law.90 In 
other words, the very mechanisms through which civil society was ordered and 
regulated by the state. In this absence Anderson and Nairn perpetuate the myth of 
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the nightwatchman state,91 a myth sustained by, yet itself sustaining, the claim to 
English peculiarity - 'other' states followed the 'proper' route to centralisation and 
rational bureaucracy. 92 
One of the problems that arises from considering bourgeois revolution is that the 
concern for the lack of political power of the bourgeois class after 1832 focuses on 
Parliament, government and Cabinets, as the figures given above concerning the 
continued existence of aristocratic elements indicate. This occurs in both Marxist 
and non-Marxist accounts. (Sometimes this is supported with an account of 
ideology and consciousness, as found in Anderson and Nairn). The problem is that 
it operates with a narrow conception of the political, of the kind found in the 
Second International discussed in Chapter Two. For just as the revolution III 
'bourgeois revolution' is misread as political, so the political is reduced to 
Parliament. This encourages a Marxist reading of Parliament as 'the arena of 
genuine class confrontation'. 93 Political power is taken to mean the control of 
legislation through either Parliament, government or Cabinet (or, ideally, all three), 
with a sideways glance at the operations of the judiciary. Because the bourgeoisie 
failed to penetrate these institutions their failure to assume political power is taken 
as read. But whilst these changes were occurring (or not occurring, as the case may 
be), a parallel set of developments were also taking place: the emergence of new 
administrative mechanisms for the ordering and regulation of civil society in 
general and the working class in particular. The contention here is that we need an 
expanded concept of the political that includes administration. This would allow a 
number of advantages. First, it enables an analysis of these administrative 
mechanisms and avoids an excessive focus on Parliament. Second, it encourages 
an exploration of the links between law and administration. Thus an account can 
be given of the links between the simultaneous emergence of citizens as subjects 
of right and objects of administration. Third, it encourages us to explore the links 
and boundaries between Parliament, government, Cabinet and the judiciary, and 
administration. To facilitate this I will develop the idea that administration is 
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial. This allows us to explore the category 
administration without, pace Foucault, losing sight of the state or law, for the 
'quasi' is intended to indicate the problem of a boundary. Nor does it encourage 
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the cruder forms of base-superstructure argument found in some Marxist accounts 
of law. 
One of the outcomes of 1832 was that the aristocratic control over patronage was 
displaced to Parliament and increasingly centred on party needs. Yet without a 
hierarchically structured and bureaucratically organised party system controlling 
backbench and independent MPs - such as was to emerge in the 1870s after the 
further extension of the franchise - patronage remained disorganised, haphazard and 
unpredictable; political leaders had next to no control over it. Given that 1832 
increased the centrality of Parliament to political life, and began the process of 
increasing the number of 'commoners' within it, one solution to the problem posed 
for political leaders by the unpredictable nature of Parliamentary patronage was 
to shift power from Parliament to the administrative arm of the state. 94 The 
'independent' character of the administrative mechanisms examined in Chapter 
Five, such as the Poor Law Board, were shaped partly by the reformers' fear of 
patronage. Here a brief analysis of the emergence of a modern Civil Service 
provides a useful starting point, and will allow us to introduce some of the 
arguments concerning administration developed in the following chapter. 
Patronage in the Civil Service remained unreformed after 1832 - Trevelyan was 
to write that 'patronage in all its varied forms is the great abuse and scandal of the 
present age' - and constituted the main driving force behind Gladstone's decision 
to reform the Civil Service. 95 Yet in his correspondence at the time Gladstone also 
claims that his efforts at reforming the Civil Service are his 'contribution to 
Parliamentary reform'.96 In this sense MacDonagh is right to claim that 
administrative reform was seen as the follow-through to the Reform Act of 1832. 
However, it is not true to claim that reform was promoted by the middle classes, 
nor that it was an assault on the ancien regime. 97 For just as the Reform Act can 
be seen as a partial defence of aristocracy, so can administrative reform. Gladstone 
saw his reforms as a means of retaining and reinvigorating the ascendancy of a 
Coleridgean clerisy. Through the creation of a new Civil service elite to which 
entry was possible only by exam, for which Oxbridge education was remarkably 
suited the reforms were intended to consolidate the links between the higher , 
classes and administrative power. In other words, it was 'a means of extending 
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confirming, cleansing and legitimising an existing elite'. 98 It is true that the 
reforms were intended to win the acceptance of such structures by the rising middle 
classes - the reforms had nothing if not the air of meritocracy - but they were 
neither a response to the demands of the middle class nor intended to allow middle 
class entry into the administration. 99 
Yet the emergence of a modern centralised administrative body in Britain was 
a contribution to Parliamentary 'reform' in another, more profound way, for in the 
process of its creation the Civil Service failed to make it on to the statute books, 
revealing the increasing impotence of Parliament vis a vis administration. The 
Order in Council - an administrative order emanating from the Queens Privy 
Council - of early 1855 was laid before Parliament, voted down, but implemented 
anyway, since the implementation did not require Parliamentary approval. In other 
words, the emergence of centralised administration was itself an act of 
administration. Moreover the Order, as an instrument drawn up in the Treasury and 
used to effect increasing executive power, made the Treasury the organ for 
integrating administration, in the process depriving Parliament of any direct control 
over the commissioners created by the Order. 1oo 
This link between the ruling class, administrative power and the extension of 
Parliamentary representation can also be seen in later changes. The full logic of the 
Northcote-Trevelyan Report was only carried through in 1870, once it became clear 
that the doors of Parliament would have to be opened further still, even to the 
working class. As the franchise was extended yet further in 1867, making 
Parliament even more representative (at least in the quantitative sense) and creating 
a much larger electorate which, because of its size and social make-up was neither 
predictable nor controllable through patronage, so there occurred a further shift in 
power from Parliament to administration. First, the 1870 Order in Council -
approved by Cabinet without Parliamentary approval - rendered competition more 
widespread throughout the Service and extended Treasury control over Civil 
Service regulation and, second, an amendment to the Standing Orders of the House 
of Commons allowed public spending to be increased without Parliamentary 
approval. 101 Moreover, when the post of Head of the Civil Service emerged after 
1867 it was a Permanent Secretary (to the Treasury) who assumed it. 102 Finally 
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the introduction of universal male suffrage (alongside an organised labour 
movement) in 1918 occurred simultaneously with the consolidation of Treasury 
control over the administrative machinery. 103 
The issue here is not the relative control over the administrative machinery by 
the bourgeois and aristocratic classes, but the institutional form and political thrust 
of state power. The Gladstonian conception of an administrative elite was intended 
as a defence of the class state - the 1854 reforms were to 'strengthen and multiply 
the ties between the higher classes and the possession of administrative power,104 
- a defence intended to win the bourgeoisie away from any links it might forge 
with the working class. Moreover, it also indicates the extent to which an attempt 
at developing the conceptual tools for an analysis of state power should not be 
limited to Parliamentary mechanisms. For many of the changes that occurred in the 
organisation of state power in Britain from 1832 occurred outside Parliament, or 
at least at its edges, in a series of administrative structures. The threefold purpose 
of administration from 1834 traced in the following chapter - the fashioning of a 
modern labour force, the subsumption of working class struggles into the state and 
the constitution of legal subjects - is one which unites both aristocracy and 
bourgeoisie. In relation to the first purpose, it will be argued that the working class 
was made by the state - it was formed and structured by the capitalist state in the 
late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. To this end there developed a series 
of administrative innovations through which the working class was structured and 
ordered. In Britain such administration was rooted in the state. In relation to the 
latter purpose, administration will be argued to be a product of class struggle, the 
mechanisms whereby the state subsumes working class revolutionary will and 
transforms it into a bureaucratic form. 
Using the category of 'administration' in this way makes the historians' debate, 
concermng the continued aristocratic elements within Parliament, merely a 
historians' debate. 105 Likewise, the excessive concern with the 'feudal' or 
'pre-modern' characteristics of the British state misses one of its key features, 
perfectly surmised by Walter Bagehot, that the archaic continuities within the 
British constitution act as a dignified mask for its highly efficient and rational 
core. 106 From 1832 onwards an increasing amount of power was exercised not 
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by Parliament, nor for that matter other traditional political bodies such as the 
judiciary, but by quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial administrative bodies. From 
1834 many central policy-making bodies, whose decisions had the force of law, 
grew outside of the immediate Parliamentary arena. Here we will focus upon the 
development of the administration of subsistence by the state. This will begin with 
an analysis of the 1834 New Poor Law, for it is this that established the model for 
much of the subsequent development. The comment of Nassau Senior to de 
Tocqueville that 'The Poor Law Amendment Act was a heavier blow to the 
aristocracy than the Reform ACt'107 is telling, for the long term effect of the New 
Poor Law, it will be argued, was the creation of the centralised administrative 
structures through which, firstly, the bourgeois social revolution could be 
consolidated and, secondly, through which later working class struggles could be 
administered and negated. 
Whilst the New Poor Law will be shown to have its roots in the concerns, 
discontents and desires of the bourgeoisie, later developments in the administration 
of subsistence were a response to working class struggle. In this sense, 
administration will be shown to be the prime institutional mechanism for the 
mediation of struggle. Yet in the process of developing administrative mechanisms 
for this purpose, the institutional structure of the modern state was fundamentally 
altered, and with it the institutional relationship between state and civil society. It 
will therefore be argued that the state was equally 'made', through the process of 
class struggle. 
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Chapter Five 
Political Administration in Britain 1832-1918: 
The Fashioning of Labour Power, the Subsumption of 
Struggle and the Constitution of Legal Subjects 
The New Poor Law, Labour and State Administration 
Political administration from 1834 was concerned first and foremost with the 
condition of the working class. Pauperism, or indigence, was regarded as 'the social 
problem', because as non-labour it undermined the very principle of the bourgeois 
social order. Thus one writer at the time described pauperism as 'one of the great 
calamities which can afflict civil society, since, with certain exceptions, it generates 
everything that is noxious, criminal and vicious in the civil body'. 1 As a problem 
pauperism was not new - political theorists and administrators had long recognised 
it as of central concern - but from the early nineteenth century it was regarded as 
a suitable object for political administration. Before this can be illustrated we need 
to say a little more concerning the distinction between poverty and pauperism. 
It is misleading to describe the New Poor Law as concerned with poverty; quite 
the opposite is true. Some thinkers, especially those behind the Poor Law, 
recognise the intimate connection between poverty and wealth, understanding that 
the eradication of poverty would be the eradication of wealth. This has its roots 
partly in Bentham's work on the Old Poor Law, where he claims that 
Poverty is the state of everyone who, in order to obtain subsistence, is 
forced to have recourse to labour. Indigence is the state of him who, being 
destitute of property .. .is at the same time, either unable to labour, or unable, 
even for labour, to procure the supply of which he happens to be in want. 2 
Given that Bentham's followers were the principle architects behind the Poor Law 
Amendment Act of 1834, most notably Edwin Chadwick, it is unsurprising that this 
understanding of poverty and indigence forms one of the intellectual 
presuppositions behind the Act. The Report on the Poor Law states that 
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In no part of Europe except England has it been thought fit that the 
provision, whether compulsory or voluntary, should it be applied to more 
than the relief of indigence, the state of a person unable to labour, or unable 
to obtain, in return for his labour, the means of subsistence. It has never 
been deemed expedient that the provision should extend to the relief of 
poverty; that is, the state of one who, in order to obtain a mere subsistence , 
is forced to have recourse to labour. 3 
Two factors are important here. First, the distinction between poverty and 
pauperism, and the recognition of the necessity of poverty for labour and therefore 
wealth, implies the recognition of the need for a class of persons who remain 
within poverty, who have to labour for their subsistence; in other words the 
necessity of the working class and for its condition to be one of poverty. 4 Second, 
there is the growing recognition of the importance of administering this aspect of 
civil society politically. What follows from the distinction between poverty and 
pauperism, from the understanding that poverty is 'natural' to capitalism, and from 
the threat to civil society posed by pauperism, is the belief that pauperism can be 
administered by the state. But this administration is also indirectly the 
administration of poverty, and therefore of the working class. For this to be 
achieved civil society needed to be reconstituted through a series of appropriate 
administrative policing mechanisms. 
Although the Report has been described as 'wildly unhistorical' and 'wildly 
unstatistical',5 the methodology severely lacking - the 'evidence' for the most part 
taking the form of written submissions from various parishes, visits by the 
Commissioners to the parishes, and some information on Poor Law practice in 
foreign countries - and the Report was written before all the evidence had arrived, 
never mind studied,6 it remains a crucial document for an understanding of the 
development of political administration in the period. For regardless of whether 
what the Commissioners believed was the truth or not, the subsequent legislation 
was based upon it, and it was written with the authors knowing that subsequent 
reform would be based upon it. What people thought was happening was, for the 
purpose of social policy, more important than what was actually happening. Thus 
the accuracy of the evidence of the Report, its methodological flaws and wildly 
unhistorical nature are largely irrelevant. 7 
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The findings of the Report were that the provision of poor relief was haphazard 
and confused. Apart from relief within workhouses there was outdoor relief of 
numerous forms. There was outdoor relief in kind, such as rent, as well as outdoor 
relief in money - straightforward relief, an allowance in aid of wages, the 
Roundsman system, employment by the parish, the labour-rate system. In addition 
there was outdoor relief of the impotent. 8 Added to this it was administered by 
over 15,000 parishes. The system was thus regarded as open to abuse, in two 
significant ways. First, conditions in workhouses were often better than those of 
poor labourers outside and, second, provision of outdoor relief in aid of wages 
often meant that labourers reduced their working hours where possible in favour 
of relief provided by the parish, (with employers often using the existence of relief 
to keep wages down, on the grounds that low wages will be supported by relief). 
In other words, the real problem was that the system encouraged idleness, that is, 
non-labour; it encouraged the avoidance of the very activity that defines one as 
working class. 
The solution consisted of a number of recommendations, not all of which were 
fully implemented. The first of these was the principle of less eligibility. 
The first and most essential of all conditions, a principle which we find 
universally admitted, even by those whose practice is at variance with it, is 
that his [the pauper's] situation on the whole shall not be made really or 
apparently so eligible as the situation of the independent labourer of the 
lowest class.9 
Since the belief was that the existing system of poor relief encouraged pauperism 
by offering generous benefits if one did not work, then a situation should be 
created whereby they could not/would not wish to do this. A simple reversal of 
syllogism provided the solution: if men quit the class of labourer to join the more 
eligible class of pauper then they would quit the class of pauper and join the more 
eligible class of labourer were the relative conditions to be reversed. 10 Thus relief 
should provide a standard of living below that of the lowest worker. The 
Commissioners saw this as the 'dispauperising' of the able-bodied poorll whereby 
a broad line of distinction could be drawn between the class of independent 
labourers and the class of paupers. This line could be drawn and maintained by the 
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second recommendation, that of providing relief within a workhouse, which would 
correct the three faults of the system of poor relief: it would remove the 'poor', 
that is the able-bodied labourer, from poor relief and deal only with the pauper; it 
would restore the principle of work, so that paupers would work in return for relief; 
and through the principle of less eligibility the abuses of the Old Poor Law would 
be removed. 
The workhouse would do this because of its conditions. 'The only protection for 
the parish is to make the parish the hardest taskmaster and the worst paymaster that 
can be applied to' Y The phrase 'less eligibility' is often taken to mean that the 
conditions of the workhouse must be worse than that of the poorest pauper, and 
that since the conditions of the poorest pauper were so awful it would be 
impossible to achieve.13 But in fact the early administrators did not conceive of 
workhouses which were dirty, insanitary, overcrowded and badly built; nor did they 
wish paupers to be badly fed or clothed. 14 Chadwick, for example, envisaged the 
workhouse as containing wholesome food, well-ventilated with good 
accommodation. 15 The workhouses were intended to repel through their discipline, 
through the monotonous regime, and through the loss of liberty and deprivation of 
sexual contact. 
The third recommendation was to create a central board to overcome the 
unavoidable discrepancies and corruption created by an administration of 15,000 
units. The key feature of the central board was its responsibility for uniformity in 
the administration. 16 
The Act of 1834 itself did not introduce all of these recommendations to the 
extent desired by Chadwick and his colleagues. A Poor Law Commission was 
created, but without the powers desired by the Report's authors. It could not 
compel the newly created Poor Law Unions to build workhouses, despite the 
centrality of the workhouse to the Act. Moreover the Commission had little power 
over those Unions which did not co-operate. Fraser notes that 'the Poor Law 
Commissioner's function was thus supervisory. It could cajole, encourage, 
reprimand, inspect, but could not compel unions'. 17 The Bill that went through 
Parliament contained no reference to a workhouse test in the form of less 
eligibility. And whilst the Bill originally contained the stipulation that allowances 
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in aid of wages were to cease on 1 June 1835 this clause was later dropped. Instead 
it was left to the discretion of the Commissioners, who were to issue directives 
concerning the regulation of outdoor relief. However, the wording of the Bill has 
been read as implying that the Commissioners were to take the Report as their 
guiding light,18 a significant point, as we shall see. 
The only area in which the Act was explicit was in the creation of a new 
politico-administrative structure. The new political forms operated at both local 
and national level. At the local level there was created a new unit of administration 
(the Union of Parishes) with an elected tax-raising body to control relief (Boards 
of Guardians) and to replace the magistracy. At the central level the creation of the 
Poor Law Commission was a dramatic change. Initially free from Parliamentary or 
ministerial control, in its attempt at achieving uniformity the Commission operated 
through an inspectorate. 19 It is only from the 1870s, when the Commission (by 
then a Board) could impose its will on the Unions, that complete uniformity would 
be achieved. The point however is that the Poor Law established the political forms 
and administrative structures essential for the further development of the state in 
Britain and which became the basis for the period of state-building into the 
late-nineteenth century and early-twentieth. This is the central claim; to justify it 
we must first consider some of the central problems in interpreting the New Poor 
Law. 20 
The first issue must concern why the New Poor Law developed when it did. 
Here the central question concerning the relationship between state and civil society 
is relevant. One way of interpreting the origins of the New Poor Law is to argue 
that it was a response to the growing social disorder. Commentators have pointed 
to the series of disturbances in nearly nineteenth century Britain: Luddites, violent 
strikes in response to bad harvests of 1816-17 and 1819, machine-breakers, the 
Peterloo demonstration and subsequent killings by the Yeomanry in 1819, and most 
notably Captain Swing in 1830-32. Thus Ginsberg suggests that 
it was the agitation by the agricultural labourers that prompted the 
appointment in 1832 of a royal commission, which produced the famous 
Poor Law Report of 1834 and led to the passing of the Poor Law 
71 Amendment Act.-
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Whilst other writers do not draw such a close connection between working class 
discontent and the Poor Law, causal links between these events and the 1834 Act 
are often implied. 22 
Now, such an analysis appears to be suited to a Marxist theoretical approach. It 
assumes revolutionary behaviour (at least potentially so) on the part of the working 
class (witness Hobsbawm's comment that 'at no other period in modern British 
history have the common people been so persistently, profoundly, and often 
desperately dissatisfied. At no other period since the seventeenth century can we 
speak of large masses of them as revolutionary', or Thompson's claim that a 
revolution was possible in 1832)23 and suggests that the response to this by the 
bourgeois state was to reform the relief system to placate these forces. The analysis 
appears to function well as a Marxist analysis because it contains key categories 
and sits well with a particular Marxist account of the state. Categories such as 
'class', 'poverty', 'struggle', 'revolution' and so forth all make their appearance, 
and the state operates in favour of the bourgeoisie against the working class. The 
problem is that it is not at all apparent that such an analysis can be sustained; the 
social discontent may have had some impact on the production of the New Poor 
Law, but that impact seems to have been limited. 
F or the Report itself contains few references to the discontent of the previous 
years. 24 This is not due to the desire to conceal such a concern for, as Himmelfarb 
notes, such an argument from expediency was entirely respectable and, as we have 
seen, widely used in the debate over the Reform Act two years earlier.25 Moreover 
what references the Report does contain to the disturbances prior to 1834 suggest 
a very different perception of them. For example in relation to 'the events of 1830 
in the disturbed districts' the Report states that 'partly under the application of 
force but much more under that of bribes, that paroxysm subsided'. 26 In other 
words the Report's conception was that the working class could be curtailed by 
direct force or by higher payments ('bribes'). There is no suggestion in the Report 
that reform of the relief system would stop working class disturbances. 
In fact, if one is considering discontent, particularly over the relief system, then 
it is bourgeois discontent that was far more widespread, systematic. formal and 
influential than working class disturbance. The reasons for this lie in the political 
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economy of a society undergoing rapid and dramatic change, one of the effects of 
which was to increase the numbers receiving poor relief thereby adding to the poor 
rates. Between 1760 and 1784 taxes for relief rose by 60%, doubling by 1801 and 
rising by 60% in the next decade. By 1818 the poor rate was over six times as high 
as it had been in 1760. In the crisis years 1817-19 expenditure on poor relief was 
nearly £8 million per annum, or 12 to 13s per head of the population. Whilst this 
fell in the early 1820s it began to rise again following the 1826 financial crisis, 
reaching £7 million again by 1831.27 Thus a large amount of discontent was from 
the middle classes who found themselves faced with enormous taxes, the effect of 
which was a drastic curtailing of the rate of profit. The Report quotes a House of 
Commons Committee of 1817: 
Unless some efficacious check were interposed, there was then every reason 
to think that the amount of the assessment would continue to increase, 
until...it should have absorbed the profits of the property on which the rate 
might have been assessed. 28 
The Report goes on to add that since 181 7 the amount of relief has increased, and 
gives examples from parishes concerning the effect this has. 
In Cholesbury therefore, the expense of maintaining the poor has not merely 
swallowed up the whole value of the land; it requires even the assistance for 
two years of rates in aid from other parishes to enable the able-bodied after 
the land has been given up to them to support themselves; and the aged and 
impotent must even then remain a burthern on the neighbouring parishes. 29 
The reference here to both able-bodied and 'aged and impotent' is significant, for 
the practical application of the distinction between poverty and pauperism was to 
be the solution. The costs of the poor rates to the middle classes led to demands 
for the introduction of a relief system which did not provide relief for all, 
especially the able-bodied. Since pauperism should be relieved, but poverty not, 
there was no need for the high poor rates. Restricting relief to the impotent would 
reduce poor rates and, through the lowering of wages, improve the rate of profit. 
And it could do all this by returning to the natural law of labour, prudence and 
virtue. Thus 
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We have seen that one of the objects attempted by the present 
administration of the Poor laws is to repeal pro tanto that law of nature by 
which the effects of each mans improvidence or misconduct are borne by 
himself and his family. The effect of that attempt has been to repeal pro 
tanto the law by which each man and his family enjoy the benefit of his 
own prudence and virtue.30 
The reasoning behind the development of the New Poor Law can therefore be 
found not so much in working class struggles but in the conjunction of bourgeois 
political economy and bourgeois philosophy. In the discourse surrounding the 
workings of the Poor Law we discover how closely entwined bourgeois political 
philosophy and political economy are. For this discourse reveals the political 
significance of labour - its commodification within capitalist production and 
ontological status within bourgeois political philosophy and morality. 31 
I t would seem that the true effect of working class disturbance is thus not, as 
some Marxist commentators have maintained, that the bourgeoisie responded by 
reforming the Poor Law, but that for the bourgeoisie, burdened with damaging 
poor rates of £7 million a year, there were still these disturbances. 32 The point is 
that the working class were in no way organised in the early nineteenth century to 
threaten bourgeois society to the extent that some commentators have claimed. 
Indeed it did not matter how much the working class was antagonised as long as 
the right strategies - force or bribery - were used against them. After Parliament 
extended the franchise to the middle classes in 1832 any agitation by the working 
class movement against the old system of poor relief was isolated and weak. 33 
It is notable that the Report does not come to the conclusion that the system of 
relief is open to abuse by all classes of persons. It states that widows are 'a class 
of persons [who] have in many places established a right to public support'. It also 
suggests that outdoor relief to the impotent (sick and aged) offers little opportunity 
for abuse. Thus several classes of person are exempted automatically from the 
charge that they may abuse the system. 34 Instead the Report focuses on one class 
of pauper: the able-bodied male (and his dependents). Thus it claims that 'the great 
source of abuse is the outdoor relief afforded to the able-bodied on their own 
account, or on that of their families'. 35 Karel Williams points out the importance 
of recognising this focus on able-bodied males and not able-bodied persons, and 
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that the Report does not suggest radical reform of relief to other groups such as the 
sick, old, or young widows.36 He claims that the historiography of the Poor Law 
has made the mistake of blurring the distinction between able-bodied persons and 
able-bodied males, a crucial one because the Report does not recommend change 
in relief for the non-able-bodied. Williams argues that conventional analysis of the 
1834 Poor Law is that it created a central authority with the objective of abolishing 
relief to all classes of able-bodied poor. The conventional analysis then suggests 
that because outdoor relief was not abolished the central authority failed in its 
objective. 37 But even after the New Poor Law had been in operation for over a 
decade the focus was still on able-bodied men. Thus the 'Outdoor Relief 
Prohibitory Order' (1844) and the 'Outdoor Relief Regulation Order' (1852), both 
issued by the central authority, provided a legally binding set of regulations about 
what classes could obtain outdoor relief and under what conditions. Neither of the 
two Orders tried to restrict outdoor relief given to the able-bodied. The 1852 Order 
restricted relief given to able-bodied male persons; the 1844 Order exempted 
able-bodied widows with dependent children from the general prohibition on 
relief. 38 
What this also draws out is the fact that the New Poor Law was as much 
concerned with those outside the workhouse as those within. It is only after 1870 
that outdoor relief was severely curtailed. From 1834 to 1870 most paupers were 
outdoors.39 In other words, the strategy of 1834 was negatively to repress 
pauperism by making indoor relief thoroughly unattractive and outdoor relief 
unobtainable for able-bodied men. In terms of the development of industrial 
capitalism this strategy was crucial, for it helped construct a modern workforce of 
wage-labour. The New Poor Law was the first attempt to draw a clear line of 
demarcation between the poor and paupers, that is the working class and the 
non-employed. (It will be 50 years before 'unemployment' becomes a category of 
state administration, as will be shown below). The attempt to limit outdoor relief 
via the principle of less eligibility was therefore a concerted attempt to fashion a 
modern workforce in which wage labour became the form of existence for the 
working class. The New Poor Law consolidated the social status of labour power 
as a commodity for sale on the market. 
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Yet it could be argued that in itself this was hardly an original feature of the 
protracted process which constitutes the bourgeois revolution; the account given by 
Marx of the 'bloody legislation against the expropriated' from the fifteenth century, 
the forcing down of wages by Parliament, is testimony enough to the state power 
used to shape the working class.40 Yet the significant feature of the processes 
being examined here is not just this fashioning, but the nature of the structures used 
- the unitary state and the creation of politico-administrative structures specific to 
the task. 
The one feature of the Report that the Act adhered to was the creation of a new 
central authority. It was only on administration that the Act was explicit. 41 This 
is due partly to Chadwick's insistence that less-eligibility necessarily called for an 
ad hoc central and coercive agency: central and coercive because the parishes 
would not accept it voluntarily; ad hoc because the agency could not be parliament 
itself. 42 It is this centralising tendency that is the key to state development. There 
had been shifts towards centralisation in various areas of concern prior to 1834. 
Concern over factory conditions, in particular for children, led to an 1833 Royal 
Commission on which a number of Benthamites - Chadwick, Southwood Smith and 
the secretary James Wilson - sat. The main changes the Commission suggested 
concerned the length of the working day and certain regulations concerning child 
labour, but one recommendation was the establishment of a central agency to 
regulate and administer the factory conditions. As Roberts notes, 'the significance 
of the act lay not in the shift of administrative power from local authorities to a 
central department but in the insistence that the central government can regulate 
private enterprise for the public's welfare'. 43 Roberts claims that this marks the 
beginning of the centrally directed collectivism in the nineteenth century. In fact 
the 1832 Anatomy Act (also heavily influenced by Benthamites, and Bentham 
himself) initiated the first centrally financed and administered national Inspectorate, 
pre-dating the Factory Inspectorate - usually seen as the first - by a year.44 One 
can trace the centralising tendencies in other areas too. The growth in state 
regulation of Friendly Societies, and through them working class self-help and 
savings schemes, took a different turn from 1829. Prior to this there had simply 
been regulation by local officials, in particular concerning interest rates, but an Act 
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in 1829 shifted the regulation to central government and required regular returns 
of data; a further Act of 1846 reinforced the centralising tendency through actuarial 
.• 45 
superVIsIOn. 
The point, however, is not to identify which institution was the first, but to 
specify the historical tendency, a tendency which, in provoking such policies and 
institutions, also lead to the belief, in 1. L. Symons words, that 'we must have a 
central power as the primum mobile of all such policies ... there must be a central 
fund ... The state alone can, may and ought to do it' .46 The New Poor Law is part 
of this tendency, but it is significant because more than any of the other pieces of 
legislation or institutions it helped consolidate labour power as a commodity; 
because more than any other it was concerned with the administration of 
pauperism, and thus indirectly poverty.47 As Kay and Mott note, 
More than any other measure the New Poor Law consolidated the unitary 
structure of the political state in Britain, and it is no accident that this 
development occurred with respect to labour, for in the last analysis it is 
against labour that this unitary structure is ranged. 48 
In other words, the emergence of modern administration in the building of the 
capitalist state occurred at a most vital point: the constitution and regulation of 
wage-labour. 
The issue is not a question of state 'intervention'. The objective behind the New 
Poor Law was to remove from the state the paternalistic obligation for ensuring 
subsistence and to create the conditions whereby the political economy of the 
market reigned. This is not 'intervention' (or 'interference') in the market, but the 
constitution of the market, and a range of regulative institutions designed to 
facilitate its functioning. The so-called 'nineteenth century revolution III 
government' is in fact the creation of a series of political structures and 
administrative mechanisms through which the central state could make its decisions 
locally effective.49 Thus at the same time as insisting that subsistence could be 
provided by labour, a whole range of structures were created in a series of fields 
- welfare, health and sanitation, prisons, asylums, factory inspection, police - to 
effect centrally determined decisions. Roberts gives a list of central agencies 
created between 1833 and 1854 which cover areas as diverse as poor relief, lunacy, 
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mines, burials, education, joint-stock companies, sewers and so forth. 50 
This effected a recasting of the relationship between state and civil society. One 
of the ways this occurs is through the establishment of administrative bodies 
autonomous of Parliamentary power. The Poor Law Commission was completely 
separate from the legislature, and Chadwick rejected both judicial review - on the 
grounds that the courts could simply impede administration - and ministerial 
control - on the grounds that ministerial responsibility to Parliament could lead to 
political pressures. The issue here is not the 'accountability' of the structures. It is 
that the structure created was unique in seemingly possessing a combination of 
legislative, judicial and executive power. Not only did the Commission have the 
right to inspect, advise, report and order prosecutions, it also had the power to issue 
regulations with the force of law. Defiance by the guardians could see them faced 
with a writ of mandamus from the courts. Even Parliament's attempt to create a 
check on these potentially overwhelming powers by insisting that all general rules 
be sanctioned by the Home Office and then sent to Parliament, was overcome by 
the Commission issuing regulations individually as special rules. 51 Similarly, after 
1851 the Commission could decide all disputes between parishes concerning the 
cost of union relief. Whilst this meant that parishes could avoid the legal battles 
that had previously been costly, it also meant that the Commission was acting as 
a judicial board. This had the effect of blurring the line between law and 
administration such that administrative decisions appeared to have the force of 
judicial decisions. 52 The new structure therefore appeared to be not merely an 
administrative body, but to have quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. 
Again, the issue is not about the relative success or failure, or even the 
effectiveness, of the central board. Historians such as Digby who claim that 
'centralisation in the relief administration after 1834 was a convenient fiction to 
which public lip-service was paid by the inspectors', whilst containing some 
truth,53 miss the point, which is that the new politico-administrative structures 
were to provide the institutional form of state administration through the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. As Finer notes, the administrative developments 
have proved the source of nearly all the important developments in English 
local government, viz. central supervision, central inspection, central audit, 
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a professional local government service controlled by local elective bodies, 
and the adjustment of areas to administrative exigencies. 54 
The modem administrative state can thus be traced to the evolution of new political 
structures that emerged from the shift in poor relief. The administration of 
pauperism and poverty by the state was a necessary response to the development 
of private property and industrial capitalism. By constituting labour power as a 
commodity and creating the institutions to regulate it the New Poor Law performed 
the task of establishing administration as the form through which mediation 
between capital and labour could take place, and the form into which struggle 
could be recast. 
It is the absence of any recognition of this central role of state vis a vis the class 
structure that weakens the Foucauldian reading of the New Poor Law and its 
institutions. The workhouse can be read as a disciplinary institution: Foucault's 
description of the model of the disciplinary mechanisms as an enclosed segmented 
space, observed at every point, in which individuals are inserted in a fixed place, 
supervision is total, events are recorded, work is imposed and power exercised 
hierarchically, appears an apt description of the workhouse. 55 Peter Squires, for 
example, writes that the 1834 Act was in essence 'a uniquely disciplinary project', 
part of a 'disciplinary continuum' and 'the emergence of new forms and relations 
of power' which saw 'an intensification of disciplinary relations across society'; 
part of what Foucault calls the 'great Confinement'. 56 A number of factors do 
lend themselves to such a reading of the New Poor Law - comments by key figures 
at the time suggest the perception of the workhouse as a disciplinary institution, 57 
the link through Bentham, his concern with prisons and classifiable knowledge and 
his influence on the leading figures behind the New Poor Law8 - but the 
'Foucault effect' results in an absence of the state from these accounts and the 
obliteration of any concept of agency; the result is a seriously weakened account 
of the kind of changes that occurred. Martin Hewitt, for example, suggests that one 
of the ways in which Foucault's work can be used to understand welfare and social 
policy is because it avoids traditional categories such as 'class' and . state' . 
The overarching assumption of state governance .. .is diffused into a complex 
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and immanent network of disciplinary technologies, supported bv discourses 
concerning the management of numerous aspects of the body ~nd forming 
an updated and diversified version of the Panopticon. 59 
But by positing the state as simply one modality of governing and policing among 
others, the state is reduced (,diffused') into a series of disciplinary technologies 
where it becomes meaningless to actually talk of the state; this then fails to 
recognise the continued existence of a sovereign body and its key role in the 
fashioning of a modern labour force of wage labour through the operation of the 
New Poor Law; in turn it fails to recognise the process of state-building which this 
initiated, that continued into the twentieth century. 
Citizenship and Social Class, the Franchise and the State 
We will return to the administration of poverty below. A discussion of citizenship 
is necessary here because one of the distinguishing features of the administration 
of poverty after the 1870s is that it occurs in the context of an expansion of 
citizenship, an expansion that includes the working class (a process completed by 
1918). The extension of citizenship to include all individuals, regardless of wealth, 
is one of the most obvious ways in which the working class is now in and of civil 
society; the 'equality' of citizenship facilitates the appearance of a classless 
'community' . 
One can trace the contours of citizenship through the obvious legal and political 
dimensions, such as the vote, but this would be a one-sided undertaking; the 
contention here is that citizenship also needs to be thought of through the range of 
administrative mechanisms and procedures which mark the citizen as an object of 
administration. The citizen is both a political and legal subject, and an object of 
administration, but this latter aspect is often obscured in the concentration on legal 
and political rights. Here we consider the significance of the right to vote as part 
of the constitution of the individual citizen as a subject of rights, before developing 
a critique of one of the most important and insightful accounts of citizenship - that 
of T.H. Marshall - a critique based on the absence of administration in Marshall's 
account. For state administration of individuals to occur the working class needs 
to be (re )thought of not as a class but as a collection of atomised individuals. At 
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the same time, to be objects of administration they have to be recognised as 
subjects of right. In Britain political administration develops alongside the 
expansion of citizenship and the extension of the franchise. 
The standard account of the franchise and the spread of citizenship presents 1867 
as the continuation of 1832. Its very title, the Second Reform Act, suggests that it 
was geared as a continuation of the process begun in the previous one. Just as 1832 
is said to have granted the right to vote to the middle class, so 1867 is said to have 
granted the vote to the working class, a process continued in 1884 and completed 
in 1918. To claim that 1867 'transformed England into a democracy'60 is 
far-fetched. Whilst it is true that the vote was conceded to the working class, this 
concession was only to some male sections of it. This is a crucial dimension to the 
extension of the franchise between the years 1867 and 1918. The key point here 
is that it constituted the politico-legal aspect of the process whereby the working 
class was incorporated into both civil society and the state; it formed the 
complementary process to the politico-administrative process that forms our central 
concern. 
The tactical battles over the Act are a prime example of a ruling class learning 
how to change in order to preserve and thus survive. When the Liberal government 
of 1866 presented to the Commons the statistics they had been producing, the size 
and distribution of the working class became an important factor if there was to be 
an extension downwards of the property thresholds produced in 1832. For example 
they estimated that if the property threshold in the towns was to be reduced to £6 
then the new artisan vote would amount to nearly 250,000; by comparison if it was 
reduced to £7 then the figure would be 150,000. Likewise the Conservatives in 
1867, in their case for household suffrage, recognised the strategic importance of 
the residential qualification, a property threshold of £ 15 for county constituencies 
and 'fancy franchises' of plural voting. 61 
The outcome was the appearance of major political change, but in which it is 
estimated that at best only 300/0 of the adult male urban working class was 
enfranchised. 62 Given these details we can agree with Moorhouse that 1867 was 
far more a result of tactical manoeuvres between competing elements within the 
ruling class rather than any moral sentiment. Not so much a 'leap in the dark,63 
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as a controlled experiment to observe the behaviour of a sample of the working 
class.64 Once the experiment proved 'successful' in that the extension of the 
franchise did not prove to be the end of bourgeois civilisation, further experiments 
became possible. 
The further extension III 1884 proved the success of the 'slow change to 
preserve' approach. A further 1,762,000 voters were allowed, but this still left 
approximately 40% of adult males without the vote. Indeed by 1910 of the 12 
million adult males only 7- million had the vote. (Not forgetting that of these many 
had the plural vote - all of whom would by definition be of the middle class). 65 
It is partly for these reasons that the Act of 1918 must be considered the more 
important of the Acts. Until 1918 the vote was still a privilege rather than a right. 
The Act of 1918 conceded the principle that each adult male should have ( at least) 
one vote, as of right by virtue of being a citizen; at the same time it began the 
process whereby women entered into the sphere of political life. The very title 
distinguishes it from 1884, 1867 and 1832 in more than just name. The notion of 
a 'Reform' Act (whether 'great' or not) relies heavily upon the assumption that the 
Act is a continuation, with alterations, of what has gone before. The Act of 1918, 
with its announcement of the 'Representation of the People' registers the enormity 
of the change. 1918 was not to signal yet another reform; rather it was to signal the 
recognition of the existence of a 'people' that had a right to be represented. It was 
this Act that signalled the finalisation of the incorporation of the working class as 
a collection of individual political subjects into political life, with a right to a say 
in who governed them. War as much as the development of a newer liberalism was 
the cause. The introduction of conscription in the Military Service Act of 1916 
along with the increased employment of women meant that the extension of the 
franchise in 1918 was only to be expected. 66 
One of the reasons for thinking of 'the people' as a homogenous group to be 
represented is that it enables the concept of society to be evacuated of any notion 
of class, and instead thought through the idea of 'nation' or 'community'. Whilst 
classes may have been considered as constituting 'two nations', this was only a 
temporary period in the transition to 'one nation', a people or 'community' with 
common cause. The idea of the nation or community further operates to contain 
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working class action, conceived as selfishness by a particular group against the 
whole. Moreover, in being evacuated of class the idea of community jettisons any 
idea of agency: the community becomes a passive object, a collection of numbers 
unable to articulate any collective demands. The extension of the franchise, then, 
constitutes the attempt to declassify (in the sense of de-class-ifying) the system, in 
order to reconstruct the working class as part of an 'electorate', a collection of 
individuals; the decomposition of the working class and its recomposition as a 
collection of individual citizens, held together as an imagined community. Yet an 
imagined community is also an administered one: individuals can be reclassified 
through the process of administration - 'unemployed/employed' being just one 
example, the census as a whole illustrating the tendency in general. Indeed, 
whereas in the earlier part of the century 'classification' meant ordering 
information in taxonomies, by the end of the nineteenth century it had come to 
mean knowledge placed under the jurisdiction of the state. 67 
Whilst previous reforms of the franchise left it integrally linked with the actual 
possession of property - one writer was to note in 1866 that 'a man who has earned 
a competence, who is able to live without depending on the bounty of others, has 
given a test of his manhood' 68 - it was only 1918 that changed that, for it is only 
in 1918 that the vote was not attached to property. 69 For this reason it is not 
surprising that 1918 is held to be the crucial date for the transformation of Britain 
into a modern democratic state. 70 However, this does not mean that property was 
no longer relevant to the issue. Whilst it is true that from 1918 wage-labourers 
(male, over 21) could vote regardless of the actual property in their possession, this 
does not mean that the issue of property was no longer central. For although actual 
ownership of property was no longer necessary, what was still necessary was that 
the individual voter appear as a potential owner of property; if nothing else, the 
voter had the property of his/her labour power. The entrance of the working class 
into the sphere of right is a function of the constitution of the human being as a 
legal subject who has the potential to enter into legal contracts. At the heart of the 
contractual relationship lies property. 
The issue of rights is therefore justifiably central to accounts of citizenship. In 
T .H. Marshall's three 'stages' of citizenship - civil, political and social - it is the 
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type of rights that are associated with each stage that are important. The first was 
concerned with the emergence of certain civil rights in the eighteenth century, such 
as the right to work in different fields; the second sees the development of political 
rights, such as the right to vote, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; the 
last traces the emergence of social rights, said to occur with the growth of welfare 
systems in the late-nineteenth and then the twentieth centuries. 71 
One of the positive features of Marshall's account is that he emphasises the 
struggles that took place over the emergence of citizenship rights, to which class 
is central; he states categorically that, especially in the twentieth century, 
'citizenship and the class system have been at war'.72 But, despite Marshall's 
apparent emphasis on class and struggle, his account is problematic in a number 
of ways. First, as commentators have pointed out, Marshall's 'struggle' is not so 
much between classes as between opposing principles. For Marshall it is the 
principle of the market and the principle of citizenship that are in opposition. Or, 
to put it another way, the inequality of market society seems to contradict the 
equality registered by citizenship (in its 'social' phase).73 Marshall is not 
concerned with class conflict so much as principles that appear to conflict. As such 
the conceptualisation of it as 'struggle' seems a little out of place. Indeed in 
Marshall's account classes are often not in conflict or struggle at all - witness his 
suggestion that 'the familiar instruments of modern democracy were fashioned by 
the upper classes and then handed down, step by step, to the lower'. 74 Even the 
suggestion that the principles are in contradiction rather than struggle 75 seems too 
concerned with sustaining the essence of Marshall's position that there is a 
fundamental opposition involved. For whilst the formal equality of rights and the 
inequality of the market system may appear to be in 'contradiction', the latter is in 
fact premised on the former. The formal equality provided by modern citizenship, 
through law, is necessary for maintenance of the class system, and is a product of 
the constitutive power of the state. To fashion a modern labour force and impose 
the understanding that labour power has to be sold as a commodity the state had 
to constitute human beings as legal subjects, such that they could be identified as 
a population, a collection of equivalent individuals. The formal equality of legal 
and political rights was therefore a condition for the consolidation of capitalism in 
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modern Britain. This much Marshall notes himself: 'these [early] rights did not 
conflict with the inequalities of capitalist society; they were, on the contrary, 
necessary to the maintenance of that particular form of inequality' . 76 For Marshall 
it is social rights that conflict with capitalism, for they appear to grant rights 
against the economic inequalities. In other words, the welfare system contradicts 
the idea of the market, for it appears to create 'a universal right to real income 
which is not proportionate to the market value of the claimant'. In other words, 
social rights 'assume the guise of action modifying the whole pattern of 
inequality'.77 We shall return to the problems with this below. 
A second reason why Marshall's account is problematic is that he is forced to 
fit everything into the framework of civil, political and social rights. This creates 
problems when collective legal subjects such as trade unions are considered, for 
these are regarded as creating a secondary system of 'industrial citizenship', part 
of civil rights in general. Civil rights are said to have developed in the eighteenth 
century, but even the long eighteenth century - from the Revolution to 183278 -
fails to stretch far enough to incorporate the development of trade union 'rights' 
which only arrive in the period 1871-1906. More substantively, Giddens argues 
that the civil rights of individual freedom and equality before the law were fought 
for and won by the bourgeois class, enabling the development of formally free 
wage labour. This was also why civil rights are administered through the law in the 
courts. By comparison trade union 'rights' were the product of sustained working 
class struggle. Whilst the claim that individual freedom and equality before the law 
were only fought for by the bourgeois class is a dubious one, Giddens is right to 
criticise Marshall for misleadingly linking industrial rights with civil rights. 79 
However, Giddens overlooks the reason why Marshall discusses trade unions in this 
way, namely because he is treating them as legal subjects which, when engaging 
in collective bargaining, form contracts. The reason he considers them in this way 
is because he has accepted the argument, common in the nineteenth century, that 
the essence of the transition from 'pre-modern' to 'modern' society is the transition 
from status to contract. 80 
The third reason Marshall's account is flawed is that it is an account from which 
the state and, relatedly, modern administration, are conspicuous by their absence. 
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The conflict between principles certainly needs no state to work itself through, and 
even in his discussion of class struggle and the development of citizenship Marshall 
makes no sustained analysis of the state. By 1918 the individual legal subject, 
bearer of civil, political and social rights has been almost fully consolidated, but 
there is very little mention of the central agency of this constitution. Likewise even 
where discussing the constitution of trades unions as collective working class 
organisations Marshall does not, contrary to Giddens' suggestions otherwise, 
overplay the role of the state. 81 Rather, the significance of the state in this process 
is barely brought out by Marshall - he presents the development of trade unionism 
as merely an extension of civil rights, without addressing the administrative 
mechanisms and the consequent developments in administrative and public law that 
this involved. As will be shown below, this process is fundamental to the 
development of both trade unions and the state. Thus Marshall's recognition of the 
historical dimension to the development of citizenship, and even his recognition of 
class struggle, are offset by his decision to ignore the central agency in the 
constitution of the modern citizen, the state. 
Marshall's account of citizenship is ultimately hampered because by focusing on 
rights his concern remains with the legal; he therefore fails to develop any account 
of political administration, especially one used in conjunction with the state-civil 
society distinction. 
Casework, Unemployment, Insurance: English Working Citizens and Their 
Families 
As a form of mediation by the state between capital and labour, the means by 
which working class struggle became subsumed under a political form, political 
administration was only consolidated in Britain after the 1870s. For in this period 
it could be used to consolidate the incorporation of individual (working class) 
citizens into civil society and the state. From the 1870s concern with the workings 
of the Poor Law grew, and attempts to 'improve' it involved various changes to 
its administration, both inside and outside the workhouse, culminating, in this 
period, in the 1911 National Insurance Act, which was to lay the foundations for 
twentieth century state administration of welfare and through this the administration 
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of the working class. Simultaneously the workhouse underwent a change in the way 
it was perceived, as did the sections of the population for whom it is considered 
appropriate. 
The 1870s were characterised initially by an attack on outdoor relief. What has 
been called a 'crusade' against out-relief82 appears to have been a short term 
success in that the number of outdoor paupers fell by 33%, a decrease which was 
not compensated by an increase in indoor numbers, which also fell by 11 %. 83 As 
its focus was on any form of relief that threatened industriousness the crusade 
against out-relief was an attempt at dispauperisation. For the most part this 
manifested itself once again in a concern for the able-bodied pauper. Thus the 
Local Government Board, responsible for the Poor Law from 1871, found that 
some individuals regarded conditions within the workhouse more 'eligible' than 
those outside. The Board assumed this was due to the 'softness' of the conditions 
inside the workhouse. To remedy this an 'able-bodied test workhouse' at Poplar 
was established. It was supposed to be a greater deterrent due to its discipline and 
diet, which all able-bodied paupers in London had to undergo. 84 The concern that 
the provision of relief would somehow lead to demoralisation extended to other 
areas too. The London School Board was criticised by the Charity Organisation 
Society (The Society for Organising Charitable Relief and Repressing Mendicity, 
hereafter the C.O.S.) for providing boots in order that the poorest children could 
attend school. The suggestion was that if this was extended then parents would 
neglect to send their children to school in order to get the boots. 85 Likewise the 
e.O.S. regarded school meals as a form of relief to the parents, which in turn 
would encourage them to evade their responsibilities. 86 
Formed in 1869, the C.O.S. did not intend to give charity, but to organise the 
giving of charity through the co-ordination of the numerous charitable societies and 
their relations with Poor Law authorities. Membership of the C.O.S. represented a 
virtual cross-section of the more established professions. 87 This was because the 
society itself was the product of the fears of the middle and upper classes in the 
1860s that pauperism was on the increase and the gap between the classes was 
increasing. In this sense the C.O.S was a response to the problem of two 
nations. 88 
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The most notable innovation that the C.O.S. introduced was the case paper, an 
attempt at systematically investigating every individual applicant for relief. Whilst 
this was intended to enable the discrimination between deserving and undeserving 
poor89 it also laid the foundations for one of the central principles of modem 
administration - the individual subject (or family member) as an object of 
administration. The C.O.S. assumed that the only way to establish whether an 
applicant was indeed a deserving case was to have a complete knowledge of his/her 
background. This would deter both 'clever' paupers who sought to attain as much 
relief as possible, and those who could not provide proof of their status or who 
wished to avoid the humbling experience of having to do SO.90 To this end the 
e.O.S. developed the professional enquiry into the status, culture, behaviour and 
lifestyle of each individual applicant and their families. Personal contact was made 
and individuals could be visited at home, information gathered and a file created 
with details of the individual's circumstances. Whilst the initial purpose of this task 
was to decide who was an appropriate candidate for relief, the outcome was the 
development of knowledge of the individual. In tum this allowed the growth of 
forms of classification of, if not the population or the working-class, at least those 
who came forward for relief. By 1886 C.O.S. caseworkers in London were 
handling 25,000 cases a year. 
In the development of the case paper it could appear that the activities of the 
C.O.S. constitute part of the 'modern' power/knowledge network, the emergence 
of the surveillance, administration and policing of categories of people within the 
social body, and the performance of such tasks by 'unpolitical' professionals. 
Foucault writes that the 'case constitutes an object for a branch of knowledge and 
a hold for a branch of power' .91 For Donzelot such a 'social inquiry' is designed 
to produce investigatory, classificatory and interpretive knowledge which can then 
be used to provide the basis for the administration of what are regarded as the 
needs of the object of administration. In this way the social inquiry is situated at 
the meeting point of assistance and repression. In relation to the granting of charity 
the purpose of examinations that produce such casework was to make the granting 
of assistance conditional on the satisfactory outcome of the investigation of 
needs.92 Continuing this F oucauldian reading, Procacci suggests that as the 
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forerunner of the social worker the visitor of the poor is the 'instrument of the 
capillary distribution of household relief, whilst Squires claims that the 
development of casework indicates an adaptation of' older interrogatory disciplines 
to new settings' in which caseworkers were to extract a 'confession' from the poor. 
In this way casework becomes an ongoing social relation in which there is 
continual superVISIOn, observation and treatment aImmg at . character 
transformation'. Casework is thus read as helping to construct a new normative 
discourse concerning supervisory practices and surveillance. 93 Moreover, the 
central concern of the C.O.S. was family obligations, and the man as wage-earner, 
enabling it to be read as part of Donzelot's 'tutelary complex', social management 
through families. 
However, there are problems with such an analysis, concerning both the origins 
and the outcomes of the C.O.S. and its casework. We shall examine these before 
turning to the question of the family. 
In terms of its origins, there is no doubt that the C.O.S. contained an 
individualistic approach to morality and poverty. Yet it also contained a distinctly 
'statist' approach, rooted in the background of its prime movers in British Idealism. 
It is notable that in concentrating on its individualism, and the consequent 
normalising tendencies, much of the literature on the C.O.S. fails to do justice to 
this aspect of its workings.94 It is true that for those behind the C.O.S., such as 
Bernard Bosanquet and, most notably, the organisations founder and Secretary 
C.S. Loch, charity was considered a product of individual demoralisation, the very 
thing that (individualised) casework would seek to remedy. Yet the C.O.S. also 
worked on the principle that charity was a central feature of civilised life, 
overcommg the problems generated by individualism by linking the individual 
through a series of communal structures and, ultimately, to the state. By ignoring 
this latter aspect the C.O.S. can be read as just another organisation of 
individualistic slant. This fails to register the differences between the 
'individualism' found within the writings of Bosanquet and Loch and that found 
in other liberal thinkers. Bosanquet, for example. distinguishes between the atomic 
and ethical (higher) individualism. The former, found in Bentham, Mill and 
Spencer, is a one-sided understanding; the latter goes beyond mere physical 
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separateness to the ethical individual as the foundation of social life, via the linking 
of the individual to the general will. The individual's real will would correspond 
to the will of the state. As such state action was justified when it corresponded to 
the development of individual consciousness. 95 In other words, the simple 
dichotomy 'individualist' vs. 'statist' tends to force the C.O.S. into the former 
category, then further reduces it to the kind of individualism found in much 
late-nineteenth century thought; this then allows a reading of its activities as part 
of the normalising tendencies of disciplinary welfare. All of which fails to do 
justice to the centrality of the state in its thought and practice. 
In terms of its outcomes, whilst the initial impetus behind casework may have 
been from the C.O.S., a non-state body, this was only true for as long as no 
dramatic changes were needed to the runmng of the Poor Law and the 
administration of poverty. As soon as the system itself came under threat and 
changes were needed, casework developed into a form of state administration. Thus 
the early 1900s witnessed a shift in the administration of outdoor relief which was 
to be based on knowledge of paupers. The 1910 circular concerning 'The 
Administration of Out-Relief required that 
guardians should endeavour to acquire a complete knowledge of the 
circumstances and needs of the applicants and should inform themselves, by 
every means in their power, of the resources of the applicant. 96 
In the early 1900s, then, the strategy was to develop a knowledge of paupers III 
order for good administration to be achieved. This strategy was heightened by the 
1911 'Relief Regulation Order' establishing a new legally binding framework 
obliging guardians to acquire a level of knowledge of paupers necessary for the 
operation of outdoor relief. The 1911 Order obliged Poor Law authorities to 
develop case papers of all claimants. This was to contain information concerning 
the claimant but, most significantly, was to contain successive entries so that an 
historical knowledge of the individual could be developed. 97 Through these 
developments a systematic knowledge of the individual claimants could be 
developed; the pauper thus becomes a 'case' for treatment. But this knowledge 
upon which the administration is based occurs within the state. It is a state 
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knowledge which both facilitates and yet is premised upon state administration. 
This will become even more apparent with the development of National Insurance. 
considered below. 
The reasons for this are that by the mid-1880s the crisis-ridden character of 
capitalism was again being revealed, most notably in the occurrence of direct 
working class action. Given that it had been intended to solve such crises, at least 
indirectly, the New Poor Law again became the focus of attention. For this the 
C.O.S. simply did not have the means of response, and it took major developments 
of the British state to respond in order to avoid the feared revolution. 
The idea that the C.O.S. also represents part of the shift to a tutelary complex 
is also highly questionable. It is true that concern with 'the family' grew in this 
period, but the meaning of this needs to be made clear. The New Poor Law had no 
respect for families as such, breaking them apart when the male wage-earner failed 
to support the family, and separating men, women and children in the workhouse. 
The fact that this was possibly the most disliked aspect of the New Poor Law 
should not be taken as a working class desire for 'the family'. The later concern 
with 'the family' - keeping it together, maintaining 'order' within it, regulating it 
according to the standards laid down by external agencies - was part of the wider 
search for an alternative to the workhouse as a means of (re )fashioning the labour 
force. The family was constituted as part of the project of reinvigorating the 
flagging capitalist economy. The 'individualism' that appears to have become so 
central to bourgeois thought in the nineteenth century is, as Barrett and McIntosh 
point out, a form of 'familism'; 'self-sufficiency' in practice turns into the idea of 
self-supporting families, the family as the unit to be maintained and rendered 
'self-supporting'.98 Given its central role in the political and moral economy of 
bourgeois thought, the family became one of the pivotal points around which 
administration could operate. For this to happen 'family' had to be shorn of its 
earlier meanings, namely as indicating a household, including 'non-kin inmates, 
sojourners, boarders or lodgers .. .indentured apprentices and resident servants, 
employed either for domestic work about the house or as an additional resident 
labour force for the fields or the shop', 99 and rethought as an isolated economic 
unit. In this sense, if one is to talk of individualism as familism. then one could say 
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that the family became atomised. In effect 'the family' means 'the bourgeois 
family' ,100 the working class family being constituted as such as part of the 
development of class and state power. Donzelot is right to suggest that \ve think 
of government through rather than of the family, but this makes sense only if one 
does so in conjunction with the idea of class and state as agencies of this 
government through the family. The state, in Poulantzas' words, 'traces and assigns 
the site of the family' .101 The family becomes a unit of political administration. 
constituted as such by the state as part of its development of mechanisms for the 
policing of welfare and struggle. Now, this undoubtedly smacks of the Marxist 
functionalism Donzelot disdains, prompting him to ask why the working class itself 
chooses to invest in family life. 102 The answer is that the link between 
individualism and 'familism' is also the link between 'privacy' and the family. As 
a pivotal point around which administration operates, the family was also 
constituted as the realm of privacy. Eli Zaretsky writes that 
proletarianization gave rise to subjectivity. The family became the major 
sphere of society in which the individual could be foremost - it was the 
only space that proletarians "owned". Within it, a new sphere of social 
activity began to take shape: personal life ... The proletariat itself came to 
share the bourgeois ideal of the family as a "utopian retreat" .103 
It is not so much that the working class 'chose' 'the family', as that it was given 
the atomised family by the state as one of the grounds of struggle. 
Whilst it has been argued that an account of the emergence of the New Poor 
Law in 1834 resting on working class agitation cannot be sustained, such an 
account is possible for developments from the 1880s onwards, for it is in this 
period that bourgeois fears of a revolution were justified. The outcome was a 
concern over the working class condition and the failings of the Poor Law. The 
depression that ran through the 1870s and 1880s signalled that the growth of 
industrial capitalism had brought with it a growth in poverty too. It became clear 
that both 'progress' and poverty were possible at the same time. The dramatic 
increase in unemployment in 1885-86 intensified the process of class struggle, 
culminating in the riot in Trafalgar Square on February 8 1886. The violence of the 
riot was significant not only because London had not experienced anything like it 
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and that it took place in the heart of property and government, but also because it 
signified a perception of property and government that was new, one considered 
as indicating a complete lack of respect for the forces of law and order. 10-1 
Stedman Jones is right to note that the significance of the riot lies not in the actual 
events themselves, but in the response to it,105 which was that Joseph 
Chamberlain, President of the Local Government Board, the next day issued a 
circular encouraging local authorities to undertake public works as a means of 
relieving unemployment. The circular specified that the work provided should not 
carry the stigma of pauperism; that the unskilled should be able to perform it; that 
it should not compete with existing employment; and that the pay should be 
slightly less than that given for comparable private employment. Reissued in 1887, 
1891, 1892, 1893, and 1895 (though in 1895 the last point was dropped),106 the 
circular was the first recognition that there were categories of people for whom the 
existing Poor Law was not appropriate: workers. It signalled an acceptance that 
unemployment was a social rather then an individual problem, and meant that for 
the first time the state took responsibility for welfare outside of the Poor Law. l07 
The Chamberlain circular was the first recognition that the central element of 
social policy - the Poor Law - was in fact woefully inadequate for the central social 
concern - unemployment. It became clear that unemployment was not a product of 
individual demoralisation but a feature of much of the work in industrial capitalism, 
which took the form of casual work interspersed with periods of unemployment. 
The by now apparent cycles of capitalist growth also pointed to the existence of 
periods in which unemployment was unavoidable for many. In this sense the 
fundamental social problem came to be not pauperism, nor a whole range of other 
policy issues such as housing, sanitation, health and so on, but unemployment. 
Moreover behind the issue of unemployment lay the greater issue of poverty, for 
it was precisely because of the absolute poverty of the working class that 
unemployment was an issue. 
The comment by the economist Alfred Marshall that 'the problem of 1834 was 
the problem of pauperism, the problem of 1893 is the problem of poverty' 108 is 
instructive here. For, given that poverty is necessary for capitalism. the problem of 
poverty becomes the problem of capitalism, or, to put it another way. the status of 
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the working class. The shift in the late nineteenth century to a concern with poverty 
rather than pauperism therefore signals a shift towards the administrative 
recognition of the working class. It is significant that this is done through 
unemployment. It is unsurprising that the period which sees the emergence of 
• unemployment' as an object of discourse, the 1880s, is the period in which it 
becomes a category of state administration. The first global reference to employed 
manual workers appeared in official documents in 1887; prior to this all the trades 
of the workers were simply listed. Unemployment as an administrative category 
emerged through the work of political economists such as Marshall to finally take 
on widespread use and acceptance by 1895. 109 The point is that with the 
emergence of unemployment as a category of state administration the whole 
population can be regarded as existing on a plane of equivalence. On this plane 
each individual can be treated equally, as opposed to one of a series of groups, and 
thus becomes an individual object of administration. 1 10 
The response by the British state to the problem of unemployment was, firstly, 
the development of labour exchanges, and, secondly, the development of national 
insurance, culminating in the 1909 Labour Exchanges Act and the 1911 National 
Insurance Act respectively. The first of these shall be dealt with briefly. 
The 1909 Act was partly the product of the 1909 Royal Commission on the Poor 
Law, and partly the product of Beveridge's criticisms of the 1905 Unemployed 
Workmen Act. Both the majority and minority reports of the commission favoured 
the introduction of labour exchanges. Likewise Beveridge argued that the 1905 Act, 
designed to offer relief works for the unemployed along the lines recommended by 
Chamberlain, failed to tackle the problems of the labour market. What was needed, 
argued Beveridge, was not the provision of work, even relief work, but the rational 
organisation of the labour market by the state in order to ensure the mobility of 
labour. Thus the Act dealt with the issue of unemployment through the 
introduction of labour exchanges at which the unemployed could register in order 
to offer themselves for work outside of the locality. In this sense the 1909 Act did 
not create a single job, was not intended to do so, but sought to fashion a mobile 
labour force. III 
But the Act was also intended to be part of the wider package \vhich included 
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the introduction of national insurance, a point reiterated by Winston Churchill in 
his introduction of the Bill into the Commons. Far from universal - universal 
insurance would only come after the Second World War - the insurance scheme in 
1911 was intended to cover only temporary and predictable unemployment. This 
meant it would apply only to trades in which there existed cyclical unemployment. 
It therefore excluded trades which contained large amounts of casual labour, trades 
which were in decline, trades in which large numbers of women worked and trades 
which had a tendency to put workers on short time rather than lay them off. The 
other major feature of the scheme was that it would have to be contributory, 
requiring contributions from worker, employer and the state. 
The actual level of these contributions need not concern us here. 112 Nor need 
the fact that the insurance was not universal be an issue. What is of significance 
is the nature of the scheme in terms of the relationship it established between 
worker, employer and state. For what social insurance does is consolidate a specific 
relationship between worker, employer and state. By contributions being made by 
both employee and employer their relationship is locked; and it is locked through 
the mediation provided by the state. Thus the contribution from the state as the 
third force conjoins with the other two to produce a locked triad. Considered in 
more general terms the tripartite relationship can be recognised as a relationship 
between labour and capital mediated by the state. The state acts as a wedge 
between capital and labour, simultaneously pulling them together and holding them 
apart. It does this through political administrative forms such as social insurance. 
This brings the individual into a concrete relationship with the state, consolidating 
the individual as an object of administration through the formal recognition of 
needs. Even future needs are formally recognised by the state. In this way the 
establishment of labour exchanges can be read as at least a partial guarantee that 
the labour market would be regulated to the utmost degree in order that 
unemployment, and therefore state benefit payments, be kept to a minimum. 
Furthermore this development of political administration was due not only to the 
recognition of individual needs but to the recognition of the working class acting 
as a class 'for itself. The concern over the threat of insurrection, noted above, 
needs further comment. It seems quite clear that leading politicians at the time 
came to recognise that something had to be done to avert the threat of poverty. To 
this end they recognised the importance of social insurance. Churchill was to claim 
that insurance would 
increase the stability of our institutions by gIvmg the mass of industrial 
workers a direct interest in maintaining them. With a 'stake in the country' 
in the form of insurance against evil these days workers will pay no 
attention to the vague promises of revolutionary socialism .. .I t will make him 
a better citizen, a more efficient worker, and a happier man. l13 
And Balfour was to argue that' Social legislation .. .is not merely to be distinguished 
from Socialist legislation but it is its most direct opposite and its most effective 
antidote'.114 Moreover, leading political figures recognised that the example of 
Bismarckian legislation in Germany afforded a useful example of how the socialist 
movement could be cut off by the introduction of social insurance policies. 
Churchill was adamant that major advances for both state and party could be made 
if they were to 'thrust a big slice of Bismarckianism over the whole underside of 
our industrial system'. 115 The state even sponsored trips to Germany for trade 
unionists to examine the workings of Bismark's policies. 116 Finally major 
political economists such as Marshall were coming to recommend the adoption of 
some sort of schemes as used in Germany.117 
The development of new political forms within the state can therefore be seen 
quite clearly as a response to the collective power of social labour and the crisis 
ridden character of capitalism. Recognising the power of the working class, the 
state assumes a position as the wedge between needs and capacities, but does so 
through a series of administrative forms. The development of national insurance, 
as one element of the response to the threat of the working class, signalled the 
formal recognition of need by the state, a process which consolidates the separation 
of the needs and capacities of the working class and yet at the same time locks it 
in a relationship with capital and the state. In return the working class is granted 
increased political rights: individual rights of citizenship, such as the right to vote, 
and collective rights through the legal immunities granted to trade unions 
(discussed below). 
Some commentators have suggested that just as in Germany. the introduction of 
social legislation in England was a response to the increased political 'power~ or 
'pressure~ of the working class. However, it is important to specify precisely what 
is meant by this term. It is argued here that the power of the working class was 
recognised at the time as the threat of socialism; the power was the power to use 
force in order to effect revolutionary change in the social order. On the other hand~ 
certain commentators have considered the power of the working class in this period 
solely in terms of electoral power. Whilst these are not exclusive, assuming only 
the latter has allowed commentators to regard the introduction of social legislation 
as a necessary corollary of the extension of the franchise to some sections of the 
working class. Marshall's three phases of citizenship rights rests heavily on what 
he considers to be 'popular demand~. Likewise Sydney Webb assumes that 
'collectivism is the economic obverse of democracy~, that is, given the vote the 
working class will want to use it not only to vote for politicians, but also to obtain 
some sort of economic democracy. 118 Webb assumes that the working class will 
use~ and did use, its power to demand the kind of reforms introduced in the 
1906-11 period. In other words, social legislation was a response not so much to 
the revolutionary threat of socialism, but to working class demands for social 
legislation. In similar fashion some Marxists have argued that social unrest 
constituted a 'popular demand~ for such legislation. 119 There are a number of 
problems with such claims. Navarro, for example, points to the strike activity 
during and after 1890-93 as the prime example of such unrest~ but fails to show 
any direct link between this and the legislation of some 15 years later. Similarly~ 
if social reform was so popular then it should have been a major election issue, 
increasing in importance with the gradual extension of the franchise. Y et~ as J.R. 
Hay has shown, this was not the case. 120 The 1886 election was fought mainly 
on the Irish question, and in the elections of 1892~ 1895 and 1900 social reform 
was in no way a significant element on the agenda. Even in the 1906 election the 
principle issues were Tariff Reform, indentured Chinese labour and the Education 
Act of 1902. Indeed, because of the opposition by the Lords to the 1909 budget the 
two elections of 191 O~ in the midst of the liberal welfare reforms, were also for the 
most part not concerned with social reform. 121 Moreover the time-lag between the 
extension of the franchise in 1867 and 1884 and the introduction of reforms in 
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1906-11 would also need explaining. 
In fact, it can be argued that such reforms were introduced against the wishes 
of the working class, and that the working class struggled against its incorporation 
through such mechanisms. Henry Pelling, for example, questions whether pressure 
from below, in the form of electoral pressure, was the main force behind the 
growing welfare legislation. He argues that the 'extension of the power of the state 
at the beginning of this century ... was by no means welcomed by members of the 
working class, was indeed undertaken over the critical hostility of many of them, 
perhaps most of them' .122 The gradual introduction of state education from 1870 
to 1880, for example, was met with either indifference or dislike by the working 
class, as was registered by the Royal Commission on the Elementary Education 
Acts 1888. This can only partly be accounted for by the loss of earnings that a 
working class family may suffer were a child to be placed in school. Pelling 
suggests it is far more likely due to a perception of the state as an organisation run 
by and for the benefit of the wealthy. Given working class distrust of the state and 
the absence of welfare reform as an election issue Pelling argues, first, that the 
legislation on welfare of the period was for the most part sponsored by middle 
class reformers, for a mixture of humanitarian reasons and because they believed 
it would be electorally popular and, second, that there is no evidence that social 
reform was in fact popular with the electorate until after it had been carried 
out. 123 
It is true to say, however, that voting at elections is always determined by a 
number of factors, not all of which are knowable to the historian, but support for 
Pelling's argument can be marshalled from elsewhere. The largest organisations 
which had an exclusively working class membership were the Friendly Societies 
which, with a total membership of approximately 5.6 million members in 1900, 
provided insurance against sickness and old age. They can be regarded as a form 
of working class collective provision and solidarity in the face of poverty and 
against the Poor Law. The two largest friendly societies, the Manchester Unity of 
Oddfellows (713,000 members in 1899) and the Ancient Order of Foresters 
(666,000 members in 1899), were both opposed to increased state intervention, the 
former because it thought that self-help was morally and socially preferable to 
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redistributive provision by an overly powerful state, the latter because it regarded 
politicians' proposals as a means of evading demands for higher wages and regular 
work. 124 This did not go unnoticed by the politicians at the time - they recognised 
that the friendly societies were opposed to pensions and national insurance but that 
they could also provide the strongest link between the state and the working class. 
Because of this the politicians sensed the need to negotiate with the societies. 
However, the friendly societies opposed state sponsored pensions and national 
insurance up to their introductions in 1908 and 1911 respectively. Despite long 
negotiations at the end of 1910 the Chancellor was faced with the possibility of 
having to introduce national insurance without the cooperation of the societies. 125 
Even as late as September 1911 the Oddfellows Magazine was arguing that the Act 
was an attempt to deny the working class the right to self government. 
Working men are awakening to the fact that this is a subtle attempt to take 
from the class to which they belong the administration of the great 
voluntary organizations which they have built up for themselves, and to 
hand over the future control to the paid servants of the governing class. 126 
Given this, it could be argued that there was substantial working class opposition 
to the introduction of the welfare reforms in the period 1906-11. In this sense one 
might argue that despite struggling for social recognition, the working class resisted 
its incorporation into the state. As the boundaries between state and society shifted, 
with the concern for social order and thus the administration of the working class 
at the core of the shift, the working class was not a passive object of change but 
an active subject struggling against its incorporation into the state. Nonetheless, the 
very fact of its struggle helped forge the apparatus of administration that was then 
used against it. 
The Constitution of Collective Legal Subjects: Trade Unions and the State 
Marxists have noted the apparent limitations of trade unions and their acceptance 
of the status quo, as well as the unions role in constricting working class activity. 
For example Miliband describes them as 'agencies of containment of struggle' and 
'allies in the management of class conflict', as do most of the contributions in the 
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collection of essays Trade Unions Under Capitalism. But the explanatory 
conceptual apparatus these writers use is often highly problematical. There is a 
tendency to rely on concepts such as the 'labour aristocracy', the limitations of 
'trade union consciousness', the inadequacies of the Labour Party or political 
organisation generally, even Michels elite theory.127 There is a continual sense 
that the unions have somehow 'failed', sometimes linked with the perceived 
passivity or supine character of the working class found in the Anderson-Nairn 
thesis. But what such accounts fail to address is the far deeper ways in which 
unions are creatures of the state. 
The 1824 repeal of the Combination Acts - which had rendered it illegal for 
workers to collectively organise in order to raise wages or shorten hours and held 
any such organisation as unlawful with regard to the common law of conspiracy 
- saw the formation of trade unions, followed, in 1825, by the restriction of their 
activity to regulation of wages and hours of work. One of the major limitations on 
trade union activity in this period was precisely the importance of the individual 
and the contract, especially important given that unions were concerned with trade, 
the realm of freedom of contractual arrangements. This militated against the 
development of collective bargaining for, as collective action, it was by definition 
coercive; even some union leaders, such as Francis Place and Joseph Hume, felt it 
to be wrong. 128 
Such a conception remained commonplace from 1832 to 1871, despite the 
plethora of Acts concerning factory legislation, mines and administrative regulation 
generally. Thus in Hornby v. Close (1866-67) it was successfully argued that a 
trade union was an illegal body 'in restraint of trade, and depriving the workman 
of the free exercise of his own will'. 129 The break with such conceptions began 
in 1871 with the Trade Union Act. The Royal Commission on Labour of 1867 had 
proposed three principles as the basis for legislation: that no act committed by a 
workman be illegal unless it would be illegal if committed by another person; that 
no act committed by a combination of workmen be illegal unless it would be illegal 
if committed by a single individual; and that trade union funds be given statutory 
protection. As the Act of 1871 this had the effect of decriminalising acts that \\ere 
in restraint of trade. Yet at the very same time the Criminal Law Amendment Act 
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(1871) rendered any act of violence or molestation, or threats uttered, in the course 
of an industrial dispute an offence. Thus even peaceful picketing was illegal, the 
Act restating the importance of free contract and individual liberty. The repeal of 
this Act by the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act (1875) freed the unions 
from the threat of prosecution for criminal conspiracy and legalised peaceful 
picketing. Nonetheless whilst the unions may have been freed from the law of 
criminal conspiracy, the courts began to use the law of civil conspiracy, especially 
after the dock strike of 1889 when unskilled and transport workers became 
increasingly unionised, a clear example of the courts operating in defence of what 
they conceived of as the holy doctrines of the freedom of contract and the rule of 
law, and their resistance to administration. In response to Parliament declaring the 
activities of trade unions no longer criminal the courts developed the tort of 
conspiracy. 130 In a series of cases between 1893 and 1905 men involved in strike 
action were held liable for civil conspiracy, or for inducing others to break their 
contracts. The most famous case was the Taff Vale decision of 1901, in which a 
registered union was liable to pay damages from its funds for torts committed by 
those acting on its behalf. Following this the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 did for 
the law of civil conspiracy what the Act of 1875 had done for the law of criminal 
conspiracy. 131 
The years 1871 to 1906 then, saw the development of the freedom to strike. So 
long as the 'golden formula' of acting in 'furtherance of a trade dispute' was 
followed, the unions had legal immunity. Through the right to strike the state 
recognised the working class as a collective entity. This was a clear recognition 
of the power of the working class, which the state sought to steer into vehicles 
constituted to administer that power. Just as individual citizens were constituted as 
such by the state and incorporated into it through legal and administrative 
mechanisms, so were collective subjects. The freedom to strike represented the 
recognition by the state of the collective force of the working class and the 
transformation of this force into the legal category of right. The right to strike 
represented the recognition of the formal freedom of the collective worker. In other 
words trade unions were constituted by the state as the legal subjectivity of the , 
working class. 
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One of the significant features of these developments is that they occurred so 
soon after the defeat of Chartism by the state in 1848. As the most significant 
working class movement after 1832, the threat posed by Chartism was a major 
problem for successive British governments. Yet there is a crucial difference 
between Chartism and the trade unions as they were consti tuted after 187l. 
Chartism was an explicitly political programme. Its six point plan for a reform of 
suffrage, Parliament and the relationship between property and power would have 
drastically changed the nature of the British state. Nonetheless it was defeated, and 
as we saw its defeat has been read by Anderson and Nairn as the prime example 
of the triumph of a pre-modern, essentially feudal, culture and politics over an 
emergent modern one formed by radical groups and classes. The significance of the 
defeat of Chartism however lies elsewhere, in the fact that it was the last working 
class movement in Britain that was explicitly political. After this the working class 
was pushed into developing an essentially 'economistic' consciousness, exemplified 
by trade unions after 1871. The demise of Chartism and the emergence of trade 
unions are therefore not incompatible. Rather, as Ellen Meiksins Wood writes, 
the demise of radical republicanism betokens a historic shift of working 
class struggle from the state to civil society, as issues and conflicts 
historically rooted in the political sphere were transplanted to the 
economy. 132 
The constitution of trade unions by the state is thus an unintended consequence of 
the defeat of Chartism and indicative of the structuring by the state of the very 
focus of working class action. 
One of the features of Trade Union Act (1871) was the obligation to adopt rules 
for those unions which were registered. Registration, though voluntary, was crucial 
for unions since it carried an important income tax privilege. Moreover, Section 
Four of the Act stated that nothing in the Act shall allow a court to enforce directly 
certain internal union agreements and agreements between unions, thereby ensuring 
that the legal immunities enjoyed by unions since 1871, noted above, also related 
to their internal workings. However, through Section Four the state played a major 
role in developing the internal constitutions of the unions. Thus, in adopting rules 
specified by the state, most unions in the very process of their birth came to have 
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their internal workings and constitutions structured by the state. Contrary to Marxist 
writers who see unions as spontaneous organisations arising, 'naturally,133 from 
the working class, which the state then regulates or co-opts, this view registers the 
constitutive power of the state over the organisations of the working class. To the 
extent that organisations of collective labour are a product of working class 
struggle, their specific form is an outcome of their constitution by the state. Their 
internal workings, the space in which they operate vis a vis other unions, employers 
and the state were structured by the state from the outset. 
It is through this process that trade unions were constituted by the state as one 
of the mechanisms through which the 'labour problem' could be resolved and 
labour regulated. Again a whole series of administrative mechanisms were 
developed to deal with the issue. The formation of the Labour Statistical Bureau 
in 1886, later to become the Labour Department (in 1893), was to collect data 
concerning labour, such as levels of union membership, hours of work and working 
class expenditure. They also had the explicit purposes of validating the stabilising 
and conciliatory role of trade unionism, encouraging the unions' role as provident 
institutions in the community, and to 'erode the illusion' that the purpose of unions 
were to strike. Within the Department the administrators recognised that their role 
was to 'manage' and 'contain' new social problems, and that unions were a major 
tool for this purpose.134 Moreover, once such administrative mechanisms were in 
place it became a natural step to involve trade union leaders in the political 
administration of the working class. The trade union leaders could become a 
section of the range of 'expert's or 'specialists' working within the 
administration. 135 As Hobsbawm writes, 
In the policy of conciliation it seemed as natural to take unionists into the 
civil service ... as to use their statistical services. The National Insurance Act 
of 1912 even made the unions into a part of the administration of health 
insurance as 'approved societies' ... Thence it was only a step to the modern 
techniques of enmeshing labour in a net of advisory and consultative 
bodies... The trade unions are today vital intermediaries between the state 
and the worker. 136 
In this manner the state could subsume an element of civil society \vithin it. the 
organised power of the working class, grant it an administrative function and then. 
turning it against that power, use it to regulate civil society. 
The final feature that emerges from the constitution of trade unions by the state 
is that collective bargaining becomes acceptable, if not the norm. The significance 
of collective bargaining is not just that it recognises the social power of labour, but 
that it facilitates the administrative role of trade unions, a claim that can only be 
fully justified through a fuller consideration of law and administration. 
Law: From Contract to Administration? 
During the nineteenth century the idea that there had been a shift from status to 
contract became common. The classic statement is Henry Maine's Ancient Law 
(1861),137 but with its focus on the central feature of bourgeois law, contract, it 
has an obvious appeal for Marxists. Engels, for example, suggests that 
by changing all things into commodities [capitalism] dissolved all inherited 
and traditional relationships, and in place of time-honoured custom and 
historic right, it set up purchase and sale, 'free' contract. And the English 
jurist, H.S. Maine thought he had made a tremendous discovery when he 
had said that our whole progress in comparison with former epochs 
consisted in the fact that we had passed 'from status to contract', from 
inherited to freely contracted conditions - which in so far as it is correct 
was already in The Communist Manifesto. 138 
It has also been shown to be a key feature of Marshall's work on citizenship. In 
Britain it is closely related to what was a common assumption amongst legal 
theorists that there can be no such thing as administrative law in Britain, and that 
the development of administration is potentially fundamentally at odds with the rule 
of law. Dicey, for example, in his influential work on the constitution suggests that 
the rule of law means that 
there can be with us nothing really corresponding to the' administrative law' 
(droit administratif) or the administrative tribunals (tribunaux administratifs) 
of France. The notion which lies at the bottom of the 'administrative law' 
known to foreign countries is, that affairs or disputes in which the 
government or its servants are concerned are beyond the sphere of the ci\'il 
courts and must be dealt with by special and more or less official bodies. 
This idea is utterly unknown to the law of England, and indeed is 
fundamentally inconsistent with our traditions and customs. 139 
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Yet in many ways contract can be said to have declined in importance in the 
nineteenth century. In his work on the rise and fall of freedom of contract Atiyah 
claims that there was some encroachments on freedom of contract by legislative 
activity by 1870, and after this date they increased considerably.140 As will be 
seen below, some writers have in fact suggested that there was a shift not from 
status to contract but from contract to status. The argument put forward here 
however, will be that if there was a shift it was from contract to administration but 
that, sensitive to the problems such dichotomising leads to, as our critique of 
Foucault drew out, we need to think of administration in conjunction with law, and 
consider them integrated on a continuum. 
The late-nineteenth century saw a decline in the role of contract. Instead of 
relations being governed by contract and Dicey's ' ordinary' courts they become 
increasingly governed by administration and administrative law, part of the 
development of the state. In other words, the development of the state took the 
form of administration, and this necessitated a decline in the role of contract. This 
appeared to pose a threat to the traditional institutions of English law and the rule 
of law. One of the reasons that contract was historically so central, and therefore 
played the role that it did in theory, was that as an explicitly legal relation it could 
be policed by the courts; at the same time the courts would regulate legal relations 
according to the laws laid down by Parliament; and finally accountability lay with 
Parliament 
The argument here is that administration, like law, exists to facilitate the 
constitution of social and political order by the state. This means the regulation, by 
the state, of both individual and collective relations. We shall briefly outline three 
examples of this, which will then allow us to reconsider the idea of 'social rights' 
and the significance of trade unions. 
We have seen how the Poor Law Commissioners sought to work outside of 
Parliamentary control. Because their 'general rules' were subject to Parliamentary 
scrutiny they often issued individual directives to each Poor Law authority. This 
had the effect of overcoming any Parliamentary accountability and/or obstruction. 
This was far from an isolated trend in the nineteenth century. The development of 
legislation regulating factories expanded after 1832. Initially the concern \Vas \vith 
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the safety and conditions for women and children, later focusing on hours of work 
and general safety. Legislation prior to 1832 had been passed - the Act for the 
Preservation of the Health and Morals of Apprentices (1802), for example - but 
such Acts failed because there existed no machinery for enforcing them. Criminal 
sanctions did exist (however small), but their enforcement was highly dependent 
upon the co-operation of the employers, and the local justices of the peace. Where 
the Factory Act of 1833 differed was not in the increasing of criminal penalties but 
in the introduction of centralised administrative initiative. Criminal sanctions were 
relegated to an ancillary role; the primary role was to be taken by administrative 
regulation. 141 
Similarly in the mmes, the perfectly legal 'contractual' relationship between 
worker and employer, and the conditions in which the worker operated were 
considered perfectly acceptable according to the existing legal institutions and 
consistent with the law of contract. The fact that in one three year period over 3000 
lives were lost but no single conviction obtained appears irrelevant. As Arthurs 
notes 
No more dramatic illustration can be found of the moral and institutional 
imperatives that gave force and shape to the growth of administrative law. 
People were being maimed, killed and degraded; the law - the formal legal 
system - had nothing to say about the matter; a new normative system and 
new techniques of enforcement were desperately needed. Only the 
administration could respond to that need. 142 
Our final example comes from the developments of 1906-11, which as we saw 
in the last chapter consolidated the bond between labour, capital and state. With the 
development of administrative mechanisms the judiciary seemed an obvious 
institution to playa role in its operation. However, with their entrenched notions 
concerning freedom of contract and trade, the judges were thoroughly convinced 
that the development of administration was incompatible with the rule of law. In 
the case of the law concerning workmen's compensation for example, the judges 
assumed that because trade and therefore contracts were free, compensation could 
be treated as a contractual issue; the wage was the compensation for becoming sick 
or being injured. But from the 1870s the increasing political importance of the 
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issue culminated in the Employer's Liability Act (1880) limiting the employers' 
right to invoke the defence of common employment, and the \\lorkmen's 
Compensation Act (1897) to provide compensation through insurance and to have 
cases settled by agreement or arbitration. In practice however the arbitration came 
to be undertaken by County Court judges, some even going to the House of Lords. 
The government perceived this as the judiciary frustrating its intentions. We can 
add that it was also due to the judiciary's insistence on the importance of contract 
and their resistance to administration. 143 The outcome was that the developments 
in welfare legislation from 1906-1911 were explicitly framed to place the 
administration of the schemes outside of the courts. The pension schemes of 1908 
were to be administered by County Councils or Borough Councils, with appeals 
going to the Local Government Board, whilst disputes under the 1911 Act were to 
be settled by 'courts' of referees consisting of employers and workmen with 
appeals being heard by the Insurance Commissioner. In other words Dicey's 
'ordinary' courts had been deliberately bypassed in favour of administration, and 
the judiciary were excluded from crucial dimensions of the development of the 
British state. 144 
It is significant of course that the three examples are all concerned with work 
and the means of subsistence. Whilst the contract of employment appears to be the 
most obvious example of private law it is subject to a myriad number of 
mechanisms before, during and after it has been formed. As Karl Renner notes, 
Since the middle of the [nineteenth] century the state is no longer content 
merely to hold the mace and the scales, it begins to take an active part in 
administration. New norms are made year by year in increasing numbers in 
the form of statutes, orders and instructions of the administrators of the 
state. Administrative law develops into a special branch of legal analysis, 
and economic administration soon becomes the most extensive part within 
this branch. Grievances arise out of the application of the law of property 
and the contract of employment to the factory, and therefore administrative 
law must step in. Regulations relating to the normal working day, factory 
inspection, and protection of women and children are institutions of public 
law which increasingly supplement these institutions of private law. 
Insurance against sickness, accident and old age follow suit, public labour 
exchanges replace the private labour market, and so on. I n the end the 
relations of labour are as to nine parts regulated by public law, and the field 
of influence of private law is restricted to the remaining tenth. 145 
The existence and functioning of the wage-labour relation, then, can only make 
sense when thought of through administration and administrative law, which 
develop as a means of policing the working class. One is tempted to say that 
although the working class was entered the sphere of right as citizens, new forms 
of law were needed to regulate them as the class of poverty and labour. 
This also sheds some light on the nature of the problems found in Marshall's 
account of citizenship. By thinking of the third stage as granting social rights to 
citizens Marshall forces his analysis into the framework of (contractual) law. But 
the key feature of this third stage, welfare, is best understood through the interface 
of administration and law being traced here. The provision of benefits in order to 
provide for a certain level of income is best conceptualised not as a right but as a 
need formally recognised by the administration. Unemployment benefit is granted 
not on the basis of citizenship but because the administration is satisfied that 
specific conditions have been fulfilled; that IS, that one is a bona fide 
proletarian. 146 And complaints that the need is not met are adjudicated not in 
courts of law concerning the 'right' to welfare but within the quasi-judicial tribunal 
system and concern questions of maladministration. 
Dicey claims that the encouragement given to collective bargaining reduces the 
contractual capacity of both workmen and masters, and that 'the rights of workmen 
in regard to compensation for accidents have become a matter not of contract but 
of status'. 147 Likewise MacDonagh suggests that from the 1870s 
'freedom of contract' would no longer stand where it conflicted with 
collective bargaining or mass power; and the trade union now rested safely 
upon the peculiarity - in fact, uniqueness - of its status in law. 148 
One feature that lends weight to the claim that there has been a shift away from 
contract is that collective bargaining agreements do not take the form of a contract 
and are generally not legally enforceable as contracts - as illustrated by Ford Motor 
Co. v A. E. U (1969) 149 where law shows its power to regulate and yet show 
deference to administration. Kay and Mott, amongst others, suggest that collective 
bargaining agreements are de Jacto contracts, stating that there were no judgements 
on the issue until 1971. 150 The 1969 decision shows this is not the case. Like\yise 
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the Donovan Commission (1968) argued that collective agreements are not legally 
binding contracts since 'the parties do not intend to make a legally binding contract 
and without both parties intending to be legally bound there can be no contract in 
the legal sense'. 151 Whether they are de facto contracts or not contracts at all Kay 
and Mott are correct to argue that the issue is not their juridical status but the fact 
that they can exist at all, and this they can do only because of the constitutive 
power of the state to define trade unions as juridical subjects. This gives the 
appearance that the agreements they enter are contracts, but in fact the outcome of 
collective bargaining is administrative agreements. As such 'by participating III 
continual collective bargaining the trades unions are simply engaging III 
administration'. 152 In this sense whilst contract may have declined the shift has 
been not so much from contract to status, but 'from contract to administration, 
from private to public law'. 153 
Yet this in turn is also problematic. It is too formulaic, and opens up the very 
difficulties found in Foucault's account of the demise of law and rise of 
administration. Working with simple conceptual dichotomies contract vs. status, 
contract vs. administration, private vs. public law, courts vs. tribunals,154 and so 
on, encourages one to think of them as historical 'stages' (which then invites us to 
regard one as more 'modern' than the other). This oversimplifies both the 
complexity of the historical developments and the theoretical tools necessary to 
conceptualise them. Instead of a simple oppositional dichotomy we should explore 
the law and administration continuum, an exploration resting not on a rejection of 
one in favour of the other, but on a recognition of their simultaneous integration 
and separation. 
The fact that many relations in modern society are governed by administration 
rather than contract does not mean that they exist in some kind of legal vacuum. 
Rather the development of administration has seen the necessity of the rise of 
administrative law through which disputes can be arbitrated. Bodies of law are 
developed within and applied by the administration. It is in this sense that the 
administration functions III a quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial manner. 
Quasi-legislation operates through delegated legislation or through government 
departmental pronouncements as to the official point of vie\v on ambiguous points 
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in statutes; quasi-judicial action can been seen in tribunals: some tribunals exercise 
judicial functions whereas others exercise administrative functions in a judicial 
form, and it is symptomatic of the ambiguous ('quasi') nature of these bodies that 
they are called 'administrative tribunals' rather than the more indicative 
'administrative court' .155 
The development of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial administration occurred 
from 1832 and was fully in place by 1918. It was integral to the development of 
the bourgeois state. As Roberts notes: 
the central departments sat as judicial boards, much as did regular courts of 
law. But the line between the judicial and administrative was never clear ... 
The central administration was asserting itself. Gradually ... they were gaining 
judicial powers as well as legislative powers, thus laying the basis of the 
modern administrative state. 156 
Moreover, any attempt to suggest that ultimately the courts have the power of 
judicial review over administration, can reassert the rule of law as a matter of 
course and that therefore the law has ultimate power over administration is severely 
curtailed by the courts own deference to the power of administration. Since the 
development of administration at the heart of the state a whole range of judicial 
decisions have been made to the effect that wide areas of the administration are 
simply out of the jurisdiction of the courts. The key decision for our purposes is 
the Court of Appeals ruling in 1914 that the Local Government Board was not 
bound to follow court procedures in exercising its quasi-judicial powers.157 In 
other words, even the law now accepts the centrality of administration and uses its 
power to confirm administration's domination. And yet administration needs law 
to perform this act of confirmation. Because law structures social reality its 
deference to administration is a necessary requirement for administrative power. 
To say that with the development of administration the importance of the 
contract declines should not be read as suggesting that the importance of the 
juridical subject declines too. Far from it. For the juridical subject is of course both 
a legal subject and an object of administration. Administration depends for its 
existence upon the legal subject and in the process of administering it reinforces 
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its significance. We therefore need to extend our earlier formulations concerning 
the constitution of the subject. For it should now be clear that the modern subject 
is constituted through both law and administration. The citizen is both a subject of 
rights and an object of administration and is constituted as such in one and the 
same historical moment. It is this historical moment which sees the barrier between 
state and civil society, always artificial and subject to the struggles of contesting 
forces, being closed off. 
Rather than there being a split or contradiction between law and administration , 
they are in fact entirely compatible. They are limited by and dependant upon each 
other, and as such are held together in a permanent tension. The point, of course, 
is that they are interdependent; they are 'mythically integrated', and to this extent 
they are different forms of the same activity: the preservation of the state. 158 That 
this must be so is due to the necessity for both to be used by the state in its 
ordering of civil society. Law and administration are the media through which the 
state constitutes, orders, structures and closes off the bodies, human and 
non-human, of civil society. Law and administration are thus important precisely 
because they are not merely 'superstructural'. 
This distinguishes the approach from perhaps the most sophisticated account of 
law given in the Marxist tradition, that of E.B. Pashukanis. 159 Pashukanis has 
been widely praised for breaking with the analysis of law at the level of content, 
and thereby breaking with a crude instrumentalist approach.160 Accounts of law 
on the basis of its content are easily criticised. First, it becomes difficult to show 
how the content pure and simple of law has a class basis to it. 161 Second, and 
more substantively, an analysis of law that remains at the level of content falls too 
easily into an instrumentalist account of law and therefore the state. The strength 
of Pashukanis' analysis is that it is centred on the legal form and rooted in the 
categories developed by Marx for the analysis of commodities. The following 
critique is intended only to draw out the limits of Pashukanis' account: its 
weakness in dealing with law and administration, the failure to recognise the 
constitutive power of the state and the absence of any concept civil society. 
Pashukanis recognises that every legal relationship is between subjects. The 
subject is the atom of legal theory. Commodities, argues Pashukanis, need owners. 
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The exchange of commodities requires subjects who are free to own and capable 
of owning. This exchange must be a relationship in which each subject of exchange 
recognises the other subject as possessing a will, legally constituted, which makes 
him free and equal to other owners of commodities. 
The legal subject is thus an abstract owner of commodities raised to the 
heavens. His will in the legal sense has its real basis in the desire to alienate 
through acquisition and to profit through alienating. For this desire to be 
fulfilled, it is absolutely essential that the wishes of commodity owners 
meet each other halfway. This relationship is expressed in legal t~rms as a 
contract. ... At the same time the legal form ... acquires a material basis in the 
act of exchange. 162 
Pashukanis notes that although the legal form of property qualifies all people as 
being equally eligible for property it in no way makes property owners of them. It 
is the potentiality of property ownership to the formation of juridical subjects rather 
than its actuality that is important, a point made above in reference to working 
class citizenship and the franchise. 
This conceptualisation of law has been widely drawn upon by Marxists. 163 
Indeed there is much to be said for Pashukanis' work. Just as products take the 
form of individual commodities (objects), so people take the form of individual 
citizens (subjects). In each case an exchange of things which are unequal becomes 
possible, revealing their twofold character and their inherent contradiction. 
Analogous to the process of commodity production, the form of the law constitutes 
human individuals as legal subjects, thereby formally obliterating their differences. 
The law functions as the universal equivalent, and in doing so human need is 
replaced by equal 'rights'. 164 But because Pashukanis' focus is on the contract his 
formulations are, strictly speaking, applicable only to private law. This means that 
both criminal law and public law are omitted from Pashukanis's account. By 
imposing an 'identity' between commodity form and the legal form it becomes 
extremely difficult to offer an account of the various forms of law. 165 Simply 
deriving the form of law from commodity relations subsumes all law into private 
contractual law. Pashukanis either ignores or denies the significance of public law. 
Because his concern is with the legal relationship between juridical subjects he 
perceives public law as merely a reflection of the private law form in the political 
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sphere. The problem here is both historical and theoretical. Whilst it is true to say 
that private law is and has been of primacy in the development of the state, public 
law became increasingly important towards the end of the nineteenth century, as 
we have seen, central to the development of the state and forms of political 
administration. 166 This is closely related to the fact that Pashukanis does not 
recognise the active constitutive power of the state; indeed, when dealing with the 
state Pashukanis, despite his major insights into law, does not move very far 
beyond the formulations found in Lenin and the Leninist tradition. 
Pashukanis conceives of law as having an origin independent of the state, which 
stands outside of the constitution of political order. 'The state authority introduces 
clarity and stability into the structures of law, but does not create the premises for 
it, which are rooted in the material relations of production'. 167 Forcing materialist 
analysis into an economistic straightjacket, Pashukanis conceives of juridical 
subjects as the product of economic relations pure and simple; the state merely 
stands above and ensures stability. Thus the law and the state passively recognise 
an economic reality that is already given, and regulate it accordingly. It is for this 
reason that he can only conceive of the state in terms derived from his analysis of 
private contractual law: the state is merely a 'collective will' or 'collective 
person' .168 Pashukanis' later self-criticism of 1930 goes little way to correcting 
these errors, for whilst he accepts that his earlier analysis had pushed the role of 
the state into the background with a 'narrow' approach to law, and he registers the 
more active role of the state, he still insists that juridic concepts arise out of the 
market economy. 169 Moreover, the extensive focus on juridic subjects means 
Pashukanis does not have a theoretical space for an analysis of administration as 
a major tool for the constitution of order. Here we can use Foucault against 
Pashukanis. Foucault, like Marx and Pashukanis, recognises the significance of 
juridic subjects in the emergence of a parliamentary regime protecting rights and 
formal freedoms, but that these formal freedoms and equalities mask other forms 
of domination and power. But he goes further and focuses on the 'other, dark side 
of these processes' namely disciplinary mechanisms. 
The general. juridical form that guaranteed a sys~em of rights that were 
egalitarian in principle was supported by [the] tmy. everyday. physical 
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mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are essentiall 
?on-egalitarian and asymmetrical. that w~ call the disciplines. And althoug~ 
III a formal way, the representatIve regIme makes it possible ... for the will 
of a~l to form the fundamental authority of sovereignty, the disciplines 
provIde, at the base, a guarantee of the submission of forces and bodies. 
The real, corporal disciplines constituted the foundation of the formal 
juridical liberties. !70 ' 
The formal freedoms enjoyed by legal subjects make certain power processes 
possible, but are dependant upon other mechanisms of power. For Foucault then, 
the formal freedoms possessed by juridical subjects do not contradict other forms 
of power relation but depend on them as their foundation. It is for this reason that 
Foucault seeks to move beyond the juridical model of power, to an analysis 
focusing on the continuum of apparatuses of discipline and regulation - medical, 
penal, administrative and so on. 
In this sense Pashukanis' focus on juridical subjects is too narrow, and a 
materialist analysis needs to recognise the strength of F oucaul t' s point here. For the 
human individual is made not just a legal subject, but also an object of 
administration. The constitution of political order requires that this be the case. 
Given this an analysis concerned solely with subjects of law will not be sufficient. 
Moreover, as Foucault also shows, one has to consider the productive aspects of 
power. The argument here is that the state's constitutive power over civil society 
is expressed through the development of law and administration. Pashukanis, in 
perceiving the state as a collective will that regulates the inequalities of the 
juridical subjects in the market, does not have the theoretical tools to deal with this. 
Consequently Pashukanis remains within a tradition that conceives the state 
merely as a tool of repression, simply a special force for oppressing the working 
class. The active constitutive role of the state is lost, and with it any attempt to 
develop a materialist account. It is undoubtedly the case, as Redhead suggests, that 
Pashukanis' work on law is flawed because it operates in isolation from a theory 
of the state.!7! The rooting of the analysis in Marx's categories developed for the 
critique of political economy, justified on the grounds that juridical subjects are the 
product of economic relations, is in effect a crude base-superstructure analysis. Yet 
even as a base-superstructure analysis it is weak, for, lacking any account of the 
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state beyond a crude economlsm Pashukanis also follows Lenin in lacking any 
concept of civil society. This has the effect of evacuating his account of any 
conception of struggle, which allows him to obscure the extent to which the law 
is a form of class struggle and a product of it, one consequence of which is 
administration. Rather than such a crude base-superstructure analysis, law, like the 
state, is best conceived as a dependent element within a totality but which 
constitutes the character of that totality, a totality subject to continual struggle. 
But if law is a dependent element within a totality which also constitutes the 
character of that totality, then the same must be said for administration. As a 
continuum, law-and-administration, the functions of both law and administration 
have become mythically integrated, to the extent that the citizen finds him or 
herself enveloped in the processes and procedures of law-and-administration. 
Linking law and administration in this way allows administration to be thought of 
as integral to the operation of state power. Just as law is imbricated throughout 
social relations, policing them accordingly, so administration has assumed the role 
of supporting and sustaining law in this task. It is not so much that there has been 
a shift from contract and law to status or to administration, or that law has been 
displaced by administration, but that there has been a shift in the nature of the 
functioning of state power such that law's role in the policing of civil society has 
been bolstered through the development of administrative mechanisms. 
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Conclusion 
One outcome of the increasing centrality of administration to the development of 
state power in Britain after 1832 is that a rethinking of the state-civil society 
distinction becomes necessary, a requirement that has been at the heart of political 
theory in general and Marxism in particular. We have argued that rather than 
rejecting the state-civil society distinction, it needs to be reworked. Whilst state and 
civil society must be conceptually held apart and yet simultaneously brought 
together, this must now be done through the category of political administration. 
One can only understand the development of state power in Britain after 1832 
through an understanding of the network of administrative apparatuses which serve 
to police civil society, subsuming class struggle and mediating contradiction. The 
constant threat that civil society will be torn apart by its internal antagonisms 
requires that the state administer these antagonisms, to the point of constituting the 
organisations and subjects of struggle as part of the very action of the state itself. 
Political administration thus illustrates the constitutive power of the state, and is 
simultaneously a major development of that power. It is administration because it 
deals with the fossilised remnants of the dead struggles of the working class and 
through them seeks to govern the affairs of civil society, carrying through the tasks 
of state power. It is political because it takes working class struggles and 
transforms them into bodies constituted by the state, abstracting them into a state 
form and nullifying their revolutionary potential. Political administration then 
becomes a key theoretical category through which historical materialism can 
conceptualise state power in Britain from 1832. One advantage of this is that it 
encourages the use of both state-civil society and base-superstructure models rather 
than a rejection of one in favour of the other. For the argument involves the 
retention of state and civil society as explicit historical categories. Far from 
implying the rejection of base and superstructure, the use of state and civil society 
involves its more sophisticated usage, in the process avoiding the problems of 
crude economic reductionism. For it at once asserts the primacy of class struggle 
within civil society as the motor force behind historical change - the state develops 
political administration as a mechanism for subsuming struggle and mediating 
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conflict - yet at the same time recognises and stresses the constitutive pO\\~er of the 
state. To advance the argument yet further, state and civil society can only be 
understood as materialist categories and historical materialism must necessarilv 
utilise the state-civil society distinction. It is only by using the two models in 
conjunction that either of them work and, given state development in Britain form 
1832, it is only by rethinking them through the category of political administration 
that they make sense. 
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